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In September, 1982 newspapers in St. John's reported that 
the provincial governnent had declared a "war" an big 
game poaching. Perhaps the most significant of the 
initiatives announced by the provincial Minister of wild- 
life were amendments to the provincial Wildlife Act. 
These legislative changes increased fines and jail terms 
for convioted poaohers and also made the confiscation of 
any vehicle or equipment used in a big game poaching 
incident mandatory. 
This thesis examines how and why poaching became an 
issue for the government of Newfoundland and Labrador in 
1982. Legislation governing poaching had first been 
enacted in Newfoundland in 1845. Why did poaching, a 
orima for 150 years, emerge as an issue in 19821 The 
analysis draws on the body of sociological research 
dealing with the ndiscoveryN or "creationot of social 
problems. This literature suggests that a social problem 
is a social construct. It results from e process of 
definition in which e given condition is recognized as a 
~ocial problem. 
1n this thesis, spector and Kitsuse's (1977) four 
stage framework for investigating the emergence and 
maintenance of an issue is utilized, in conjunction with 
Beatf= (1987) analysis of rhetoric, to argue that the 
emergence of the poaching issue was inextricably linked 
to the provincial governmantrs desire to expand the 
outdoor tourist industry. Poaching did not emerge as an 
issue in 1982 because of an escalation in poaching 
incidents. The key faotoe was the provincial gavernment*a 
renewed interest in outdoor tourism, a specific part of 
which was "on-resident big game hunting. 
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The War on Poachinq 
In September, 1982 newspapers in St. John's reported that 
the provincial government had declared a "war" on big 
game poaching, or illegal hunting. For example, one news 
iten reported that *The provincial government has 
declared 'war' on big game poachers" (me E v e n b  
September 17, 1982). Another newspaper ran the 
headline "Yimms reveals ell out efiort: New 'war' on 
poachersll" [The, September 18, 1982). sinups, 
the provincial Minister of wildlife, announced measures 
the government would be taking to reduce poaching. The 
most significant was the strengthening of penalties under 
the provincial Wildlife Act. 
These legislative changes increased fines and jail 
t B m 6  for oonvicted poachers and also made the 
confiscation of any vehicle or equipment used in a big 
game poaching incident mandatory. Thebe harsh new 
penalties had very real effects on a variety of people. 
People convicted of poaching lost vehicles, had to pay 
large fines and were often imprisoned. At the same time, 
the amendments to the Wildlife Act made Wildlife 
and thus may have gone to extremes to avoid capture. me 
new legislation war given approval in principle on 
November 23, 1982 (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1982b:5489). Simms and officials with the wildlife 
division claimed that poachinq was Shs factor prohibiting 
the growth of the province's big game herds. Other 
p086ible factors for lack of herd expansion such as 
habitat destruction, tho imprecise nature of big game 
science, or poor management were raised. Due to a variety 
of reasons these alternatives were unable to compete 
against the argument concerning poaching. 
Statement of Problem 
This thesis investigates this "war" on poaching. 
Specifically, it examines how and why poaching became an 
issue for the government of Newfoundland and Labrador in 
1982. Legislation governing poaching had first been 
enacted in Newfoundland in 1845 (Peters end Burleigh, 
1951:31) .' Why did poaching, which had been s crime for 
' It is important to note that legal definitions of 
what ~0nstitttte~ poaching have changed considerably over 
this one-hundred and fifty year span. There has also been 
considerable variation in the extent to which, and the 
enthusiasm with which the game laws have been enforced. 
Laws may exist on the statute books but unless people are 
aware of them and ths lawn are enforced effectively they 
might as well not exist. Evidence suggests that for much 
of Newfoundland's history game laws have been enforced 
only minimally. There have, however, been exceptions to 
this; periods in which considerable effort has been made 
to enforce existing laws and re-work and extend 
legislation. Usually these efforts have been accompanied 
one-hundred and fifty years, emerge as an isrue in l982? 
That is, why did the provincial government declare "war" 
on poachers in the early 1980ts? On the surface the "war" 
was fought to deal with what was claimed to be a serious 
and escalating problem of poaching. However, I believe 
more than just governnental concsrn over wildlife 
conservation was behind this "war." I argue that the 
eloargence of poaching as an iasue in Newfoundland in the 
early 1980's was inextricably linked to government's 
desire to expend the outdoor tourist industry. That is, 
"war" was declarad on poaching largely due to the fact 
that the provinoi.al government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador had taken a renewed interest in promoting the 
 province,^ outdoors as a tourist ~ommodity.~ An integral 
part of this revived interest in promoting the 
"sportsman's paradise" war, of course, the province's 
wildlife. These resources, coupled with the  province,^ 
to enforce existing laws and re-work and extend 
legislation. Usually these efforts have been accompanied 
by attempts to create public awarensss of the importance 
of game and thus support for more effective policing. 
Historically, the "great Newfoundland outdoors" 
had been an important part of the tourist industry. lor 
example, at the turn of the century caribou hunting and 
salmon angling were both actively p:omoted. Wealthy 
sportsmen who vent afield at that time left accounts of 
their exploits (Davis [1895]; Millais (19071; and Rogers 
119121). In the late 1930's, the tourism department of 
Newfoundland hired a professional sportsman to promote 
the country's wildlife and natural setting abroad (Wulff, 
1967). 
ex tens ive  countryside.  were regarded by government as a 
source of p o t e n t i a l l y  g r e a t  revenue i n  t h e  l a t e  1970's. I 
maintain t h a t  poaching emerged as an i s s u e  i n  1982 
because of t h e  p rov inc ia l  government's renewed i n t e r e s t  
i n  outdoor tourism, no t  because of an e s c a l a t i o n  i n  
poaching inc iden t s .  
There are no ind ica t ions  t h a t  poaching a c t u a l l y  
worsened i n  t h e  l a t e  1970's and e a r l y  1980's. I n  f ac t .  
r e sea rch  revea led  t h a t  t h e  government agency rresponsible 
for  managing and p r o t e c t i n g  big game popu la t ions  was 
unsure of both how much poaching was a c t u a l l y  occurring 
and its e f f e c t s  an animal populstions.'  or example, one 
Newfoundland and Labrador w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  document 
s t a t e d  t h a t  "information required t o  ... understand 
n a t u r a l  l o s s e s  and poaching i s  Ear from adequatew 
(Newfoundland and l ab rador ,  1985s:3). One b i g  game 
b i o l o g i s t  s t a t e d  i n  an in te rv iew (August 9, 1990) t n s t  i n  
the formula used by t h e  w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  to s e t  l i cence  
quotes,  t h e  amount o f  animals poached represen t  a "fudge 
fac to r"  or "guesstimate." Another b i o l o g i s t  wrote i n  an 
i n t e r n a l  r e p x t  t h a t  t h e  d iv i s ion  had "no apparen t  means 
t o  gauge how many animals were t aken  i l l e g a l l y "  
As Freeman (1989) h a s  shown, b i g  game sc ience  is 
very  imprecise.  Th i s  uncer ta in ty  is heightened when 
cons ida r ina  moachino. one reason is t h e  so-called "dark 
f igure"  whie i  surro;nds a l l  crimes. 
(oosenbrug, 1985:l). suoh evidence makes clear that a 
critioal viewpoint is warranted when investigating claims 
that "poaching is out of control" and a "war" is needed. 
This evidence also suggests that it is reasonable to 
question the motives behind the declaration of a "war" on 
poaching. 
nore evidence which lends support to my assertion 
that it is sensible to critioally analyze the poaching 
offensive war the vary nature of the "war." The 1980's 
was a period of fiscal restraint. The state in 
Newfoundland did not have the resources necessary to 
fight or win a "war." In Pact, while certain measures 
were implemented (such as the wildlife act amendments) 
government did not really try to win the "war." It did 
not provide adequate resources to the wildlife division 
for either counting the roaming, scattered big game 
animals, or for the protection and eneorcement of the 
wildlife regulations. The declaration of "war" raised 
expectations of both wildlife agents and hunters that 
increased protection efforts would be implemented. 
However, by tho late 1980's. both resident sport~nen and 
wildlife officers publicly expressed their 
dissatisfaction with government's steadily diminishing 
efforts to combat poaching. Therefore, the "war" might be 
described as a phantom "war;" while its consequences were 
real, government did not really try to win it. 
Another reason to question the initiation of a "war" 
on poaching is historioal evidence (presented in chapter 
three) which demonstrates that poaching has been 
occurring in ~ewfoundland since the game laws were first 
enacted in 1845. That is, poaching war not a newly 
discovered phenomena in 1982; it had existed and bean 
identified for about one-hundred and fifty years. This is 
more reason to be critical of the "war" on poaching. Why 
would a ons-hundred and fifty year old crime emerge as a 
problem in 1982? Other studies of game laws such as the 
work of Thompson (1975). Hay (1975). Overton (1980) and 
Ives (1988) show that game laws are class laws which 
serve vested interests and that revisions to game laws 
are often made to serve wealthy, powerful segments 9f 
society. For example, Overton (1980) argues that by the 
twentieth Century in Newfoundland, game laws had 
transformed wildlife resources into sporting resources. 
some of the primary beneficiaries of this change were 
those involved in the tourist industry. Xvar (1988) makes 
a similar arqument in his analysis of amendnontc, to game 
laws in the late 1800's in Maine. Such studies show that 
game laws do more than just regulate the taking of 
wildlife. They also define wildlife resources as valuable 
commcdities to both individuals involved in the outdoor 
tourist indubtry and governments seeking potentially 
lucrative development sectors. 
 he activities of scme of the key actors involved in 
the "war" also suggest that mote than just concern over 
illegal hunting was behind the poaching offensive. It in 
significant to note that the Minister of wildlife who 
declared "war" on poaching had a brother heavily involved 
in the tourist industry. In 1987 this Minister tabled a 
very controversial government policy paper on the outfit- 
ting industry.' The late 1970's - early 1980'6 witnessed 
a growing body of private groups which had vested 
interests in wildlife resources. Typically, these groups 
described themselves as "conservation groups." However, I 
suggest that they are better seen as interest grOUP3, 
primarily concerned with the potential economic returns 
wildlife resources could generate. These groups lobbied 
government to ameliorate poaching d expand outdoor 
touri~m. I also discovered that key aotors were often 
members of more than one group, creating an informal 
network betwean groups. There was a consistent link 
%he outfitting industry is essentially the hunting 
and fishing camp business. However, outfitting operations 
can also include related recreational activities such as 
wilderness canoeing. An outfitter is the ownerloperator 
of a camp site, lodge, cabins and related facilities used 
as a bare for outfitting operations for sports fishing 
andfor hunting and related commercial activities 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1990:280-281). 
between claims concerning the resourcab lost to poachers 
and the potential benefits of outdoor tourism. 
Significantly, I also found there were links between 
these wildlife interest groups and key individuals within 
the state and the outdoor tourist industry. Por example, 
I focus on one partioular interest group, the salmon 
Preservation Association for the Waters of Newfoundland 
(SPAWN), whioh was very outspoken on both tha poaching 
issue and the potential benefits of outdooe tourism. Some 
of the executive mernbers of this group were 
ownersloperators of hunting and fishing camps. I argue 
that these tourist entrepreneurs wanted more wildlife 
resources for use in the tourist industry; specifically 
to sell to non-resident hunters. Signifioantly, the 
founding president of this group became the civil servant 
responsible far the province's outfitting industry in 
1984. Thio same man also writes a weekly column for e 
province-wide publication, The Newfoundland Herald, in 
which he continues to make claims about poaching and 
outdoor tourisn?. Another member of SPAWN was the 
brother of the man who would become Premier of the 
province in 1989. 
It is important to note he became ownerloperator 
of a fishing camp in 1991. This writer had (has) the 
potential to reach and influence many poople. Due to his 
occupation and background, it seems reasonable to infer 
he has economic interests in wildlife resources. This 
undoubtedly influenced the content of his columns. 
Another group I focus on is the Wilderness Society. 
~t least two key wildlife division employees (the Chief 
Biologist and the Chief of Information and Education) 
were members of this group, which typically called for 
increased wildlife and wildland protection an 
expansion of the outdoor tourist industry. This group's 
membership also included tourist entrepreneurs & media 
colunniats. Thus, there were links between lobby groups, 
the tourist industry, the state & the media. The bridge 
between interest groups and the media meant that groups 
could reach a broad audience with claims concerning 
poaching and wildlife tourism, contributing to the 
atmosphere of endangerad wildlife stocks and supporting 
culls to expand outdoor-based tourinn. Significantly, 
both of tha groups discussed above, also had their own 
means of spreading infomation; SPAWN published an annual 
magazine, while the 'wilderness Sooiety had a bi-weekly 
newspaper colum. Clearly, these groups had the potential 
ability to reach and influence many people. 
I argue that news media played a crucial role in the 
"war" on poaohing. I contend that news reports on 
poaching were not unbiased, "fact" based accountm 
reflecting the reality of poaching. Newspapers acted as 
both a form for ~laimslnakers and as a source of claims. 
For example, featured articles reported arguments 
~oncarning poaching and outdoor tourism, while editorials 
and columniste pressed claims of their own. This 
aontributed to the atmosphere of conoern about 
diminishing wildlife stocks and the potential of outdoor 
tourism. I examine the relationship between "official 
sources" and the media and discuss the media's at times 
unquestioning acceptance of government statements as 
"fact." I pay particular attention to the role wildlife 
columnists played in the "war" and to the messages they 
presented about poaching and wildlife tourism. I 
demonstrate that specific columniets were connected to 
the outdoor tourist industry, interest groups and the 
state. These links suggest the content of such calamns 
has to be viewed critically. 
Individuals and groups did not have equal access to 
newspapers. For example, some interest groups 
vrote/publirhed their own newspaper columns and 
magazines. At the same time writers of wildlife columns 
in the local print media were not unbiased, objective 
ObaerVers OF the poaching "war." I focus on several 
~olumnists and their claims about poaching and outdoor 
tourism, arguing these columns helped expand the poaching 
issue through their inflammatory, rhetorical use of 
language and their often unquestioning reliance on 
wildlife division sources. It is also important to make 
clear that several newspaper columnists exmined had 
links to interest groups and the state, for example, the 
above mentioned outdoor tourist agent who writes f o r m  
pewfoundland Herald. ~hus, certain groups and individuals 
involved in the "war" on poaching had better chances to 
"get heard" and thus influence publis opinion. 
w 
My analysis of how poaching became an issue in the early 
1980,s drawe on the body of sociological research dealing 
with the "discovery" or "creation" of social problems. 
This work Suggests that a social peoblam is a social 
c~nstruot. It results from a process of definition in 
which a given condition is picked out and identified as a 
social problem. A social problem does not exist for a 
society unless it is recognized (Blumer, 1971:301). 
This sooisl problems literature covere such diverse 
problem= as the "discovery" of child abuse, fear of 
violence in Newfoundland, the emergence of satanism as a 
problem in Canada, the spread of mugging in England, and 
the "war" against social security abusers in Canada. This 
body of work raises important questions for the student 
of any social problem. Which individuals and what 
institutions gain from an issue being discovered? Who 
becomes responsible for attending to the problem 
(Gusfield, 1981:5)? What is the role of the state with 
regard to the iesue? How has the state changed its stance 
toward the issue? What problems, fears and anxieties are 
refleoted in the issue? What is the role of the media in 
the creation of the issue (Hall et al.. 1978:viii)? I 
argue that the natural history model provides a suitable 
way to address these questions with raspest to the 
poashing problem. The natural history model is a 
framework for analyzing the eneegence and maintenance of 
an issue or problem. I utilize Spector and Kiteuse's 
(1977) four stage variant, in conjunction with Best's 
(1987) analysis of rhetoric to examine the poaching 
"war." The theoretical framework is di~cussed in detail 
in the following chapter. 
Slanificance of Work 
The invartigation of a "waras on poaching may, at first 
glance, seem to be a research topic of little interest to 
tha sociologist. However, there are several reasons why 
poaching is a worthwhile researoh topic. First, Nevfound- 
land has a long histor, of exploiting wildlife resources 
and hunting is still a part of the male sooialiration 
process in lnuch of the province. Second, residents of 
Newfoundland spend more days hunting than residents of 
any other Canadian provinse, only New Brunswiok has a 
higher percentage of hunters (Filion et al., 1987:20-23). 
A s~oiologic~l analysis of the "war" on poaching is 
warranted then, because it was pert of a government 
policy which effected the lives of many people, such as 
hunters, poachers and wildlife agents. 
Another reason why this study of a 'warM on poaching 
is important is because it saya something about how and 
why government policy is established. This analysis of 
the "warw on poashing provides insight into the political 
process and agenda setting. That is, it contributes to 
our understanding of the political process, the state, 
and the relationship between policy and interests. In 
this particular case, the state war interested in 
developing the wildlife based tourism sector. At the same 
time, there were links and channels of colnnunioation 
between the state and tourist entrepreneurs (such as 
outfitters), who were lobbying for certain concessions. 
In such a case, one might expect the state to have first 
provided a climate suitable for outdoor tourismrs growth, 
and Second, to have responded favourably to the lobbying 
of tourist entrepreneurs. This is what I found. That is, 
vhat issuer got on the political agenda, what groups got 
asked for input, vhat groups or individuals "got heard" 
and what policies were enacted regarding poaching and 
outdoor tourism was not an open process, in whioh all 
participants had equal chanses for success. Certain 
groups oocupied better positions than others. In this 
case, policy on poaching and outdoor tourism was 
influenced by actors who had links to interest groups, 
suoh as outfitters associations end organizatione of 
*sportsmen," which had speoific interests in game stocks. 
This implies that opposition groups and individuals would 
lose out in the struggle to get action on their claims. 
This is what I found in my research. 
Two significant examples of "losers" in the poaching 
"war" were the Wildlife Protection Officers' Assmiation 
and the Hunters Rights Association. The former was a 
lobby group made up of the province's wildlife protection 
agents (i.e. the men responsible for enforcing the 
wildlife act and apprehending poachers), the latter was 
an organization of working class hunters who lobbied for 
the right to hunt on ~undays.~ Both groups were largely 
unsuccessful in their attempts to get actions on their 
respeotive olaims ~onserning poaching. Wm's claims 
received little action for two reasons. Pirst, because 
6 Hunting on Sundays is illegal in the province of 
Newfoundland. Thus, if one gets caught hunting on Sunday 
one is breaking the wildlife aot and is poaohing. The 
Hunters Rights Association was formed in 1989 and wee led 
by a man convicted of hunting on a Sunday. This group was 
a grass-roots movement to change hunting laws. The 
Wildlife Protection Officers Association was formed in 
1988 to colle~tively represent WPO's. TWO of its main 
arguments were for an increase in protection staff and 
for WPO's to be issued side-arms. Both groups are 
discussed in detail in chapter seven. 
the 1980's was a decade of fisoal restraint for the 
~evfoundlsnd government. That is, the state could not 
afford to expand the protection staff and replace old 
equipment. That is, the economic conditions that the 
#war" was fought in played a major part in defining what 
groups "got heard" end what policies were enacted. 
 elated to the economic conditions perhaps was the 
state's expansion of wildlife education programs. In 1980 
an Information and Education sestion was added to the 
wildlife division. one of its primary goals was training 
hunters to behave like "sportsmen" and obey tha game 
l a w s .  This initiative was important because if hunters 
oould be successfully taught to follow the game laws. 
then fewer WP08a would be needed. Also it is significant 
to note that near the end of the 1980es, private groups 
demanded they be involved in wildlife protection. 
Typically, such arguments claimed civilianlvolunteer 
wildlife agents be used to help enforce game laws. 
Related to such claims vaa the notion that lands be 
privatized, thus controlling access to resources and 
supposedly better protecting then. It is significant to 
note that outdoor tourist entrepreneurs would benefit 
most from privatized lends. By 1990, interest groups were 
being given en active hand in protection efiorts and 
government unsuccessfully attempted to enact legislation 
which would allow private ownership of land around inland 
waterways. However, this legislation vas not enacted due 
to widespread resident opposition. 
significantly, government's "war" on poaching and 
its expansion of outdoor tourism faced apposition from 
residents. I also document how opposition cane from both 
inside and outside the official boundaries of the state. 
For example, some wildlife officials resisted increasing 
non-reaidant licence quotas. In fact, research found that 
the non-resident hunt war last on the wildlife division's 
big game user priority list. At the same time, 
individuals and some groups opposed the growth of the 
outdoor tourism sector because they feared they would 
lose "traditional" use and access rights. This was 
particularly true in the late 1980,s. when opposition vna 
DO strow that government was forced to withdraw proposed 
outdoor tourist legislation. 
similarly, government's fighting of the "war" also 
same under attack from various groups and individuals. 
The 1980'1 was a period of fiscal restraint and the 
wildlife division experienced prolonged budget cuts. This 
resulted in manpower reductions and a lack of new 
equipment. Thus, fewer and fewer wildlife agents, with 
aging trucks, outdated radios and decreasing helicopter 
time were asked to do more work (1.e. fight a "war"). At 
the same time, higher fines made their work more 
dangerous, as poashers had nore to lose and may have 
become more prone to violently resist arrest. This 
resulted in wildlife agents becoming inareasingly angry 
with their employer (i.e. the gcvernment) and their 
militancy steadily increased into the 1990's. At th- same 
time, some influential groups and individuals (including 
80m of those linked to the tourist industry discussed 
above) began to complain about governnent's handling of 
the "war." For example, some outfitters called for 
increased spending on wildlife protection, perhaps to 
help guard their investments. 
As mentioned above, both government end vested 
interest groups wanted to expand the non-resident hunt. 
That is, they needed more big game li~ences for tourist 
entrepreneurs to sell to non-resident hunters. The 
problem facing government was that only a fixed amount of 
animals could be allooated for culling without 
jeopardizing the future viability of the herds. I argue 
that budget reductions and the character ai wildlife 
science combined to make the precise size of big game 
heeds very uncertain. That is, big game managers were 
unsure as to exactly how many animals there were, or now 
many were being lost to poachers. Thus, government faced 
a dilemma: how could non-resident licence allocations bs 
inoreased without jeopardizing stooks? Where were t h e  
animals needed t o  immediately expand t h e  non-resident 
hunt t o  be found? one way was t o  implement programs t o  
inc rease  herds. However, t h i s  would have been a long t e r n  
so lu t ion  and would no t  have produced t h e  necessary 
animals quiokly enough. I argue t h a t  i n  o r d e r  t o  promptly 
inc rease  non-resident l i cence  a l l o c a t i o n s ,  go.mmment 
reduced r e s i d e n t  a l loca t ions  and s h i f t e d  t h e s t  l i cencee  
t o  "on-resident hunters. '  Taking these an imals  from 
r e s i d e n t s  was p o l i t i c a l l y  dangerous and t h e  reduc t ions  i n  
r e s i d e n t  quo tas  produced complaints, as seen i n  l e t t e r s  
t o  t h e  e d i t o r  and t h e  fo rna t ion  of h . n t e r r s  groups. 
However, government d i d  not pub l i c ly  s t a t e  it was 
reducing r e s i d e n t  quotas and increasing non-resident 
quotas;  it blamed t h e  reduction i n  r e s i d e n t  a l l o c a t i o n s  
on i l l e g a l  hun t ing  and declared "war" on poachers. 
The "war* on poaching then  had two main e f f e c t s .  
F i r s t ,  it may have reduced t h e  number of animals " l o s t "  
t o  poachers. While government and w i l d l i f e  managers ware 
unsure exac t ly  how many animals were t aken  by poachers, 
every  e x t r a  animal meant another p o t e n t i a l  non-resident 
l i c e n c e  s a l e .  A seoond e f f e c t  of t h e  "war" was t h a t  it 
provided government with a scapegoat for its raduc t ion  of 
This r e a l l o c a t i o n  process is examined i n  d e t a i l  i n  
chap te r  f i v e .  
res iden t  quotae.%~overnment decreased t h e  num5ar of 
r e s iden t  b i g  game l i cences ,  pub l i c ly  s t a t i n g  t h i s  was 
done t o  h e l p  s tocks  recover from rampant poaching by 
res iden t s .  There was no mention of t h e  Subsequent 
r e d i r e c t i o n  of those  l i c e n s e s  t o  non-residents (or of 
poaching by non-residents) .  That is, t h e  "warn might be 
seen as an at tempt t o  q u i e t  unhappy r e s i d e n t  hunters.  It 
is important  t o  no te  t h a t  t h e  number of r e s i d e n t  hun te r s  
was s t e a d i l y  inc reas ing .  That is, there war an inc reas ing  
r e s i d e n t  demand f o r  big gane l i cences ,  a t  t h e  same t ime  
t h a t  t h e  non-resident hunt was growing. A "war" on 
poaching helped d i s t r a c t  a t t e n t i o n  away from t h e  s l e i g h t  
of hand t h a t  accompanied t h e  expansion of t h e  non- 
r e s i d e n t  b ig  gane hunt. 
This is y e t  another reason why a soc io log ica l  s tudy  
of how poaching became an i s s u e  i n  1982 is a s o c i a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  undertaking.  Th i s  s tudy  s t a n d s  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  
our understanding of how s o s i a l  problems emerge; it 
con t r ibu tes  t o  our understanding of the p o l i t i c s  of 
s o c i a l  problems. How and why d o  ~ o c i a l  i s sues ,  such as 
In  my t h e s i s  I d e t a i l  t h e  way i n  which poachers 
and poaching were t y p i f i e d  by t h e  primary d e f i n e r s  o f  t h e  
i s sue .  I examine how t h e  manner i n  which poachers were 
t v ~ i f i e d  chanaed over t h e  course of t h e  1980's. Genarallv 
if was ola inez  t h a t  poachers ware becoming nore vio len t . -  
cunninq and r u t h l e s s .  T ~ ~ i c a l l ~ .  t h e  coacher was l inked  
t o  r8as ioc ia ted  e v i l s ~ ~  sGh as brinkin;, unemployment end 
a lack of morals. 
poaching, become "problems?" My research suggests that 
poaching was put on the political agenda (i.e. became a 
problem) not because it was suddenly discovered. or not 
because it was actually escalating, but primarily because 
the state in Newfoundland had taken a renewad interest in 
wildlife and wildlands as economic commodities. That is, 
the "poaching war* was not fought to combat an escalating 
poaching problam, but because it fit in with government's 
desire to expand tourism based on wildlife and wildlands. 
That is, poaching emerged as a problem for vary different 
reasons than the motives stated by the key actors 
involved. Spector and Kitsuse (1977:155) support this 
line of reasoning when they writs that governments may 
attempt to create one problem in order to divert 
attention away from another. 
It is important to critically investigate the social 
process by which poaching emerged as an issue, because it 
can help us understand the mechanics of how other social 
problem emerge, are created or get discovered. In large. 
heterogeneous complex modern societies, a vast array of 
potential social problems exist. However, only a 
relatively small amount develop as fully as the poaching 
issue did in Newfoundland in the 1980'8. It is important 
to examine how problems emerge and get slated for action 
because the government policies enactad have very real 
effectti on large numbers of people. It is also 
significant when one considers all the issues in our 
society that receive government attention and 
intense media coverage. Also this research argues that 
poaching was put on the political agenda in order to be a 
"smoke-screen" and draw attention away from other 
politically more problematic policies, such as expansion 
of outdoor tourism. This may be important in helping us 
understand how and why government acts, and can help 
direct future research into other social problems. Thus, 
my study of the "war" on poaching initiated by the 
government of Newfoundland in 1982 suggests that work of 
spector and Kitsuse (1977). Gusfield (1981; 1989), Becker 
(1967), Blumer (1971) and Best (1987; 1989) end other ao- 
callad "sooial constructionist writers" is the most 
appropriate viewpoint from which to analyze the emergence 
of social problems. That is, my thesis suggeata we follow 
the trail blazed by the above mentioned authors when 
investigating the discovery or emergence of social prob- 
lems. Thus my thesis also suggests the appearance of 
social problems deserves fooused, critical analysis 
because of the underhanded, devious manner in which the 
government of Newfoundland used the "war" on poaching to 
draw attention away from its expansion of the outdoor 
tourist industry. That is, critically analyzing the 
emergence of social problems Fan help us understand the 
mechanics of the stat-, how it works and who it best 
SBrVBS. 
Researoh Methods 
The researsh was baaed on a combination of interviews of 
key personnel and examination of seoondsry sources, 
espeoially newspaper reports. Work began in september, 
1989 with two preliminary interviews.   he subjects were s 
wildlife protection officer and the assistant Deputy 
Minister responsible for wildlife. The purpose of these 
interview war to make contact with personnel inside the 
wildlife division and gather basic facts about the 
running of the division, the poaching issue and identify 
key personnel. 
Further preliminary work involved investigation of 
media clippings on poaching and other related wildlife 
issues dating from the late 1970's. additionally, newspa- 
pers on microfilm were searched for items concerning 
poaching. Newspaper offices were visited and any 
available files searched.' News reports told of 
government "crackdowns" on poaching, and spoke of the 
increasing violence and cunning of the poacher. From this 
- 
It is risnificant to note that The K v e b a  
Tele.rsn, a long-running daily St. John's newspaper whish 
has an extensive library of clippings, did not begin a 
file on poaching until 1982, the year "war" was declared 
on it. 
media search it was apparent a "war" had been declared on 
poaching in the early 1980's by the Newfoundland 
government. This media coverage was used to Irame the 
study and pinpoint the most visible actors and agencies 
involved in the "war." In this way, a preliminary 
interview program was assembled. rt 00nsisted mainly of 
former provinsial government cabinet Ministers, other 
government membera, wildlife division officials, interest 
group representatives and msdia personnel. since relying 
on media repoets to gather preliminary data may have been 
somewhat problematic, steps were taken to offset possible 
methdological problems. 
In order to better understand how poaching emerged 
as an issue in 1982, it was decided to visit five main 
research sites. 'O The primary sites were selected 
be~ause they housed Wildlife offices: St. John's, where 
the wildlife division's provincial headquarters are 
located; Clarenvilla which is home to the eastern region 
wildlife office; the central region office at Gander; the 
western region office in Pasadena; and Goose Bay, which 
lo The costs associated with this field research 
were paid for with money peovided through a research 
grant provided by the Institute of Social and Economic 
Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland. 
houses the Labrador regional office." I also hoped to 
investigate whether there was any variation in the 
poaching "waro' from region to region. I travelled Crom 
St. John's to a site, stayed there iron three to seven 
days and then returned to st. John's to transcribe tapes, 
rewrite field notes and contact subjects at the next 
research site. The main research period was from May to 
August 1990, and during those months the primary sites 
were visited and 43 unstructured interviews ~onducted.'~ 
Babbie (1986:247) defines unstructured interviews a8 
essentially a conversation in which the interviewer 
establishes a general line of questioning and pursues 
specific topics raised by the subject. The interviewer 
typically has a general plan OF enquiry, but no specific 
set of questions that must be asked in a certain order. 
Ideally, the subject does most of the talking and the 
researcher probes into what was said. some of the intar- 
views were highly formal, involving high ranking civil 
I' Additionally, other communities such as Deer 
Lake, Rocky Harbour, Grand Palls end lavisporte were 
visited. 
l2 n o  important interviews were conducted in early 
1991. The recently retired, long time director aP the 
wildlife division was interviewed on May 8. 1991. The 
leader of the opposition party, who had been Minister 
responsible for wildlife in the early 1980's was intar- 
viewed on April 2 4 ,  1991. I had been unable to reach 
either man prior to this. 
servants, and were often conducted in Confederation 
Building in st. John's. Others were more informal, such 
as an interview with an interest group representative 
conducted on his patio, or  a conversation with a wildlife 
officer in hie pick-up truck. 
SkCWBZe of the The& 
The thesis is divided into eight (8) chapters. Following 
the introduction, chapter two reviews the literature on 
the natural history model and outlines the theoretical 
framework utilized in the thesis. It traces the natural 
history model from its sippearanoe in 1941 up to more 
recent adaptations of the modal, paying particular 
attention to the variant put forth by spador and Kitrure 
(1977). The sodel is critiqued and Best's (1987) attempt 
to move beyond its limitations is also detailed. Best's 
work is used alongside Kitsuse and Spector's to analyze 
the data. 
The third chapter provides a general background on 
NswEoundland and Labrador necessary for an appreciation 
of the use of wildlife as e resource. It briefly outlines 
the geography and history of the province, plaaing 
particular emphasis on people's traditional use of 
wildlife resources and state efforts to manage them. This 
ohapt-r demonstrates that, historically, residents of 
Newfoundland relied heavily on wildlife resources to 
supplemant their diets and incomes. It argues that, by 
the late 1800's. wildlife had begun to be used for 
tourialn and that game lawn enacted at that time 
increasingly defined game as sportingltourist reeources. 
Chapters Pour through seven outline the natural 
history of poaching in Newfoundland. The fourth chapter 
details stage one in the natural history of poaching, 
Which, I argue, lasted from early 1980 until September, 
1982 when the provincial government declared "waru on 
poachers. The chapter begins by focusing on the 
importance placed on tourism, the rediscovery of wildlife 
as a specific part of this emphasis and the period of 
fiscal restraint the provincial government was entering. 
The structure of the wildlife division end the importance 
of wildlife education are then discussed. The bulk of the 
chaptar investigates agitation around the poaching issue. 
Pour categoriee of claims-nakars are identified and 
particular attention is paid to the types of claims made. 
Agitators clailned that poaching was endemic and was seen 
by many residents as socially acceptable behaviour. stage 
one concluded with controversy and heightened awareness 
01 the issue. 
Chapter five examines stage two in poaching's 
natural history, which began in mid-September 1982 and 
lasted until December, 1984. The "war" on poaching is 
described and analyzed, as is the reported escalation of 
lawlessness in the province's countryside. It is argued 
that a "moral panic" in the countryaide provided the 
baokdrop for the "wars' on poaching. It was believed that 
law and order wan disintegrating in the woods and barrens 
of the province, that there was an increase in violent, 
lawless behaviour perpetrated by a new type of hunter who 
was willing to go to any lengths for a successful hunt. I 
argue this stage witnessed a redefinition of poaching, as 
olaims-makers alleged that poaching was now being carried 
out for black-market sale. The 1982 revisions to the 
Wildlife Act are also discussed and it is argued that 
these laws can be beat analyzed as social class laws. 
They were enacted by the state to improve control of 
hunters and benefit outdoor tourist entrepreneurs. Also 
discussed is the growing apposition government faced to 
its wildlife management programs and its expansion of the 
outdoor tourism industry. 
The sixth chapter examines the third stage in the 
natural history of poaohing. No new definition of 
poaching developed in this stage. There was s lull in 
]media coverage of the issue in 1985 and moat of 1986. 
Than in late 1986-early 1987 news coverage of poaching 
expanded substantially. Tha most important tlleme of this 
chapter is the complaints lodged against government €or 
its handling of the poaching problem and its management 
of the outdoor tourist industry. This chapter concludes 
with the province's wildlife protection officers (WPO'a) 
growing steadily dissatisfied with their work situations 
and besoming increasingly militant. This development 
continued into the fourth stage in which WPors f o m d  an 
Association to represent their concerns and voice their 
opinions. Two ether new interest groups were also formed 
in this final stage, and the chapter focuses on these 
three groups and their activities. Stage four saw another 
redefinition of poaching; it was claimed that poacher's 
reactions had changed, that poachers were more apt to 
react violently toward enforcement personnel. The final 
chspt;er summarizes the thesis, and makes suggestions for 
further researoh. I now turn to chapter two and detail 




This chapter reviews the literature on the natural history 
model. The work discussed ranges from some of the first 
pre88ntations of that model up to more recent critiques and 
attempts to go beyond it. The purpose of this discussion is 
to familiarize the reader with the theoretical framework 
used to analyze how poaching became a problem in 1982. 
THE NATURAL HISTORY MODEL 
The natural history model is a framework widely used to 
analyze social problems. The iramework was developed more 
than forty years ago by Puller and Myers (1941) in their 
study of how trailer camps had becme a problem in Detroit 
in Ule 1930's. Puller and Myers asserted that: 
social problems exhibit a temporal ooil:cse of 
development in which different phases or stages 
may be distinguished. Each stage anticipates 
its sufcessor in time and each ruc~seding stage 
contains new elements which mark it off from its 
predeceesor. A sooial problem thus conceived as 
always being in a dynamic stage of "becoming" 
Passes through the natural history stages of 
awareness, policy determination and reform... 
The "natural history" as we use the term is 
simply a conceptual tool for the examination of 
the data which sonstitute social problems 
(Fuller and Myers, 1941: 321). 
As this quote highlights, Puller and UYersl natural history 
model had three stagas (awareness, policy determination and 
refom) through which the authors asserted social problems 
progressed. A decade later Lemert (1951) failed in his 
attempted replication of Puller and Myers' study. Lemert 
attempted to apply the natural history model in his work on 
the appearance of, and raaction to, trailer camps in five 
California citias. At each stage Lemert found results 
unlike those of Fuller and Myers (lemert, 1951:117-221). 
lemert consluded: 
In conclusion we can nay with considarabls 
certainty that the Fuller-Myers formulation of a 
natural history of social problems is inapplio- 
able to the rise and regulation of trailer camps 
in California cities. Furthermore it appears to 
be an insufficient conceptualization of the 
interplay of public opinion in culture conflicts 
in modern society (Lemert, 1951:223). 
Clearly, Lemert (1951) thought there was little value in 
the natural history model. 
lemert (19511 may have failed to find the three stages 
as outlined by Puller and Myere (19411, and his criticism 
of their work is well founded. Yet, his total rejection of 
Puller and Myers' model is unnecessarily harsh. Puller and 
MYeI'6 may have moved too hastily in generalizing from one 
case to a broader Elass of problems, and their model may 
have been overly rigid and mechanical, but this does not 
llwarrantthe total rejection of the natural history nodel 
for the study of social problems" (Spector and Kitsuse. 
1977:134). The model, as presented by Fuller and Myers may 
have been imperfect. However, many writers have successful- 
ly used Some form of e natural hietory model to analyze 
different social problems (for example: Beokar, 1967; 
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Blumer, 1971; Spector and Kitsuse, 1973; Partan, 1980; 
Nelson, 1984; Ritzar, 1986; Lippert. 1990). 
The main point of Fuller and Myers' (1941) model was 
thht a social problen consisted of an objective condition 
and a subjective definition. The two interacted to Porn a 
social problem when an objective condition was defined by 
members of society as a problen, about which something ought 
to be done (Fuller and Myers, 1941: 320; Becker, 1967:z). 
Fuller and Myers suggested that sociologists must study 
both the objective conditions and the value judgments of 
people involved, which cause them to define a problem sa 
such (Fuller and Myers, 1941: 321; Spector and Kitsuse, 
1973: 146) . There are difficulties in this approa~h, 
however, specifically concerning the role of objective 
conditions in the creation of a problen. In attempting to 
explain the existence of objective conditions, Puller and 
Myers' position resembled the functionalist view that 
objective conditions beoone sosial problems only if one 
assumes society must be maintained as it is (Becker, 
1967:4). The functionalist study of social problems is 
inadequate, as it focuses on analyzing problems as aosietal 
dysfunctions and does not clarify who decides that they 
exist nnd deserve attention (Spector and Riteusa, 
1973:145). That is, it does not focus on power and who has 
the resources to define something aa s problen. 
Another difficulty with Fuller and Myers' (1941) 
focus on objective conditions arisen when we ask if a "on- 
existent social condition can be defined as a social 
problem. This is indeed possible, as witnessed by the Salem 
witch hunt or the soape-gaating of Jews in Nazi Germany. 
social problems may or may not have a fastual basis, and 
the social scientist muat be attuned to thin (Becker,  
196716). Thaoretiaally, objective conditions adr neither 
necessary nor sufficient to cause a social problem to be 
identified (Spactcr and Kitsuse, 1973:146). Additionally, 
Fuller and Myers' model seems to imply that a consensus 
exists as to what does or does not constitute a social 
problem (seckee, 1967;s-8). Howaver, research has shown 
that a social problem often means different things to 
different interested groups, some of which may even use a 
particular problem to achieve their own agendas (see for 
example bippert's [I9901 essay on the construction of 
satanism as an iesue in Canada). Finally, Fuller and Myers' 
model was simplistic in its assertion that all social 
problems moved through the stages they outlined. Later work 
made it clear that very few potential social problems 
actually become recognized as such (see for example Blumer, 
1971). 
Fuller and Myersr (1941) original conception of a 
natural history of social problena was problematic, but the 
concept none the less is an efficient means to analyze how 
problems emerge. The fact scholars are still using some 
form of the model today points out its usefulness. The 
natural history nodel may be imperfect, but it gives the 
~ocial scientist "a more complete understanding of the 
relevant fasts and their interrelations" (Becker, 1967:9). 
An examination of some of the adaptations of the natural 
history model can make this clear. 
-s of the Natural Historv Model 
ae stated above, e number of writers have used some S o m  of 
natural history model since Puller and Myers (1941) 
popularized the framework. For example. Becker (1967) 
argued: 
Fuller and Myers, a generation ago, presented a 
definition of social problems that is implicit 
in much of this book. Though their examples are 
dated, their conception is as useful now as it 
was when first presented (Becker, 1967:2). 
Backer vent on to write that: 
We need not accept the terms they use, or the 
stages they posit, to share Fuller and Myers 
principal idea: to understand a social problem 
fully, we must know how it came to ba defined as 
a social problem (Becker, 1967:ll). 
Becker still viewed social problems as resulting from a 
political definitional process in which arguments and 
 omp promises OCCUI. 8s different viewpoints are put forth 
(Becker. 1967:13). He than ou t l ined  h i s  own t h r e e  s t a g s  
adap ta t ion  of t h e  na tu ra l  h i s t o r y  model. 
Becker (1967) a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  a t e p  i n  s o c i a l  
problem development occurs when an i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t y  (a 
person or group) perceives a s e t  of o b j e c t i v e  cond i t ions  as 
problematic.  H e  ou t l ined  s e v e r a l  qus r t ions  t h e  s o c i a l  
s c i e n t i s t  might consider.  For example, who becomes i n t e r -  
e s t e d  i n  a g iven  cond i t ion?  What b r ings  it t o  t h e i r  
a t t e n t i o n ?  what type3 of cond i t ions  appear as troublesome 
t o  what kinds o f  people? (Becker, 1967:12). Th i s  d i f f e r e d  
from P u l l e r  and Myers' (1941) s t a g e  one, eetablishlnsnt  of 
a s t a t e  of awareness, i n  t h a t  Becker (1967) focused on t h e  
o r i g i n s  o f  the  problem i n  s t a g e  one and widespread aware- 
ness of t h e  problem i n  s t a g e  two. 
Becker's (1967) s t age  two was t h a t  concern with a 
g iven  problem "nust become shared and widespread i f  it is 
t o  achieve the s t a t u e  of a s o c i a l  problem". The o r i g i n a l  
d e f i n e r  o f  t h e  problem must convince o t h e r s  t h a t  t h e  
problem i n  question r e q u i r e s  pub l i c  ac t ion .  Who w i l l  t h e  
primary d e f i n e r  be a b l e  t o  convince? Who w i l l  oppose 
herlhim? What t a c t i c s  w i l l  be used? What is t h e  mediats  
role, and how is it accessed? (Becker, 1967:12). Becker's 
(1967) s t a g e  two was p a r t  of F u l l e r  and Myers' (1941) s t a g e  
one end h i s  separa t ion  of d e f i n i t i o n  and awareness (both 
contained i n  Fuller and Myers' stage one) was important as 
it recognized these two very important events i n  t h e  career 
of a ~ o c i e l  problem. Becker's (1967) stage two was similar 
t o  Puller and Myers'(l941) stage two, as it involved the  
poss ib i l i ty  of squabbling between d i f fe rent  i n t e r e s t  
groups, 
The t h i r d  stage of Beckerrs (1967) model was t h a t  the 
problen i n  question had t o  become embodied i n  an orqanie- 
a t ion  or i n s t i t u t i o n  i f  it was t o  achieve las t ing  existence 
as a soc ia l  problem (Becker, 1967:12). B e d e r  wrote of two 
possible outcomes a t  t h i s  s tags ,  one i n  which an ex is t ing  
orqanization takes respons ib i l i ty  f o r  the problem, another 
i n  which a new organisation might be s e t  up t o  dea l  with 
t h e  problem. In e i t h e r  case, however, personnel involved 
w i l l  redefine t h e  problem t o  conform with t h e i r  om 
opinions of the  problem. I f  police are given the reeponsi- 
b i l i t y  for  a new problem, they W i l l  redefine it as a law 
enforoement problem. I f  a new mental health organization is 
s a t  up t o  deal,  f o r  example, with alcoholian, it w i l l  
l i k e l y  be s ta f fed  by personnel fro. an established i n s t i t u -  
t ion ,  who may redefine alcoholism as a mental health 
problem (Becker, 1967:12-13). This is s imi lar  t o  Pul le r  and 
Myers' (1941) s tage  three  of reform, i n  whish the  machinery 
of government begins t o  move, experts s tep  i n  t o  dea l  with 
the problem, and new legislation is proposed (spector and 
Kitsuse, 1977:132). 
Beoker (1967) asserted that once an organization takes 
reeponeibility of a problem, interest groups may lose 
interest in the problem, as they no longer have to worry 
about it. This war a tenuous conclusion, howevar, which 
would be addressed in later adaptations of the natural 
history model. Becker made an important point, however, 
when he stated that once an organization takes rasponaibil- 
ity for a problem, its personnel may build their lives end 
careers around its continued existence. Anything which 
threatens to lessen "their* problem's importance is 
perceived as a threat. The organizational personnel 
responsible for a problem must show attempts at enforcement 
and control of the problem are effective, while st the same 
time showing that the problem still exists.  Therefore, 
enforcemant organizations, especially when they are seeking 
funds, may claim that the problem is nearing solution, 
while at the sane time arguing the problem is worse than 
ever and requires increased efforts to control it. Becker 
concluded that "every social problem has a history and 
develops through a series of stages" (Beoker, 1967:13). 
Becker seems to have fallen into the same trap as Fuller 
and Myers, in asserting that s l l  social problems develop 
through the natural history stages. This view fails to 
consider tha t  many issues come t o  widespread a t t e n t i o n  in  
the mass media, but not a l l  of them receive vigorous 
government attention. This f rac ture  in t h e  natural h is tory  
model was addressed by Bluner (1971). 
slumeefs (1971) t h e s i s  was t h a t  ~0oi.1 problem= were 
"products of a process of col lec t ive  definition"; t h a t  
process was responsible for  a problem's emergense, f o r  how 
the  problem was seen, how it was considered, and f o r  t h e  
planning, and implementation of the o f f i c i a l  response 
(Bluner, 1971:301). Blumer went on t o  argue tha t  t h e  
prooees of aol lec t ivedef in i t ion  "determinesthe career and 
Pate of s o d s 1  problems, from the  i n i t i a l  point of t h e i r  
appearance t o  whatever may be the  terminal point of t h e i r  
courseo8 (Blumer, 1971:301). He presented a f i v e  s tage  
model, similar t o  the  three stage models of Puller and 
Myers (1941) and Becker (1967). but introduced an inportant 
qus l i f ioa t ion  t o  t h e i r  statement t h a t  a l l  soc ia l  problems 
move through each stage. Blumer emphasized t h a t  movement 
from one stage t o  the next is highly problematic (Spector 
and Kitsuse, 1977:139). Blumer's f ive  stages are :  
1. The emergence of a socia l  problem 
2. The legitimation of t h e  problem 
3. The lnobilization of action 
4 .  The formation of an o f f i c i a l  plan 
5. The implementation of t h e  o f f i c i a l  plan 
Blumer (1971) discussed the concept of contingency, a 
branching point betwean two adjacent careers, to explain 
how a social problem may proceed so far, and then stall, 
failing to reaoh subsequent stages. Blumer stressed that 
social problems develop unevenly and problematically. This 
model might be thought of as a funnel; a number of possible 
problems enter stage one, but very few go all the way to 
stage five. Along the way many possible problems are 
svchoked off, ignored, avoidedm (spector and Kitsuae, 
1977:140; Blumer, 1971:302-303). Societal recognition of 
problems is a highly seleotive process and many potential 
problems push far recognition in "what is frequently a 
fierce competitive struggle" (Blumer, 1971:302). ~ h u s ,  
while altering Fuller and Myers' (1941) model, Blumer 
remained close to their main thesis that a problem only 
becomes a problem when it is recognized to exist by a 
sooiety. It is a mistake to assume any kind of harmful 
condition automatically becomes a problem. Certain condi- 
tions may be ignored at one time, yet without ohange in 
their makeup, become "matters of grave ooncern at another 
time" (Blumsr, 1971:302). 
For a social problem to ~ontinue on its path, Blumer 
(1971) asserted the problem had to acquire legitimacy and 
endorsement. The problem must have, or gain, the necessary 
degree of respectability which entitles it to public 
consideration in recognized arenas of public discussion 
such as themedia, church, schools, civic organizations and 
legislati~~a8semblie..Witho~tre~pe~t~bility, the problem 
is doomed. men if a condition or problem is recognized by 
some people in sooiaty as a problem, this does not mean it 
will entar arenas of public consideration. of the many 
social conditions recognized as harmful, very few gain 
legitimacy (Blumer, 1971:303). 
At M a  next stage, mobilization of action, the problem 
becomes the object of discussion and controversy among 
interest groups with diverse claims. clashes occur between 
those seeking changes in the area of tha problem and those 
trying to protect vested Interests. Interplay between 
groups can greatly affect the career of a problem; often 
the problem may be redefined as compromises ere reaohed. In 
stage IOUF, an official plan ie formulated, representing 
how the problem is now perceived by society's official 
apparatus and how it intends to act on the problem. The 
final stage occurs When the plan is put into practice, and 
is modified and adjusted, to accommodate and appease 
various interested parties, thereby ushering in a new 
definition of the problem (Blumer, 1971:303; Spactor and 
Kitsuse, 1977:140). 
Blumar'e (1971) analysis, like that of Puller and 
Myers (1941) and Becker (1967), ends with some Porn of 
official action in the problem area. Yet this seemingly 
goes against his own argument about the problematic nature 
Of social problams. The fate of the problem after the final 
stage seen* to be that it is solved, or that it at least 
falls from public visibility once acted upon officially. 
Blumer, like Becker, and Fuller and Myers before him, 
failed to describe what happens alter legislation has been 
enacted, institutions or agencies set up, and programs 
implemented. All fail to consider the question of when the 
social problem ceases to exist (Spector and Kiteuse, 
1977:142). 
spector and Kitsuse's (1977) work attempted to answer 
this question in a book that Best (1989) described as one 
of the most influential on the raciology of social problems 
(Bast, 1989:251). They pogited a four stage natural history 
model, with stage two corresponding to the end of Blumerrs 
(1971) and Puller and nyers' (1941) model. Spector and 
Kitsuse's stages three and four present a way of examining 
a social problem after official policy has been developed 
and implemented. They are a "kind of second generation 
social probleln in which the solutions to previous problems 
(responses to previous demands) become the basis for 
renewed claims and demands" (speotor and Kitsuse, 
1977:142). The model put forth by spaotor and Kitsuse 
(1977) is the same model posited in a 1973 essay, in which 
the authors pointed out " [ O l u r  presentation of then (four 
stages) should be taken as an ideal type model of social 
p r ~ b l e m ~ "  (Spector and Kitsure, 1973:148). 
speetor and Kitsuse (1977) wrote that their model is 
hypothetical, an outline of what they think natural 
histories of social problems should examine. Their four 
stage model ia a guide for aocisl problems researchers 
(Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:141). While going beyond 
Blumerts (1971) model in their consideration of what 
happens after official action has been taken, Spector and 
Kitsuse do share some of his ideas. For example, Speotor 
and Kitsuse share slunrer's view of the uneven and problem- 
atic development of social problems. They also share his 
assumption that official and government agenoies are 
prominent parties in the history of social problems 
(spector and Kitsuse, 19771142). Spector and Kitsuse's foue 
stages are: 
1. OIDUP(S) attempt to assart the existence of some 
condition, define it as offensive, hzmful, or 
otherwise undesirable, publicize these assertions, 
stimulate controversy, and Create a public or 
politi~al issue over the matter. 
a. Recognition of the legitimacy of these group(s) by 
some official organization, agency, or institution. 
This may lead to an official investigation, proposals 
for reform, and the establishment of an agency to 
respond to those claims and demands. 
3. Reemergence of claims and demands by the original 
group(s1, or by others, expressing dissatisfaction 
with the established procedures for dealing with the 
imputed conditions, the bureaucratic handling ol 
complaints, the failure to generate s condition of 
trust and confidence in the procedures, and the lsck 
of sympathy for complaints. 
4. Rejection by the complainant grrrup(s1 of the 
agency's or institution's response, or lsck of 
response, to their claims and demands, and the 
development of activities to create alternative, 
parallel, or counter-institutions as responses to the 
established procedures (Spectar and Xitsuae, 
1977:142). 
Riteer (1986) also used Spaetor and Kitsuea'a (1977) nodel 
to outline the career of a social problem. Riteer aalls 
stage one Agitation, stage two Legitimation and Co- 
optation, stage three is labelled Bureaucratization and 
~eaction, and staqa four is Reemergence of Movement 
(Ritzer, 1986:s). A more detailed account of Xitsuse and 
speotorls model is now presented, rinse it is the main 
analytic framework used in the thesis. 
SPECTOR AND KITSUSE'S NATURIL HISTORY MODEL 
ataxe one: Auita!&!n 
The roots of a social problem are planted when aona 
group(s) attempts to remedy a condition it sees as offen- 
sive and undesirable. This primary definer may, or nay not 
be directly affected by the condition. For exampla claims 
about the physical abuse of children were made by pediatric 
radiologists (Parton, 1980). Activities at this initial 
stage "often consist of attempts to transform private 
troubles into public issuesu (Ritzer, 1986:8). However, not 
all attempts are successful, there are many contingencies 
in this stage. For example a groupsc problem defining 
activities may go unnoticed, it nay lose its backing, it 
may go unnoticed by the media, the group may be weakened by 
in-fighting, or it may be unable to mobilize economic 
raaourcee. The most critical aspects of this first stage 
are "the ways complaints are raised and the strategies used 
to press claims, gain publioity and arouse controversy" 
(Spector and Kitsuse,l977:143). The successful development 
of s social problem m y  be relatively independent of the 
objective ssriousnass and extent of t h e  problen (Spector 
and Kitsuse, 1977:143). 
spector and Kitsuse (1977) a s s e r t  t h a t  social problems 
or ig ina te  through t h e  claims of groups. Any claim might 
became t h e  bas is  of a social problem. but very few sotua l ly  
do, as most c l a i m  are disposed of.  To understand how only 
a small portion of claims about problems actually become 
soc ia l  problems. we must consider t h e  power of the problem- 
defining group, the type of claims it is making, and t h e  
s t r a t e g i e s  it u t i l i z e s  (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:143). 
A problem-defining group's power is very important 
with regard t o  t h e i r  claims becoming a soc ia l  problem. 
Generally groups wi l l  be mare successful i n  pressing t h e i r  
claims i f  they have wealthy members, a r e  large and well 
organized, and are held i n  generally high esteem. Groups 
w i l l  o f ten  try t o  e n l i s t  powerful supporters in t h i s  ear ly  
stage t o  increase t h e i r  strength. While groups may loudly 
proclaim themselves t o  be very powerful, they may i n  
r e a l i t y  be unable t o  mobilize tho  s t rength  they claim 
(Ritzer,  1986:8). 
The type of claims a problen-defining group makes a l s o  
influences whether a particular issue becomes a soc ia l  
problem. Claims about a par t icu lar  condition may be very 
s p e c i f i c ,  or they  may be very genera l .  Problem-defining 
groups may have no idea  who c rea ted ,  who is responsible 
f o r ,  or who caused t h e  condit ion i n  question;  conversely 
they  may have ve ry  s p e c i f i c  ideae about who, or what is t o  
blame, and possess well  defined remadial  p l a n s  and propo- 
s a l s  f o r  change. The problem-defining group nay e n t e r  i n t o  
a Coa l i t ion  wi th  o the r s ,  ga in ing  numbers, p res t ige ,  and 
access t o  a u t h o r i t y ,  b u t t h i s  may water down t h e i r  i s sue ,  
as t h e i r  claim may be considarad as p a r t  o f  a l a r g e r  
problem. Genera l ly ,  t h e  more s p e a i f i o  a claim is, t h e  
b e t t e r  its chances f o r  successful  r e c e p t i o n  (Spector and 
Kiteuse,  1977:143-144). 
The type  of c l a im a group makes is i n p o e t a n t ,  b u t  j u s t  
a s  important  is how t h a t  claim i s  made. Doer t h e  problem- 
de f in ing  group know who t o  complain t o ?  If they  complain t o  
t h e  wrong p a r t y  they  nay g e t  no r e s u l t s ,  bad advice,  o r  
r evea l  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  t o  an  adversary,  t h u s  undermining 
t h e i r  pos i t ion .  To be successful, a group ha8 t o  know who 
t o  conplain to .  S imi la r ly ,  t h e  way t h e  media is handled 
g r e a t l y  a f f e c t s  t h e  problem's career. A t t r a c t i n g  end 
holding t h e  media's a t t e n t i o n  i s  important .  using press 
r e l e a s e s  and informing the  media be fo re  hand about sched- 
u led  even t s  can h e l p  influence t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of a 
group's s l a i n .  Of ten  a group w i l l  suppor t  i t s  claims t h a t  
a p a r t i c u l a r  cond i t ion  deserves a c t i o n  wi th  "expert00 
testimony, or "official" otatistics (Spector and Kitsuse, 
1977:147]. 
social problems emerge frmclaims by problem-definers 
that some existing condition is intolerable and requires 
changing. This may lead to controversy, sa groupa that 
prefer things the way they are may lobby against propsed 
changes. This oonflistmay heighten public; awareness of the 
issue, and is the culmination of stage one. The problem may 
be stalled here, it nay move to the next stage, or it may 
wither away (Spector and Kitruaa, 1977:148). 
Baa8 Two: Leaitimation and Ca-o~tatia 
Legitimation occurs with official acknowledgment of the 
condition. Stage one activities were almost entirely 
unofficial; with official recognition, however, the 
problen-definers nay now be treated as concerned citizene, 
invited to attend hearings and submit briefs. This may 
increase the prestige of the group, but it nay also signal 
a lessening of control by the original problem-definers, 
and they may now become only witneseas. official hearings 
may silence gmupn and cool the problem. The original g m u p  
may be overshadowed as powerful agencies and organizations 
become involved, and the group becomes only a supplier of 
infomation (SpectorandXItrure, 1977:149; Ritzer, 1986:9- 
10). 
co-optation OEEUrs when some o f f i c i a l  agency t a k e s  
con t ro l  or t h e  problem as its own; of ten  t h e  u n o f f i c i a l  
problem-defining group may be phased ou t  o f  operation.  The 
government may claim t o  have a monopoly on understanding 
t h e  problem, and t h s  problem may be redef ined  and expanded 
( n i t z e r ,  1986:9). Severa l  outcomes can r e s u l t  from t h i s  co- 
opta t ion .  The problem-dafining group may be  "cooled-out" as 
government promises t o  study t h e i r  complaints.  Another 
outoone might be t h a t  t h e  group*s claims are exposed as 
unfounded. Another outcone could see t h e  government 
supporting t h e  group's claims,  ye t  t h e  problen may s t i l l  go 
untended. F ina l ly ,  t h e  government might t a k a  e t f a c t i v e  
a c t i o n  t o  address  the  group's  complaints. Co-optation by 
government does n o t  imply t h a t  the problen is e i t h e r  so lved  
or buried.  Commonly, a n  o rgan iza t ion  is s e t  up o r  an 
e x i s t i n g  one given r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  d e a l i n g  with com- 
p l a i n t s  about t h e  problem. Once t h i s  ooours, personne l  of 
t h e  respons ib la  agency t aka  a vested i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  
problem and lobby fo r  l a r g e r  budgets a rgu ing  t h a t  they  are 
doing t h e i r  job, bu t  t h e  condit ion is worsening and they  
need more money. When some agency develops a ves ted  
i n t e r e s t  i n  handling complaints about a problem, s t a g e  two 
is f i n i s h e d  (Speotor end Kitsuse,  1977:151). 
S t e s e  Three: Bureaucra t i za t ion  and Reaction 
S tages  one and two s e e  a t t e n t i o n  focused on claims t h a t  
t h e r e  i a  a problem. I n  s t s g a  thraa, complaints are r a i s e d  
abou t  t h e  way t h e  problem i s  being handled. O f f i c i a l  
pTIO0edUre~ and channels may b e  eesn as inadequate or u n j u s t  
t o  p r o t e s t  groups. Bureaucratic handling o f  t h e  problem is 
seen as unsa t i s fac to ry ,  as the respons ib le  agency seems t o  
be doing l i t t l e  t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h e  problem. At t h i s  s t a g e  t h e  
p m b l e n  is not problem. b u t  t h e  bureaucra t i c  response 
t o  t h e  problem. As s r e s u l t ,  t h e  agenay respons ib le  f o r  the  
problem may now move f u r t h e r  away from d e a l i n g  wi th  t h e  
problem and nay begin to ask, "How can we g e t  them t o  s t o p  
cmpla in ing?"  (Ri tze r ,  1986:lZ). 
The outcome of s t a g e  t h r e e  might be  a reform of 
e x i s t i n g  procedures,  a change of government personnel,  o r  
es tab l i shment  s f  a new agency. O r  groups may g a t  t i r e d  of 
f i g h t i n g  through an  end less  sea of red t ape ,  l o s e  conf i -  
dence i n  government procedures and o rgan iza t ions ,  and begin 
t o  mobil ize,  p r o t e s t i n g  the  manner i n  which t h i n g s  are 
handled. T h i s  is t h e  beginning of s t age  f o u r  (Spec ta r  and 
x i t s u s e ,  1977:151-152; R i tea r ,  1986:12). 
S t a a e  Four: R-rwce of Movement 
This s t age  i n  the career of a s o c i a l  problem occurs when 
some group(=) become d i s i l l u s i o n e d  with government r u l e s  
and regulations, and begin to plan their activities on the 
notion that "it is no longer possible to work within the 
system" (spector and Kitsuse,1977:153). The group or groups 
involved at this stage may or may not be the original 
problem-defining group, but the focus of complaints is to 
create and establish alternative solutions for their 
problem. There is a rekindling of interest in the problem 
and outcry against established channels for dealing with 
it. In stage four groups are liable to ohallenge the 
legitimacy of established organizations and their methods 
for handling a problem. The problem at this stage can 
develop in two directions: one towards the development of 
new public organizations to deal with the problem for the 
benefit of all; the other, towards private solutions to the 
problem, =hiefly benefiting group members. In either case, 
the problem's development hinges upon people coming to see 
established channels ae ineffective and deciding to work 
outside the system (speator and Kitause, 1977:153; Ritear, 
igasria-13). 
Group aotivities at this stage face many of the 
hurdles and pitfalls faced at earlier stages. For example, 
groups must be able to mobilize support, overcone oppo- 
nents, access the media and avoid being co-opted by some 
government agency. Co-optation is a "frequent outcome of 
stage four social problems" (Spector and Kitsuae, 
1977:154). Attempts to bet up new organizations outside the 
existing establishment may create new experts. Existing 
organizations may view these attempts to work outside their 
jurisdiction, and the new experts, as threatening, and may 
try to take over the new organization, or co-opt its 
leaders. By making leaders of critical groups part of the 
existing structure they were oritioizing, established 
organizations may effectively silence and discredit 
outspoken detractors. In this way the group's claims are 
placed in a questionable light and its future power is 
weakened (spector and Kitsuse. 1977:154). 
spector and Kitsuse's (1977) natural history model 
maker clear that the emergence of social problems is s 
political process in which the problem comes to be widely 
aooepted and official responses are molded and remolded. 
Politics is a process in which not all have equal power and 
resources. Who is able to "get heard," and get action on 
their definition of a problem is what social scientiets 
must looK to when examining how something became a problem. 
spector and Kitsuse's (1977) model is useful for this 
reason (Ritzer, 1986:13). In addition, the model directs 
the reseamher to examine the role of "moral crusaders" and 
government. This does not imply there are the only actore 
in the career of a social problem; "moral crusaders" and 
government officials represent only a portion of the 
possible range of actors who may try to define a problem. 
we must remember that actors may not act an we might 
~tere~typically assume they will. Just because the natural 
history nodel focuses on political activitie. a "consistent 
treatment of the definitional process of social problams" 
is not ensured (Spector and Kitsuss. 1977:155). In addition 
we must remember that government and other official 
agencies not only respond to cries of concern, they also 
raise their own cries about a problem and may play a major 
part in defining it. Government may attempt to create one 
problem in order to draw attention away from another 
(Spector and Kitaura, 1977:155). The natural history model 
must be treated with care; it is not perfect. The discovery 
that one social problem was crested in this way does not 
prove other social problems ware created in a like 
manner. It may well be imppoesibla to find a sequence of 
events common to problsms. A witar using the natural 
history model may fall into the trap of making the data fit 
the model. Care must be taken to avoid this. However, the 
modal doer provide the student of soaial problems with a 
general guide for considering how a particular problem 
emerged. In the study of a social problem "a hypothetioal 
natural history may serve as a temporary procedural manual, 
a checklist of things to attend to, and a first order of 
business" (Spector and Kitsuse. 1977:158). 
Bsvond soector and Xitauee's Natural Historv Model 
Since the publication of Spector and Kitsusera (1977) 
natural history modal, there have bean some attempts to 
critique and go beyond it. Two siqnificant critiques 
appeared in 1985. Woolgar and Pauluch's (1985) essay 
offered an incisive critique of social constructionist work 
and a "critical commentaryo# on the social constructionist 
framework (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985:214). While this essay 
focused on the broad body of social oonstructionist 
literature, it is important for this thesis, since the 
natural history model is part of the constructionist 
school. 
The main conponent of Woolgar and Pawluoh's (1985) 
critique was that social constructionist work, including 
speotor and Kitsuse (1977), assumes that the inputad 
conditions have not changed. The authors asserted that 
assuming conditions have not changed allows social con- 
structionists to focus on the "factw that changes have 
occurred in the definition of the problem and the claims 
made about it (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985:215). Woolgar and 
Pawluch reviewed a large amount of social constructionist 
research and in each Fa68 found that the key assertion was 
that the actual character of the condition in question had 
notchanged, butthat definitions of the imputed conditions 
had. Woolgar and Pawluch maintained that by making this 
assumption, social constructionist authors make claims of 
their own: 
In naming, Identifying or describing conditions, 
these authors (constructionists) inevitably give 
definition to the putative behaviourr and oondi- 
tions they discuss. While the claims of the 
claims-makers are depicted as eosio-hietoricsl 
constructions (definitions) that require expla- 
natlon, the claims and the conorructlve work of 
the author8 renal" hldden and are to be taken 
tar granted (Wooiqar and Pawluch, 1985:217). 
Despite offering this cutting oriticism, woolgar and 
Pawluch (1985) wrote that their critique was "not a call 
for a return to the study of social problems in the style 
opposed by definitionalists" (Woolgar and Pawluch, 
1985:224). 
Pawluoh and Woolgar argued their critique offered 
guidelines for further constructionist research. For 
example it suggested that caution be used when attempting 
constructionist studies and that certain inconsistencies 
are inevitable. They also suggested that so~iologists focus 
on the rhetorical strategies of social problems explana- 
tions (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985:224-225). As will he seen 
shortly, more recent aonrtruetionistuork has attempted to 
focus on the rhetoric used in social problems activities. 
Another imprtant critique of constructionist work 
appeared that same year in Schneider's "review and critique 
of the origin and development of the sociology of ~ociel 
problems" (Schneider, 1985:209). However, unlike Pawluch 
and Woolgar, Sohneider foouaed more on spector and s it- 
suae'r. (1977) natural history model. He outlined the 
natural history model in sane detail and also discussed 
other relevant research (Schneider. 1985:210-223). 
Schnsider then detailed both the problems and the insights 
of the perspective. 
schneider (1985) argued that sociologists studying 
social problems must try to avoid participating in social 
problems activities and defending or challengingthe claims 
and definitions about putative conditions (Schneider, 
1985:224). Schneider critiqued the natural history modal 
and, like Pawluch and Woolgar, argued that both verbal and 
nonverbal activities that convey meaning about the problem 
or condition should be considered as data. Schneider 
stressed that language was highly important and careful 
attention should be paid to it. He went on to suggest that 
spector and Kitsuse's (1977) concept of "viable claimsM 
understood as those claims and definitions that claims- 
makers can "gat away with" needed clarification. Sehneider 
also suggestedthsta clearer understanding of how psrtici- 
pants' aotivities affected claims was needed (Schneider, 
1985:221-225). 
schneidar (1985) usadTroycr'e unpublished (1983) work 
to suggest that the concept of a natural history directs 
attention to loose similarities across cases. schneider 
then draw attention to Wiener*= (1981) work on the politics 
of alcoholism to argue that the sequantial aspect of 
natural history models may be misleading when considering 
the definitional process (Schneider, 1985:225). A more 
realistic view might be one of "overlapping, simultaneous 
and continuously ricacheting interaction" (Schnaider, 
1985:225). A natural history model may also encourage 
overstating the extent to which specific kinds of activ- 
ities occur at particular stages. Schneider argued this 
Beem likely for spector and Kitsuse's (1977) stages 1 and 
3 (schneider, 1985:223). He then asserted that Wienerjs 
(1981) work reinforces Kitsuse and spsctor*s view that the 
social problems process is open ended. Despite offering 
this detailed review, Schnaider concluded that the 
"insights of the constructionist perspective as detailed by 
spector and Kitsure appear intact, criticisms notwithstand- 
ing" (Schneider. 1985:226). He maintained that Kitsuse and 
Spector's model proposed bold new changes that should be 
judged nore for what it called for and stimulated than what 
it ignored (Schneider, 1985:226). 
In 1987 another significant ~OntribUtion to the study 
of social problems appeared in the form of Best's (1987) 
work on "rhetoric in claims-making". This essay focused on 
the words and arguments used in social problems activity 
and perhapa steamed from Schneiderls, and from Pavluch and 
Woolgar's suggestions conaerning the importance of lan- 
guage. Best followed Kitsure and Spector and other oon- 
atructionists' assertions that ~ociolagista aE eooial 
problems focus on the process of claims-making and not on 
objective conditions. However, Bsst attempted to go beyond 
spector and Kitsuse's (1977) work. 
Best (1987) argued that nost constructionist research 
intentionally paid far more attention to the process of 
claima-making and the claims-makersthemselves, rather than 
claims. He asserted that while Spector and Kitsuse (1977) 
did acknowledge that the "claims of groups may be groundad 
in values, they warn against trying to explain claims- 
making by simply specifying olalms-makers values and 
motivesl~ (Best. 1987:lol). Best wrote that while Xiteuse 
and Spector argued that values are resources used by claims 
makers in defining a problem, they and other construction- 
ist 0a.e studies, did not explore how values were incorpor- 
ated into claims; they "treat olsims as a given" (Best, 
1987:lol). Best's work built on Gusfield'e (1981) awument 
that soientific claims m d e  about a problem have to be 
viewed in terms of rhetoric and not simply as objective 
evidence. Best applied rhetorical analysis to the claims 
made in the construr;tion of the missing children problem 
(Best, 1987:lol). 
~ e s t  (1987) asserted that ehetorio is oentral to 
claims-making about social problems as claims-makers hope 
to persuade and claims-making is rhetorical activity (Best, 
1987:115). He used Toulmin's (1958) The Uses of Arsument to 
examine the rhetoric used in creating the problem of 
mi~sing ohildren. Best outlines three of ~oulmin's (1958) 
concepts: grounds, warrants and conclusions. Grounds are 
the data or basic "facts" the argument is based on. These 
"facts" are socially constructed. Warrants are juetifica- 
tions for what steps are taken or called for. Conclusions 
are typically calls for action (1987:lOa). Bast further 
divided each category into types. 
Beat (1987) outlined three types of grounds; dafini- 
tions, examples and estimates of extent. Defining a problem 
is perhaps the most fundamental form of claims-making. The 
problem is named, identified, and boundsriee for further 
disoussions set, as some issues are made relevant and 
others relegated out of bounds (Best, 1987:104). Defini- 
tions can take two forms. Domain statements set boundaries 
and are especially important when a new problem in being 
identified as they call attention to the previously 
unacknowledged. In addition to identifying a problem's 
domain, claimr-makers often attempt to orient the problem 
by giving some type of assessment of it. orientation 
statements can influence the way a problem is interpreted, 
by offering one particular judgement ovar another (Best, 
1987z104-1051. 
Examples are the second type of grounds discussed by 
Best 11987). He suggested that definitions may actually be 
preceded by examples (Best, 1987:105). In his work on 
missing children, Best found that media reports on the 
subject often opened with atrocity taler or horrific 
examples. He writes that opening with an "emotionally 
riveting grabber" ie a standard journalistic techniquethat 
focuaes attention on the problem in question. often, the 
atrocious examples become reference points for further 
discussions of the problem (Beet. 1987:lOS-106). 
Numeric estimates of extent are the final type of 
grounds Best (1987) discussed. He argued that estimates are 
important claims because the "bigger the problem, the more 
attention it can be said to merit" (Best, 1987:106). 
Therefore, most claims-makers emphasize a problem's sire. 
Incidence estimates are perhaps the most straightforward 
way to establish a problem, by estimating the number of 
cases, incidents or people affected. Claims-makers may 
argue a problem is widespread and thus demands attention. 
Growth estimates are the second type of estimate outlined 
by Best. These often show the problem is wornening and 
suggest that, unless action is taken, further deterioration 
will O S E U ~ .  Range olaime show the problem is endemic, thus 
maXing everyone a potential victim and making everyone 
believe they have, or should have, a vested interest in the 
problem (Best, 1987:104-108). 
Warrants are statements which justify drawing con- 
clusions from tha grounds. Warrants are often implicit and 
in then values most often come into play (Bast, 1987:108). 
Best (1987) suggested that since warrants are often 
implicit, any list of warrants would be selective and 
incomplete pest, 1987:109). He outlined six warrants he 
found in claims around the missing children problem. For 
example, one such warrant concerned the value of children. 
Claims-makers etressed that children were sentimentally 
priceless and "our most valuable resource" (Bert, 
1987:109). Tha other warrants outlined by Bart were: 
blameless victims; associated evils; deficient policies; 
historical continuity; and rights and freedoms (Beet, 
1987:108-112). These shall be discussed at more length 
below in the bady of the argument. 
C ~ n ~ l u ~ i o n s  are the final rhetorical devioa outlined 
by Best (1987). There are typically Eella for action to 
alleviate or aradisate the imputed problem; claims-makers 
may have an agenda with several goals (Best, 1987:112). 
Three conclusions outlined by Best were awareness, praven- 
tion and social control policies. claims-makers around tha 
missing children problem often tried to inorease public 
awareness and involvament. They emphasized the importance 
of prevention and they demanded new social control policies 
(Beat, 1987:112-113). Best concluded his essay by stressing 
the significance of the rhetoric used by claims-makers. 
SLMKURY 
This chapter has completed two tasks. First, it has 
reviewed the literature on tho natural history model. 
Secondly, it has outlined the analytic framework to be used 
in this thesis. Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) natural 
history model is used in conjunction with Best's (1987) 
analysis of rhetoric to examine how poaching became an 
issue in 1982 and to follow its career into the 1990'8. 
Before comencing analysis of stage one activities, an 
overview of the province's geography and history is 
presented. attention is focused on the historical uses of 
wildlife resources within Newfoundland. 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the geography and history of the 
province to provide necessary background for the reader 
of 'Chis thesis. The first section examines the physical 
setting, while the second examines the settling of the 
province and people's use of wildlife resources. 
THE PHYSICAL SETTING 
go- 
Situated in the North Atlantic, on the eastern edge of 
North Ilmerica, between 46 and 52 degrees N. lat., 
Newfoundland has a landmass of 43,359 rg.mi., and is the 
sixteenth largest island in the world (Montevecchi and 
TUok, 1987:13). Newfoundland is geographisally distinct 
from, but politi~ally linked with, Labrador (112,826 
sq.mi.; 52-60 degrees N.lat.) and together they make up 
the most easterly, and seventh largest, of Canada's ten 
provinces (see nap 3.1). The island portion of the 
province is a tilted plateau rising northwestward from 
the east coast. Western Newfoundland, the most 
mountainous portion of the island, is home to the Long 
Range Mountains. These rise to over 600 m in some 
locations, and are geologically paxt of the Appalachian 
Mountain chain (Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:13). West of 

the ~ o n g  Range Mountains, a low lying coastal plain 
stretches the entire length of the west coast. The Avalon 
Peninsula is on the east coast of the island, and is home 
to the capital city, St. John's, and 246,608 of the 
 province,^ 568,349 residents (Statistics Canada, 1986 
census). 
Newfoundland and Labrador has an abundance of excellent 
wildlife habitat. Mush of the interior of the inland is 
similar to alpine barrens, and is dotted with shallow 
rocky ponds and lakes (Mednie, 1981:218). The terrain 
rang85 from the gently undulating to the ruggedly hilly, 
to open barrens and bogs, to thick forests. Just over 
half the island is presently forested ( 5 6 % ) ,  while the 
relaaining 41% consists of paatlands, barrens, and fresh 
water (~ontevecchi and Tuck, 1987:25). Bogs are common 
throughout the island, especially in the southern 
interior and on parts of the west coast. Common plants in 
bogs are sphagnum moss, Labrador tea, bakeapple and 
pitcher plant. The forest grows in s variety of 
formations, with varying degrees of success. The 
principal species are coniferous; balsam fir and spruce 
are common varieties, but a wide range of deciduous 
species are also found (summers, 1967:250). Oftan there 
is no distinct bundery between barrens and forest 
(Mednis, 1981:213 -246). The effects of glaciation have 
l e f t  much of t h e  province vneu i t ab la  f o r  l a r g e  soala 
a g r i c u l t u r e ;  genera l ly  the  p rov lnce  has  poor, t h i n  s o i l s .  
The bottom h a l f  of t h e  west coas t  of t h e  i s l and  is gen- 
e r a l l y  more f e r t i l e  than  o t h e r  areas of t h e  province 
(Nontevecshi and Tuck, 1987:13-23). The coas t  is heav i ly  
indented and deep f i o r d s  occur  on t h e  southwest  and 
nor theas t  E086tB. 
Ixlbrador's phys ica l  landscape is s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of 
t h e  i s l a n d ,  being composed mostly of barren racks .  muskeg 
and l akes .  However, Labrador has more tundra (Nednis, 
1981:218). The nor the rn  p a r t  of Labrador i r  beyond t h e  
t r e e  l i n e  of t h e  northern con i fe rous  f o r e s t  zone and 
possesses  t h e  moss-heath-lichen vege ta t ion  of t h e  tundra .  
Ixlbrador's rugged E m s t  i s  a l s o  much indented wi th  long 
f i o r d s ,  bu t  it is more mountainous than t h e  i a l and ' s  
m a s t .  Geologically,  Labrador is p a r t  of tha  Canadian 
s h i e l d  and its nor the rn  Torngat  mountains con ta in  t h e  
h i g h e s t  po in t  of land i n  t h e  province,  Mount Caubvick 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1991:7) .' 
The Climate 
The c l i m a t e  v a r i e s  cons ide rab ly  throughout t h e  province.  
' Space c o n s t r a i n t s  d i c t a t e  t h a t  t h i s  d i scuss ion  be 
kep t  b r i e f .  Those i n t e r e s t e d  i n  a more in-depth 
d i scuss ion  of t h e  province's  geography and n a t u r a l  
h i s t o r y ,  might consu l t  Meades (1990) work. 
summers are usua l ly  s h o r t  and coo l ,  win te r s  range from 
telnperate t o  arct ic; ,  depending on l a t i t u d e  and d i s t ance  
from t h e  sea. A l l  but  t h e  i n t e r i o r  of i n s u l a r  
~evfound land  possesses a marine c l ima te ,  while southern 
end c e n t r a l  ~ a b r a d o r  has a rub  a r c t i c  c l ima te  and 
~ o r t h e r n  Labrador experiences an a r c t i c  cl imate.  
Temperatures i n  Newfoundland and southern Labrador aee 
genera l ly  temperate and coo l ,  whi le  northern and i n t e r i o r  
Labrador experience severe extremes,  ranging from -49 
degrees cen t ig rade  i n  winter  t o  +38 degrees cen t ig rade  i n  
summer (Hodgson, 1981:452-453). 
Southern Newfoundland has  an annual p r e c i p i t a t i o n  
r a t e  of 127 t o  140 centimeters,  which decreases t h e  
f u r t h e r  nor th  one goes. The smal le r  amount of 
p r e c i p i t a t i o n  i n  northern p a r t s  o f  t h e  province a r e  
o f f s e t  by snowfalls ,  which dur ing  a winter ,  are o f t e n  
g r e a t e r  than  254 centimeters.  S imi la r ly ,  sou theas te rn  
Newfoundland, including t h e  Avalon Peninsula,  exper iences  
n o r e  fog than do t h e  western and nor the rn  p a r t s  o f  t h e  
i s l a n d  and Labrador (Rowe, 1980:6). P reva i l ing  winds are 
genara l ly  from t h e  west. Prost f r e e  days vary €ram 
approximately 145 along t h e  south c o a s t  of t h e  i s l a n d  t o  
muoh l e s s  i n  t h e  S t r a i t  o f  Be l l e  I s l e ,  where f r o s t  can 
occur even i n  summer (Hadgson, 1981: 451-4531. For t h e  
f i r s t  European s e t t l e r s ,  t h e  means of obtaining a 
livelihood was influenced perhaps as greatly by the 
physical environment as by economic opportunitien of the 
time (summers, 1984:494). The rugged adversity of the 
surrounding physical environment held the resource base 
which made successful settlement eventually possible. A 
brief description of the settlement of Newfoundland will 
now be presented. 
THE INMAN POPULATION 
-a1 Peonle 
Prior to European settlement, at least three aboriginal 
groups occupied parts at Newfoundland. Each of these 
groups relied heavily on the surrounding environment to 
provide necessary supplies. There three groups were the 
Maritime Archaic Indians, the Paleo or Dorset Eskimos, 
and the Beothuks (Rowe, 1980:23-29). The Archaic Indiana 
occupied the island 4900 years ago, while the Dorset 
B~kimae arrived around 2700 years ago. Bath groups 
mysteriously disappeared. It is known that the Dornet 
prebenoe overleppsd with the Beothuks, but scholars are 
unsure when the Beothuks arrived. Unfortunately, the 
Beothuka were unable to cope with European diseases and 
weapons and became extinct around the 1820's. By the mid 
eighteenth century Micmacs from eastern Canada had become 
permanent residents of the island. Labrador is hone to 
the Montagnais-Nasoapi, a people of the interior until 
this century (Rowe, 1980:23-29;153-173).' 
W o D s a n r  
Norse Vikings are known to have established a settlement 
on the tip of the Great Northern Peninsula of 
~ewfoundland, at L'Anse aux Meadows around 1000 AD 
(Marshall, 1977243). It is thought the Vikings only 
remained a few years at ~'nnse aux meadows. Almost five- 
hundred years later, John Cabot eailed from Brirtol, 
England under the sponsorship of Henry the VII and 
8 t d i s ~ ~ ~ e r e d "  Newfoundland in 1497. Like the Vilings, the 
first English settlements in Newfoundland were of a brief 
duration (Thorns, 1967:528-535). 
After Cabot's discovery of the island, no formal 
European attempt st settlement took place until 1610, 
when John Guy, under charter from King James I, rtartad a 
colony at Cupids (Rowe, 1980:119). In the 1500's. 
however, English fishermen may have been leaving winter 
crews in Newfoundland, like the Barque whalers in the 
strait of Belle Isle (Rowe, 1980:119). The first formal 
Native people became highly visible in the late 
1970,s in discussions surrounding wildlife management 
issues, particularly big game hunting. For example, the 
Innu of +brador received concentrated media attention in 
Thr: Evsnlna Telaqram in 1977 and 1978 when several people 
were charged with poaching caribcu from the Mealy 
Mountain herd. Native people continue to press claims 
regarding access and use of wildlife resources. 
66 
attempts at settlement were the results of British 
merchants' plans to colonize the island and tap local 
resources besides the cod (Mannion, 1977:5). The first 
recorded birth in Newfoundland occurred in 1613 and, by 
1637, there were known to be approximately 356 families 
in Newfoundland (Thorns, 1967:528-535). The population 
00ntinued to grow until, by 1901, there were 220,219 
people on the island (nannion, 1977:13). The majority 
were fisher folk, who spread out along the coast of the 
island and Labrador, pursuing the cod fish. 
The interior of both the island and Labrador was 
uninhabited and unexplored until the nineteenth oentury 
(Hutohings,l967:372-377). BY 1898, a narrow gauge railway 
across the island war virtually completed, which opened 
UP the interior to development. Subsequently, several 
towns grew up near the rail line. For example, Grand 
Palls and Bishop'* Falls beeame sites of pulp and paper 
mills, Badger was a logging depot and Millertown a saw- 
mill centre. other towns like Clarenville, Gambo and 
Gloverto~n also grew up near the rail line, with cut 
 lose by the bottolll of all the great bays (Rowe.1980:21 
and 129). Having briefly outlined the history of European 
settlement, the manner in which residents used wildlife 
resouroes is now presented. 
WllDLlPE RESOURCES AND THE SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY 
Traditional Newfoundland Lifest* 
AS mentioned, the majority of Newfoundland's settlers 
were fisher. folk. However, hunting played an ilnportant 
part in their economic activity. The early English 
settlers supplemented their meager diets with fish, game 
and the natural vegetation of the land (Peyton, 1987:s). 
POI. example, sea-birds and their egge were a vital part 
of people's diets. The great auk was used for food, bait, 
feather mattresses, and oil (Montevecchi and Tuck, 
19871211). Another source relates that settlers were 
beginning to trap fur as early as 1760 (Rowe, 1980:126), 
again demonstrating settlers' utilization of natural 
rBB(IUrEBS. 
similarly, the native caribou (Rangifer tarandus), 
either fresh or salted, was the main souroe of neat for 
many of the inhabitants of Newfoundland. One witer at 
the turn or the oentury theorized that "Newfoundland is 
probably the only country in the world where venison, 
salted or Cresh, is s staple srtisle of diet for the 
masses" (McGrath, 1902:63). This same Source discnssed 
how settlers used caribou antlers and hides in their 
homes (McGrath, 1902:63). Saunders (1986) relates that 
settlers on the northeast coast of the island at the end 
of the 1800's took caribou whenever they needed it 
(Saunders, 1986:237). Moose (Alces alces) van introduced 
to the island in 1878 and 1904 (Pialott, 1953:563), and 
subsequently replaced caribou as the most important big 
game species (Peters and King. 195923-4). one writer 
argues that by the tine the first open season on moose 
waa declared in 1936: 
noose meat had become one of the staDles of the 
outport diet, and in some parts of the country 
was at least aa important as the dola in carry- 
ing people succesrfully through the great de- 
pression (Horwood, 1986:39). 
The snowshoe hare or rabbit (Lapus americanus) Was also 
introduced in the mid-1860's and became an important 
source of fresh meat in winter to those living along the 
coast and on offshore islands (Saunderm. 1986:160). 
Not only were wildlife resources important food 
items, they were also signifioant cash crops. Murrea' 
eggs ware gathered and shipped aboard schooners to market 
in Halifax or Boston where they sold for huge profits. 
The great naturalist Audubon visited the Quebec Labrador 
Coast in June, 1833 and left accounts of the heavy 
exploitation of seabirds. He estimated a party of four 
men took nearly 40,000 eggs the previous spring 
(suzuki,l9as:e). Rabbits were also an important cash 
crop; Butler (1980) details how, in 1914, five men from 
Placentia caught rabbits in central Newfoundland and 
shipped them to St. John's, where an agent paid 16 cents 
each for them (Butler, 1980:90-101). Another source 
describes how, in the 1920'9. rabbirs caught in Gander 
Bay were shipped in one pound cans to St. John's for sale 
(Saundera, 1986:160-163). Caribou was also an important 
cash orop, as an account from the early 19oO'a 
demonstrates: 
This south coast deer hunt is a regular indus- 
try, like the catching of cod or lobster. The 
settlers are fitted out for it by their mer- 
chants just as they are for the other pursuits 
named. The outfits consist of advance- of 
requisites for the hunters families, the deer 
killed being turned over to the merchant on the 
El068 Of the hunt to offset advances 
recsived...the product of the hunt is then 
loaded on dog teams and hauled out to the 
coast, where the outfitters ship the meat to 
St. John's, there to be sold on the open market 
for what it will fetch. In January, 1900, the 
mail steamer...brought 411 and 575 carcasses in 
two shipaente ... choice cuts of venison can be 
bought for five cents a pound (Mccrath, 
1902:64). 
Clearly, wildlife resources were highly important for 
residents into the twentieth century. At this point a 
sketch of wildlife management and protection efforts is 
presented. 
me Game Lsvr 
The first European settlers to the island ware initially 
unrestrained in their hunting efforts. They broke with 
English traditions, which favored the exclusive use ol 
wildlife by propertied sport hunters. Wildlife was viewed 
as a free for the taking rssovrce (nontevecchi and ruck, 
1987:209). However, them were conplaints made to the 
English government concerning unregulated hunting and, by 
at least 1793, game laws vere baing enforced on the 
island. That year, several men from Greenspond were 
flogged for taking eggs from Funk Island in a Eloeed 
season. The flogging was ordered by the colony's first 
magistrate under en English Act of Parliament 
(Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:212). 
Newfoundland did not get its own game lavs until 
April 23, 1845, when "An Act for the Protection of the 
Breeding of Wildfowl in this Colony" was passed (Peters 
and Burleigh. 1951:31). On April 20, 1859, "An A& for 
the Protection of the Breeding of Wildfowl and 
Preservation of Game" was passed. This 1859 Act 
recognized the rights of poor settlers to take wildlife 
resources for conaunption purposes (nontevecohi and Tuck, 
1987:213). The special rights of poor settlers continued 
to be recognized in wildlife laws, until they vere 
amended in 1896, after which time poor settlers were not 
mentioned specifically in wildlife legislation (Overton, 
1980:44-45). That is, one could suggest that by the early 
twentieth century, wildlife resources had been trans- 
formed from a resource free for the taking into s reore- 
ationallsporting resource governed by laws. The laws in 
place by t h e  e a r l y  1900's spec i f i ed  when w i l d l i f e  could 
be taken,  how much might be t aken  and i n  what manner. 
These laws defined w i l d l i f e  resources as s p o r t i n g  
re sou roe^. 
Other measures t o  p ro tec t  w i l d l i f e  were undertaken 
by government i n  t h e  l a t e  nineteenth and e a r l y  twen t i e th  
cen tu r i es .  I n  1898, a Department of marina and  F i s h e r i e s  
was c rea ted  and took respons ib i l i ty  f o r  h i r i n g  wardens 
( b N a i l y ,  1910:5-6). P r i o r  t o  t h i s ,  an o rgan iza t ion  of 
sportsmen, t h e  Game Protection soc ie ty ,  had been respon- 
sible lor t h e  appointment of warden*. I n  1906, a Gmc and 
Inland F i she r ies  Board was c rea ted  on paper, bu t  no 
a c t u a l  Board was appointed u n t i l  1909. The f i r s t  vice- 
p res iden t  o f  t h e  Board, A.J. McNeily, had been a vica- 
p res iden t  of t h e  Game Pro tec t ion  Society.  He wrote t h a t  
t h e  Game Board was c r e a t e d  i n  1906 as t h e  r e s u l t  of a 
p o l i t i c a l  scandal ,  since the  appointment of wardens had 
become a mat te r  of p o l i t i c s  and patronage (McNeily, 
1910:6). Af te r  s e v e r a l  meetings with government, t h e  
Board was a b l e  t o  in f luence  t h e  c rea t ion  of "The Game and 
Inland F i she r ies  Act,  1910a (McNeily, 1910:6). Th i s  Board 
remained respons ib le  f o r  game pro tec t ion  and propagation 
u n t i l  1934, when t h e  Colnlaission of Government revised t h e  
Galne and Inland F i s h e r i e s  Act and t r a n s f e r r e d  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for. making regu la t ions ,  p r o t e c t i n g  and 
propagating animals and b i rds  t o  the Comnissioner of 
Natural  Resources (Evbank, 1938:88) .' 
Another e f f o r t  t o  protect  w i l d l i f e  resources i n  t h e  
ea r ly  twen t i e th  cen tu ry  was t h e  implementation of a 
510814 season on deer and moose from 1925 t o  1936 
(Pimlott ,  1953:573). Alra a t  t h i s  time, a National  
Preserve fo r  d e e r  was created on the  Avalon Peninsula 
loverton, 1980:46). There i n i t i a t i v e s  t o  p r o t e c t  
w i l d l i f e ,  came a t  a t ime  when various o the r  sources were 
a g i t a t i n g  t o  have w i l d l i f e  protection strengthened.  For 
example, by t h e  e a r l y  1900's, Sportsnen*s orgardzations 
had become a c t i v e  i n  Newfoundland. The Game F i s h  
Pro tec t ion  Associat ion was concerned c h i e f l y  with game 
f i s h ,  while t h e  Game Pro tec t ion  Society of Newfoundland 
es tab l i shed  i n  1890, war concerned with gsma b i r d s ,  deer 
and o the r  anilnals (McNeily, 1910:5). The Game Pro tec t ion  
soc ie ty  was on ly  a c t i v e  f o r  nine years,  but  was an 
important  o rgan iza t ion  since,  as mentioned above, it wee 
responsible f o r  appointing game wardens u n t i l  1898 
(McNeily, 1910:5-6). I n  1927 t h e  Game Pro tec t ion  Associ- 
a t i o n  was es tab l i ehed .  This p r iva te  o rgan iza t ion  was 
' I" 1934, under t h e  commission of Government, a 
Newfoundland Ranger Forse war created.  One of t h e i r  major 
func t ions  was enforc ing  t h e  game and f o r e s t r y  laws 
(Horwood, 1986:12-13). In  1938, t h e  Commissioner f o r  
Natural Resourcab de l ive red  an address t o  t h e  St .Johnts 
Rotary Club on preserving game and f i s h  (Evbank, 1938). 
*!founded by a group of public spirited oitizsns who 
desired that greater attention should be paid to the 
conservation of the various spar;ies of wildlife" (Muir, 
1937:218).   his group qitated far stricter enforcement 
of game laws, better regulation of open seasons and the 
establishment of game ~anctuariea (Muir, 1937:a18). Other 
S O U ~ C ~ L  a160 lobbied for increased wildlife protection, 
for example, the Game Board in its report for 1914 (Game 
and Inland Fisheries Board, 1914:8). Well known 
individuals, like Sir Wilfred Grenfell, also called for 
better enforcement of the gana lawn.' Similarly, 
newspapers and elected government representatives also 
called for tighter wildlife protection (see for example: 
Tbe Evenina Chronicle, February 18, 1910; Newfoundland, 
1910a:686-687). Clearly, game and fish protection were 
issues both for government and for various individuals 
and groups in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
~ent.ariea. 
In 1908, Dr. Grenfell introduced 300 reindeer from 
Lapland for his mission on the Great Northern Peninsula. 
The herd was heavily poached, particularly from 1914 to 
1917. D r .  GrEnfell lobbied the Game Board to amend the 
laws, to protect the animals better. Amendments were 
made, but poaching continued and in 1917 Grenfell offered 
the remaining 230 animals to the Canadian government. 
They were subsequently moved to Anticasti island in the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence (Grenfell, 1967:423-424). 
m f e  Resources for Tourism 
At the same time as concern with protecting wildlife 
resources was increasing in Newfoundland, efforts were 
also being made to use these reaourcen to attract 
hunterltaurists. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
organized attempts were made to lure tourists to the 
country by using wildlife resourcas as bait (Overton, 
199119). To a colony looking to diversify its economy 
beyond the fishery, the seemingly inexhaustible supply of 
game, fish and wilderness appeared as an attractive 
development alternative. The railroad company played an 
important part in transforming the caribou into a tourist 
resouroe, as the trans-island line had opened up the 
interior, thus allowing access to the migrating caribou 
herds. For example, a sportsman who visited Newfoundland 
at the turn of the century wrote that "hundreds of camps 
are set up near the railway to intercept the deer" 
(~illais, 1907:3). Another source estimates that from 
1911 to 1915, 1,000-1.500 deer were I.illed annually along 
the railroad track (Haran, 1981:351). 
The railway company was also a big booster of the 
outdoor tourist industry and produced some of the first 
tourist promotional literature, which described Newfound- 
land as a "sportsman8s paradise abundant in caribou and 
other gale" (Overton, 1991:lO). The railway company built 
a hotel in the early twentieth century, psrhaps to 
capitalira on the increasing tourist traffic (McGrath, 
1902:69). The vice-president of the Game and Inland 
Fisheries Board paid tribute to the railroad company for 
opening up the interior to tourists, explorers and 
sportsmen. He stressed that the interests of tha company 
paralleled the interests of the colony (McNeIly, 1910:8). 
Evidence which supports the argument that the 
Newfoundland government viewed wildlife as economic 
commodities is found in the Legislative Council 
Proceedings an the debate of the Game Board Bill. The 
elected representative who introduced second reading of 
this Bill stressed that the colony's wildlife needed 
protection, since it was e valuable economic asset that 
could help increase tourist traffic (Newfoundland, 1910s: 
686-687). Similarly, Muir (1937) refers to a Royal 
Commission of Inquiry, which emphasized the advantages of 
the country as a natural fur farm (Muir, 1937:218). 
other sources from the early twentieth century 
pressed the potential benefits of outdoor baaed tourism 
for Newfoundland. For example, Prowse, in his history of 
Newfoundland, theorized that: 
To the sportsman, the tourist, the angler, and 
the canoeist, the new railway will offer unri- 
valled attractions. For the hunter of big game 
there is the noble cariboo, a species of rein- 
deer peculiar to the island: they ranse over 
Contemporaries of Prowre also argued thet wildlife could 
be used to attract tourists here (see for example: 
NcGrath, 1902; Wood, 1911). A newspaper article from 
1910, "Slaughter of Caribou by Newfoundlanders" further 
supports the argument thet wildlife resources were being 
used to attract wealthy sportsmen to the island. This 
report discussed the killing of large numbers of caribou 
on the island's south coast and asserted that this 
"wanton destructian...will (sic) affect considerably the 
chances of the sportsman" (& Evenins C b r o W ,  
February 18, 1910).' Clearly wildlife resources had 
become highly important eoonolaic commodities to 
Newfoundland's government. 
Qpoorition to Game Laws and conflicts over Wildlife 
AS alluded to in the section on the traditional economy, 
residents of the island did not discontinue harvesting 
' The promotion of Newfoundland's wildlife as 
tourist rasourcea continued into the 1940's. For example, 
at that time the Tourist Development Board of the 
Department of Natural Resources hired a professional 
sportsman, Lee Wulff, to promote the country's wildlife 
resources to the North American market (Wulff, 1967:346). 
Wulff became involved in the war on poaching in the aid- 
1980,s as will be seen below. 
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wildlife resources after the implementation of the game 
laws. In fact there was much opposition to the game laws 
and there is much evidence which demonstrates that the 
game laws wers not clonely adhered to. For example, the 
praviovsly discussed newspaper item from 1910 concerning 
the "slaughter of caribou" reported that a policeman from 
st. John's had been rent to the area in question to check 
out reports of poaching. It was also reported that fines 
and jail terms had been assigned by magistrates (m 
Evenina Chronicle, February 18, 1910). Another example 
hiqhlighting people's disobedience of the wildlife laws 
is found in the c - Board Report of 1914. This report 
stated that deer were being killed throughout the year, 
for both food use and for sale in adjoining settlements 
(Game and Inland Fisheries Soard, 1914:8). 
Another example of people's defiance of the game 
laws may be inferred from Horuood's (1986:39) statement 
that moose meat had become a dietary staple by the time 
the first open season was declared in 1936. similarly, 
Pilgrim's (1986) work on the accidental death of a 
Newfoundland Ranger shows that in the winter of 1935-36 
much poaching of caribou was occurring on the Great 
Northern Peninsula. A significant example of resident 
opposition to the game laws comer from the early 1940's 
when the commission of Government banned the summer 
shooting of shearwaters or bawKs, a coastal bird. This 
law was met with huge popular resistance, prompting a 
looel songwriter to ridicule the government in a song 
entitled "The Shooting of the Bavks": 
The ones who made this law oan sit, eat 
chicken, drink port wine, But what about the 
Door old whost who hauls a fishin. line? He has 
50 watch 6awkr flock round, upon ; foggy day, 
And watch then rob his trawls of bait, and 
Watch them fly away: He's not allowed to kill 
one, or someone sure will squawk, for there's a 
bloody law aqin' the killing of s bawk. 
No doubt our wise Commissioners will formulate 
a plan, to furnlsh fresh meat for everyone who 
lives in Newfoundland. Thev'va aot a mllion 
It seems clear that residents defied the game laws and 
wildlife resources remained an important part of the 
subsistence lifestyle. 
By the twentieth century, the stage had been set for 
conflict over wildlife resources. This conflict would pit 
settlers involved in a subsistence lifestyle against 
sp~rtsmen and govarnment-supported capitalists involved 
in ma tourist industry. To a colony promoting itself as 
a sportsmen's heaven and wishing to attract wealthy 
foreign sportenen, wildlife resources had to be treated 
as economic commodities in need of protection and 
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management. To the government of the day and to those 
involved in the tourist trade, the disregard or the game 
laws by the resident population was most certainly a 
problem that needed to be dealt with. The assertion that 
the game lave served oertain interests is supported by 
the reaction of two elected reprssentativss from the 
south ooast to a report on the "slaughter of caribou" 
(The Evenina fhmnirle, February 18, 1910). The 
representative for Belleoram argued that the article was 
biased towards $porting interests, which had "yet to 
learn that the deer of this country were put here as an 
article of food for its inhabitants" (Newfoundland, 
1910b:311). The representative for Burgeo-La Poila argued 
that: 
The fact is that the sportsmen are jealous of 
the fishemen. ..&ey (fishermen) never Xi11 any 
more than is allowed by law, and they have as 
much right to the deer as any outside sportsman 
who cones here and kills for mere pleasure 
(Newfoundland, 1910b:311-312). 
This comment highlights the conflict between settlers, 
who used wildlife as a food resource, and sportsmen and 
capitalists, who viewed wildlife resources as economic 
commodities. 
The different views of wildliie held by the settlers 
and government-supported touristlsporting interests are 
important. Montevecchi and Tuck (1987) argue that the 
second phase of North American wildlife exploitation 
80 
began in the twentieth century and is characterized by 
legislation which eliminated "utilitarian endeavors" and 
emphasized the recreational aspects of wildlife as 
sporting resources (Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:210).6 
Similarly, Narohakrs (1987) work on the fish processing 
industry in British Columbia provides useful insight into 
the transPomation of Newfoundland's wildlife resources. 
Marchar (1987) writes: 
rather than rubsi&te;ce.~ie the reason for 
' 
catching fish (or cutting trees or any other 
activity), there is a need to define and defend 
property rights; without such definition, indi- 
viduals and companies would be unable to ensure 
that they, rather than any others, should bene- 
fit from their investments and activities (nar- 
chak, 1987:ll). 
If we substitute gathering wildlife resources where 
Na~chak has written, "any other activity," it might be 
reasonable to argue that the state and various 
capitalists had become interested in wildlife resource= 
as e~onomic commoditias at least by the late 1800's in 
Newf~undland. Poor reridente continued to use wildlife 
resources to supplement their diets and incomes. However, 
state supported interests held an opposing view and game 
laws were stringently enforced. The use of game as a food 
item in the traditional economy was not tolerated; for 
' Wildlife laws are discussed in more detail in 
chapter five. 
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example, the Ranger's pressed many charges for poaching 
during the late 1930's (Horwood, 1986:40). 
S m R Y  
It has been suggested that by the early twentieth 
century, game laws in Newfoundland had transformed 
wildlife resources from a food resource to a sporting 
resource. By this time, game was an important part of a 
fledgling tourist industry and laws defined wildlife as a 
resource pursued for recreation and amusement by wealthy 
sportsmen. Laws specified when and how wildlife resources 
might be gathered. However, the residents of the 
province, still involved in a subsistence lifestyle. 
ignored the game laws and continued to use wildlife a8 
food reeources. This scattered human population, combined 
with the large area of the island, readily available 
animals and a lack of wardens, made effective enforcement 
of the game laws hard. Having outlined the historical 
pattern of wildlifa use and early attempts to manage and 
promote it, analysis or the 1982 war on poaching will new 
FOmenEe. The fallowing chapter outlines stage one in the 




This chapter outlines stage one in the natural history of 
poaching, which lasted from sarly 1980 until September 
1982. However, in order to place the poaching issue in 
context it is necessary to examine big game management, 
tourism and related issues in the 1970's. These issues are 
considered under two headings, the provincial government 
and the provinsial wildlife division. Subsequently, 
agitation about the poaching issue is examined. 
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNNENT: MID 1970'S -EARLY 1980'5 
Tourism In- 
Prior to 1973, the wildlife division was a part of the 
department of minas, agriculture and resources. In 1973, 
wildlife was moved to the newly created department of 
tourism (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1973:24). Tourism was 
one of six departments in government's resource policy 
group. The others included forestry and agriculture; 
fisheries; industrial development; minas and energy; and 
rural development. The 1973 stated that "An inport- 
ant part of our resource development programme is the 
expansion of programmes in the tourist industry" (Newfound- 
land and Labrador, 1973:24). 
 ore evidence that tourism was receiving increased 
governnent attention is found in a major study of the 
industry conducted in 1976 by government. This study set 
the stage for a significant event in the province's tourism 
industry, that being the formulation of a cost-sharing 
program with the federal government to expand tourism in 
this province (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980:4&4. 
t he csnada-Newfoandlend Tourism subsidiary Agreement, 
was signed on February 22. 1978. Its main objectives were: 
(a)  to promote the expansion of, and to assist 
in the development of the private tourism 
industry: 
(b) to increase the net benefit of tourism to the 
provincial economy. This will include such 
ractors as: 
- to extend the length of the tourist season 
- to increase tourism related emplopent 
- to inorease tourism spending 
(E) to improve the quality and availability of 
tourism plant and services (accommodation, food, 
information and other services) throughout the 
province to meet the expanding requirements of 
the industry through public investments in areas 
such as natural and historic attractions and 
public infrastructure which are important toue- 
ism industry resources and where the private 
sector cannot be expecrted to oontribute; 
(dl to induce tourism growth in selected regions in 
association with the rural development objec- 
tives of the Provinoe; and 
(e) to ensure that all tourism development programs 
are consistent with the preservation of the 
Pr~vince's culture and heritasa (Canada-New- 
foundland, 1978:Z). 
The 1978 provincial M also made clear that emphasis 
was being placed on the tourist industry. It referred to 
the above mentioned agreement, and stated that "over 
$13,000,000 will bs spent ovar the next five years to 
improve tourist attractions and to inprove accamnodations*, 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1978a:ll). Accompanying the 
that year was a Blue~rint for Develonment, which 
singled out tourism as an important area for economic 
growth and expansion in the coming years (Newfoundland and 
Labradoe, 1978e:l-2;11;15). Governmentcontinuedto nurture 
the tourist industry into the 1980's. The 1980 provincial 
budget was accompanied by nanaaim All our Rasources, which 
was a development plan far the pariod 1980-85 in whish 
tourism was given a prominent place (Newfoundland and 
Labrador. 1980:47). 
By the mid to late 1970'8, the provincial government 
had taken a renewed interest in using wildlife and wild- 
lands to attract tourists. As nentionad abava, in 1973 the 
wildlife division became part of the new provincial 
departrent of tourism, suggesting the status wildlife war 
given by government at this time. Another example of the 
attempt to link wildlife and tourism waa the wildlife 
division's plan to implement a "caribou sports hunt in the 
northern managanant zone of Labrador" (Ames.1977:iv). In 
response to this proposal the Labrador Inuit Association 
commissioned a report, which voiced their concerns that the 
provincial game laws seem "to be geared for the southern 
sports hunter" 
The Tourism Subsidiary Agreement also contains 
evidence of increasing government interest in outdoor 
tourism. Point lo) of that Agreement (see above) explicitly 
' The native people of Labrador were highly visible in 
the late 1970's in disoussions surrounding big game 
management. media coverage from that period maker this 
dear. Por example, at least15 articles or reports daaling 
with native people and big game use appeared in   he Evening 
Xasaxan. in 1977 and 1978. One of the focal points of this 
conflict was the Mealy Mountain caribou hard, which ranges 
~outh of Goose Bay. In the late 1970's this herd gained 
prominence when several native people were Eharged with 
poaching. The Minister of Tourism at that time received 
much media coverage for his handling of the situation (see 
for example: The Evenina Telaaram, August 25 and 27; 
October 15; 20 and 2 6 ,  1977; July 1 and September 14, 
1978). 
An important part of the context of using wildlife 
resources as tourist resources is opposition from local 
hunters. Historically, tension existed between those who 
would use big game resources for tourism and local hunters 
who viewed the same animals as food resources. As Anesr 
(1977) report exemplifies, opposition to touristlsport 
hunting was still very much alive in the late 1970's. This 
opposition continued to be a factor throughout the 1980,s 
and into the 1990's. Thus government was forced to find 
ways to undermine and weaken this opposition. I argue that 
hunter education programs ware one means government used to 
try and weakan opposition by training hunters to behave in 
a sportsman-like manner. The hunter- education program is 
discussed at more length in chapter five. 
recognized t h a t  n a t u r a l  r s source r  were important  t o u r i s t  
resources. The "development of na tu ra l  and s c c n i c  a t t r a c -  
t ionas '  was i d e n t i f i e d  as one of t h e  programs t h a t  Newfound- 
land's  government would arrange t o  carry o u t  (Canada- 
Newfoundland, 1978). It seems c l e a r  t h a t  n a t u r a l  areas and 
reaourcea were recognized as important  sngments of t h i s  
p rov inceps  t o u r i s t  indus t ry .  
The 1978 Blvearint a l s o  emphasized t h e  
o u t d o ~ r s  and n a t u r a l  resources as touriatcornmodit ies.  Th i s  
dooument e&nowledged t h e  importance of tourism, a t  t h e  
same t ime p lac ing  emphasis on c u l t i v a t i n g  t h e  r u r a l  economy 
by development o f  t h e  "prinarv resources  of t h e  f o r s s k  
. f i e l d s  and seasv (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1978b:ll; my 
emphasis). Resource development was t o  inc lude  t h e  outdoor 
tourism sea to r :  "Po ten t i a l  z x i s t s  €or continued growth i n  
t h e  t o u r i s t  indus t ry  based upon h i s t o r i c  s i t e s  and 
n a t u r a l  scen ic  besu tv  of t h e  erovlnca" (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1978b:15; my emphasis). Thus Newfoundland's g r e a t  
outdoors was aga in  being looked upon as a p o t e n t i a l  source 
of revenue. Another example of t h e  rediscover> of w i l d l i f a  
r e sources  as economic oppor tun i t i e s  occurred i n  l a t e  19?8 
whenTouriam Min i s te r  James Morgan announced t h e  f i r s t  open 
season on  black bea rs  since 1975. A r e p o r t  of t h i s  an- 
nouncement noted t h a t  most bear hun te r s  were i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
t h e  sk ins  fo r  souven i r s  (me Evenine TelearaQ, November 1 ,  
1978).  Th i s  Minister  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  bear ware hunted for  
rec rea t ion  and t r o p h i e s ,  which again suggests t h a t  s p o r t  
hunting was being expanded by t h e  p rov inc ia l  government. BY 
t h e  l a t e  1980's black bear hunting would become a much 
promoted aspec t  o f  t h e  o u t f i t t i n g  business.  
Late 1978 and e a r l y  1979 a l s o  sew government attempt- 
ing t o  inc rease  s t andards  in t h e  outdoor t o u r i s t  indus t ry .  
For example, s newspaper a r t i c l e  announced t h a t  an "Inspec- 
t o r  w i l l  b e  appointed far hunting and f i s h i n g  camps" (BE 
Nenins T e l e a a ,  November 13, 1978). I t  was repor ted  t h a t  
t h i s  move was t o  coincide wi th  a crackdown on camp oper-  
a t o r s  who "ripped off  t o u r i s t s . "  Evidently,  t h e  p rov inc ia l  
government (or a t  l e a s t  t h e  department of tourism) was 
inc reas ing  i t s  r egu la t ion  of t h e  outdoor t o u r i s t  industry.  
The "increased emphasis on the  inspection" o f  t o u r i s t  
f ac ; i l i t i ea  was a l s o  mentioned i n  Manacinw A11 O u r  Reso -e.s 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980:48). In 1981, government 
demanded t h a t  o u t f i t t e r s  improve t h e i r  f a c i l i t i e s .  There 
examples demonstrate government was shaping t h e  o u t f i t t i n g  
indus t ry  and was attempting t o  increase and regu la te  t h e  
q u a l i t y  of t o u r i s t  f a c i l i t i e ~ . ~  
Tourism is a highly competi t ive indus t ry  and q u a l i t y  
of produot i s  very important. Since government was p lac ing  
so much emphasis on tourism, it i n  undsrstandable t h a t  
r egu la t ion  of f a c i l i t i e s  was increasing.  
Another example of t h e  growth of outdoor tourism 
occurred in Hay, 1980 when "The Wilderness and Ecologioal 
Reserves AE~" was passed i n  the  provincial leg is la ture .  The 
a c t  save government the power to set as ide  important 
natural areas throughout t h e  province "for t h e  benef i t ,  
education and enjoyment of o u r  people today and tomorrow" 
(me Evenin. Tele-, May 2, 1981). Wilderness neserves 
vere t o  be "areas t h a t  show l i t t l e  permanent evidence of 
man's presence;" they were t o  be maintained i n  t h e i r  
na tura l  s t a t e ,  free f romindus t r ia l  developments (Newfound- 
land and Labrador r i ldarness  and Ecological Reserves 
Advisory council, 1983:Iv). People were t o  be allowed 
access t o  Wilderness Reserves t o  camp, hunt, f i s h ,  pick 
ber r ies  and use then f o r  "adventure and recreation." 
Wildlife,  l i k e  caribou, which need la rge  wild l i v i n g  spaces 
would be protected, as would important r i v e r s  and other 
spec ia l  landscapes. E e o l ~ g i o a l  Reserves would generally he 
smaller than Wilderness Reserves and serve a more spec i f ic  
purpose, l i k e  protecting a seabird colony o r  r a r e  p lant  or 
animal. They were t o  be more numerous than Wilderness 
Reserves (Newfoundland and labradorwilderness and Ecologi- 
c a l  Reserves Advisory c o ~ n c i l ,  1983:Iv). I t  may seem t h a t  
governmentwas concarned chief ly  with wi ld l i fe  and wildland 
conservation and preservation. However, governmentwas a l s o  
in teres ted  i n  economic returns: 
Reserves a l s o  provide important economic 
returns. They w i l l  a t t r a c t  increasing numbers of 
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tourists from all over the world as wilderness 
and natural areas grow scarce elsewhere. In this 
way our reserves can provide the foundation for 
outfitting and guiding enterprises (Nfld. and 
Lab. Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisory 
council. 19a3:vII). 
Clearly, more than concern for animals was behind the 
implementation of thie act. 
Fiscal Res- 
By the end of the 19108s, the provincial government was 
entering s period of spending cuts. This attempting to 
follow a policy of limiting or cutting spending in many 
areas would prove to be highly important in the coming 
"war" OD poaching. The need for budgetary restraint was 
alluded to in the plue~rint far DeveloDment (1978): 
... the Government of Newfoundland end Labrador 
through its various resource departments is 
prepared to taka the steps necessary to ensure 
that thie Blueprint for Development is succers- 
fully realized. It will not be easy. As a Prov- 
ince, we must be prepared to accept a levelling 
off of OUT standard of public services, and a 
postponement of expectations for new and 
improved social programs. The private sector 
must be prepared to invest in the creation of 
new business enterprises and the expansion of 
existing operations. Government can only go so 
far. It can create a favourable climate in which 
investments in our energy, fishing, forestry, 
tourism, mining and agriculture sestors can be 
made without excessive risk on the part of the 
private sector. The rest is up to the private 
entrepreneur (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1978b:24). 
This quote demonstrates that government was aware it would 
be facing difficulties achieving the agenda of the 1978 
Blueorint. It also recognized the important role the 
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private sector would be expected to play in development 
initiatives. 
The anticipated fiscal constraint was clearly evident 
in nay, 1982 when the provincial government brought down a 
"Hard-times budget," which inoluded increased taxes and 
fees for government provided services. In addition a 
"salary and Wage Restraint Program" was implemented 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982a). Government was cutting 
spending, but at the same time, it was nourishing the 
Outdoor tourist -eator. By the end of the 1980's, govern- 
ment would attempt to out spending further by increasing 
the control of those inmlved in the outdoor tourist trade; 
that is, by privatizing wildlife resources. 
The Federal Govsmnment: late 1970's to earlv 1980's 
It is important to consider the federal level of government 
because the R ~ P  and the Canadian Wildlife Service are both 
federal agencies responsible for some aspects of wildlife 
enforcement in Newfoundland. As well, the province in very 
much dependent on federal government transfer payments. 
What happened on the provincial scene has to be viewed in 
this context. 
As discussed above, the federal government entered 
into the 1978 Tourism Agreement with the province. Obvious- 
ly, it was interested in this industry. Similarly, the 
asonomio benefits of wildlife had been established through 
a national survey conducted in 1981 by the Canadian 
Wildlife Service. Survey results found that one in ten 
Canadians did some type of hunting, spending an estimated 
$1.2 billion, or about $602 per hunter (Pilion et al. 
1983). This 8UrVeY demonstrated how widespread, popular and 
economically important wildlife was to Canadians. It can 
reasonably be assumed this survey influenced provincial 
governments.' 
In 1980, a ~omprehensive Canadian wildlife policy was 
first discussed at the 44th Pederal-Provincial Wildlife 
Conference. One of the guiding principles of the Guidelines 
m i f e  Poliov in Canada was that s'conservation of 
wildlife depends upon a well-informed public" (Canada, 
1983:7). This conference was attended by various officials 
from both the federal and pmvincial governments. There- 
fore, we night assume that conservation education was an 
issue for provincial and federal levels of government in 
1980. significantly, the provincial wildlife division'. 
infomation and education section war set up that year. As 
mentioned, education was regarded as having an important 
' Newfuundlandrs representative to this committee for 
a National Survev on the Value of W i l U  (created in 
1980) was the Director of the province's Wildlife Division 
(Pilion et al., 1985:320). 
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part to play in the transformation of wildlife into 
e~onanic sportltourirt resources as it allowed government 
to shape attitudes and opinions towards wildlife. The 
cuiaelinee (1982) suggested that: 
Host Canadians feel that wildlife is imwrtant 
to them, at the very least as a symbdl o f  a 
desireable quality of life or, more spaciEi- 
cally, for the recreational and ecmomic bene- 
Eits and pleasure that wildlife provides 
(Canada, 1983:l). 
By the beginning of the 198O's, the importance of wildlife 
and of wildlife related public education had bean recog- 
nized and established. 
THE PROVINCIAL WILDLIFE DIVISION 
The structure of the Wildlife Division 
Since 1980, the division has been composed of four 
branches: research and management; protection; information 
and education; and administration (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1983a:130). The information and education branoh 
Wan added in 1980. The division had been more or lass the 
same, minus infomtionand education, sinca 1973. Prior to 
1973 the division had two units, research and management, 
and protection and administration. The reoently retired 
director (1965-90) of the division explained that the 
decision to change the division's structure in 1973 was 
made at the exeoutive level; that is the Minister and hie 
deputies (interview, Hay 8, 1991). Significantly, this 
internal restrusturing occurred the same year that tha 
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wildlife division moved from the department of mines, 
agriculture, and resources to the newly created department 
of tourism (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1974:24). The 
division remained in this department until 1979, when 
governmental restructuring moved it to the new department 
of tourism, recreation and culture (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1979). In 1981, more re-alignment sew the 
division shifted to the department of culture, reoreation 
and youth, where it remained until 1989 when it became part 
of the department of environment and Lands (Newfoundland 
end Labrador, 1981 and 1989). Figure 4.1 clarifies the 
structure of the division as it stood in 1982. 
Pi9~1.e 4.1: wildlife division, 1982 
Departmental Minister 
Deputy Minister 
Assistant Deputy Minister 
Director of Wildlife Division 
Chief Chiaf Chief 
Of Of Of 
Research Information Protection 
In order to simplify the management and protection of 
wildlife the province has bean subdivided into four regions 
with a headquarters in St. John's (see nap 4.1 taken from 
Newfoundland and Labrador. 1983:1331. The regions have a 
head office from whish the regional supervisor manages the 
region. The eastern region office is in Clarenville; the 
central region office in Gander; the western region offioe 
in Pasadena; and the Labrador region office in Goose Bay. 
Each region has both wildlife protection officers (WPO's) 
and management officers (MO) assigned to it. In addition, 
each regional offioe has a regional biologist stationed 
there. Tabla 4.1 illustrates the regional breakdown as it 
Stood in 1982. 
*able 1.1 wildlire Regions, 1982 
Eastern Central Western Labrador 
Region Region Region Region 
H.Q. H.Q. H.Q. H.Q. 
Clar~n~ille Gander Pasadena Goose Bay 
supervisor Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor 
11 WPO 11 WPO 14 WPO 10 WPO 
6 HO 6 MO 6 NO 3 MO 

In addition to the 48 full tino wildlife protection 
officers (WPO's) and the chief of protection, there were 
also 17 part-time staff employed during peak seasons 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:156). Regions ware 
further sub-divided into patrol districts. 1n 1982 there 
were 30 protection districts (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1983a:156). The regional breakdown remains the same today. 
However, the numbers of staff have declined. 
ame Animals 
It 1- important to oritically examine the way in which the 
size OI big game herds end the extent of poaching are 
estimated. First we must consider the methods used to count 
big game animals in ~ewfoundland.~ One method is the so- 
called block census, which is the preferred method for 
counting both moose and caribou. Newfoundland has been 
divided into big game management areas, which are 
further subdivided into blocks one kilonetre square. Four 
of these blocks are taken together in a square, or quadrat, 
measuring two kilometers by two kilometers, and represent 
The chief of education (Minty)end the central region 
biologist (Porsey) co-wrote a half-page newspaper article 
on conducting a census of big game herds which provides 
some useful information for this diecuesion (- 
w, September 7, 1982). Also useful are Bergerud and 
Manuel's (1969) work on the aerial census of moose and 
Bergerud et al.'s (1983) work on the Avalon Peninsula 
caribou herd. 
~t present there are over fifty management areas 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1989b:IE). 
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one sample unit. A management area nay have a number of 
sample unite within it, depending upon its size. TO 
estimate the number of animals in a management area, a 
number of sample units would be randomly selected and 
surveyed. The survey involves a slow, thorough search of 
the block by a helicopter flying a ories-cross pattern. 
observers record the number of animals eeen and the total 
number of animals counted is then multiplied by the number 
of sample units. Far example, if, in a management area 
comprised of 100 sample units, one sample unit was surveyed 
and eight animals counted, eight multiplied by 100 would 
give an estimate of 800 animals for the particular nanage- 
ment area. Tho central regional biologist and the chief of 
infomation and education compared this method of counting 
big game to estimating the number of raisins in a loaf of 
bread by ~0unting the number of rsisIns in a few slices and 
then multiplying by the total number of slices. Minty and 
Forsey (1982) etated that this nethod will not be exact, 
but very clone. 
Another for. of counting is the "strip census," in 
which a fiued-wing aircraft flies a rtraight-line several 
kilometers long and observers count the numberr, of animals 
eeen and then extrapolate € m a  this figure. The strip 
census is useful in open country with little woods or rough 
terrain in which animals can hide. It is less expensive 
than the blook census since fired-wing are cheaper to rent 
and more country can be covered in a shorter period of 
tine. However, they are less accurate than the block census 
and are not practical for counting noose in wooded country 
(Minty and Forsey, 1982). The wildlife division doer not 
completely survey each management area, but instead samples 
about 128 of an area when estimating moose numbers and 
about 15-20? when sampling caribou numbers (Minty and 
Foreey, 1982). Additionally, the division does not sample 
eaah management ares every year. For exanpla. in 1982 five 
moose management areas were ranpled (1A. 2, 10, 24 and 37) 
while in 1983 only three areas were conpletaly surveyed 
(11, 13 and 24) and two areas were partially surveyed (23 
and 26) (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:131). Trend data 
are used to estimate  population^ in the other areas. 
In addition to census results, the wildlife division 
relies on two other types of data supplied by hunters: 
licence returns and the lower jawbone of animals taken. The 
former are questionnaire-like devices which all licenced 
big game hunters have to return. These indicate population 
fluctuations or trends. The jawbones indicate the age 
~~mposition of the herds. By 1983-84, continual outs to 
aircraft budgets forced the wildlire division to rely 
heavily on trend statistics from hunter reports and lover 
mandible collections (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1984:2). 
However, when relying on such data, wildlife managers are 
forced to do much guessing, as the comments of the chief 
biologist show: 
Essentially what we do, well to do it correstiy 
of course, we'd need s count first. Then you'd 
need an estimate of mortality end your produc- 
tivity ... then theoretically you should plug this 
into a population model ... barring that, you 
normally don't have that for most populations, 
there's, ah, you work with data on other areas 
that are similar or adjaoent. And you look at 
your trend data to see if you know if your 
population is increasing at a certain rate. And 
ah again, you plug the sane figures with a lot 
of guessing into you model and come up with an 
estimate (intarview. July 25, 1990). 
It is important to point out that the data gathered Prom 
licence returns ere problematic. Both the central ragion 
biologist and the chief biologist made this clear in 
separate interviews (July Is and July 25,  1990). For 
example, both men suspect that the high hunter success rate 
in moose management area 37 (Grey River East) does not 
reflect the actual number of moose legally taken in that 
area. There two biologists believe that hunters apply for 
a licence in this remote area on the provinsets south- 
coast, but hunt and kill an animal in a more accessible 
area. Both biologists suspect that hunters apply to hunt in 
Grey River East because there is less demand for this area 
and hence it is easier to get a licence. This exanple 
suggests that relying on hunter returns to estimate the 
number of animals taken from a management area and the 
remaining population is highly problenatic. 
I t  i s  important  t o  cons ide r  t h e  accuracy of t h e s e  
sampling methods because t h e  est imates a r r ived  a t  in f luence  
t h e  s e t t i n g  of l i cenos  quotas,  which are obviously an 
important  p a r t  of government's w i l d l i f e p o l i c i e s .  The ch ie f  
of education and t h e  c e n t r a l  r eg iona l  b i o l o g i s t  claimed 
t h a t  a e r i a l  censuses a re  about "90 p e r  cent aoourate" 
(n in ty  and Forrey, 1982).  That is, a population es t ima ted  
to con ta in  1,000 animals may a c t u a l l y  have anywhere from 
900 t o  1,100 animals. Estimates are o f t en  cor rec ted  f o r  
" s igh tab i l i ty" ;  f o r  example, i n  1982 t h e  w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  
es t ima ted  t h e  t o t a l  caribou population of Newfoundland was 
between 36,776 and 40,119 animals,  with a 10 t o  20 p e r c e n t  
co r rec t ion  f o r  s i g h t a b l i t y .  Without a c o r r e c t i o n  f o r  
s i g h t a b i l i t . ~ ,  a f i g u r e  of 33,433 a n i n a l s  was a r r i v e d  a t  
(Mercer + t  e l . ,  1985:zo). One study conducted by  t h e  
w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion  suggested t h a t  " l e s s  than  one-half of t h e  
moose i n  any given area are genera l ly  seen by obse rvers  
from e i t h e r  he l ioop te r  o r  fired-wing a i r c r a f t "  (Newfound- 
land and Labrador, 1983a:137). S imi la r ly ,  Bergerud and 
Manuel (1969:911) wrote t h a t  "quadrat  census can prov ide  
a c c u r a t e  r e s u l t s  i n  c e n t r a l  Newfoundland. [Hlawever, t h e  
necessary cond i t ions  are extremely r igomus .*  Bergerud and 
Manuel (1969) went on t o  s p e c i f y  t h a t  counts be  conducted 
wi th in  a few hours of a f r e s h  snowfall ,  be fo re  t r a c k s  of 
animals mingle, and t h a t  experienced p i l o t s  and obse rvers  
and h igh ly  maneuverable a i r c r a f t  are also high ly  r i g n i f i -  
cant with regard t o  influencing est imates.  However, other  
sources suggest  t h a t  e s t ima tes  of big game herds are highly 
speculative.  For example, t h e  black bear and caribou 
b io log i s t ,  i n  a b r i e f  t o  t h e  independent review panel  on 
northern cod wrote tha t :  
The Grey River Caribou herd inhab i t s  a region of t h e  
south-central  Newfoundland barrens,  an area of open, 
gen t ly  undulating t e r r a i n  comprised p r imar i ly  of 
e x t e n s i v e b ~ g l a n d a n d  heatboomunities...Between 1979 
and 1987 a t o t a l  of 26 complete or p a r t i a l  surveys of 
t h i s  population were conducted, providing es t ima tes  of 
population s i z e  t h a t  varied by as much as 3 times1 
(Mahoney, 1989 : 6-7) . 
Similarly,  Freeman (1989) d i scusses  t h e  imprecision of big 
game sc ience  and t h e  problematic; nature of t h e  es t ima tes  
produced by b io log i s t s .  C lea r ly ,  e s t ima tes  of t h e  s i n e  of 
big game herds are high ly  va r i ab le  and imprecise.  
Having produced an es t ima te  of t h e  s i z e  of b ig  game 
herds ,  b io log i s t s  are then  a s k e d t o  s e t  quotae for  cu l l ing .  
These quotas t r y  t o  maximize hunter p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and 
economic benef i t s ,  and a t  t h e  same t ime ensure t h e  f u t u r e  
v i a b i l i t y  of herds. It is important t o  examine t h e  formula 
used t o  e e t  quotas because it i s  he re  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  of 
poaching on t h e  herd i s  considered.  Th i s  management t o o l  is 
also s ign i f i can t  because it aga in  demonstrates t h e  uncer- 
t a i n t y  involved i n  b ig  game management. Hunting quo tas  are 
es tab l i shed  using t h e  following formula: 
Clear ly  t h i s  formula involves maliy est imations,  which. as 
discussed above, are o f t e n  e x t r m a l y  imprecise. 
This formula includae b ig  game mor ta l i ty  due t o  
poaching. Currently,  the div i s ion  estimates poaching l o s s e s  
a t  5 1  annually.  when I asked t h e  ch ie f  b i o l o g i s t  how t h e  
f i g u r e  f o r  poaching l o s s  i s  a r r ived  a t ,  he r e p l i e d  t h a t  it 
was r e a l l y  a "guesstimate.. .when you look a t  it and t r y  and 
p in  down how many animals are being poached every  yea r ,  
t h a t ' s  a rough th ing  t o  do" [ interview, J u l y  25,  1990). 
Similarly,  t h e  black bear and caribou b i o l o g i s t  a l s o  
desoribed t h e  5% f i g u r e  used t o  r epresen t  poaching l o s s  as 
a "guesstimata." H e  went on t o  s t a t e  t h a t  when w i l d l i f e  
biologiatrr e s t ima te  herd s i z e ,  t h e  number of poached 
animals used i n  the  formula is "a fudge f a c t o r , "  since 
' A s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  v a r i a n t  of t h i s  formula was 
given by t h e  chief  b i o l o g i s t  when he  was interviewed. He 
s t a t e d  tha t :  
Quota = Population x Recruitment* - Mortali ty** 
........................................ 
SUcEeas Rate 
* ind ica tes  t h e  percent of yea r l ings  
** inoludes k i l l  by hun te r s ,  na tu ra l  loss ,  c r i p p l i n g  l o s s  
( i . e .  sho t  hu t  no t  r e t r i e v e d  by hunter)  and k i l l  bv 
poachers. 
t h e r e  i s  "no mechanically accura te  way of f inding o u t  the  
i l l e g a l  take" ( interview, August 9,  1990). It  seems c l e a r  
t h a t  t h e  w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion  was unsure of haw much poaching 
was a c t u a l l y  occurring.  Concomitantly, t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  and 
aoouraoy of population es t ima tes  of both noose and rraribou 
he rds  i n  Newfoundland must b e  questioned due t o  the  na tu re  
of b i g  game science and t h e  problems assoc ia ted  with 
counting roaming animals i n  rough t e r r a i n .  
Since a "warn was dec la red  on poachers i n  1982, it is 
inpor tan t  t o  question t h e  f i g u r e s  end es t ima tes  of b i g  game 
s c i e n t i s t s .  HOW c e r t a i n  were w i l d l i f e  b i o l o g i s t s  t h a t  hard- 
Were decreasing i n  t h e  e a r l y  1980's ? How c e r t a i n  were 
t h e s e  b i o l o g i s t s  t h a t  poaching was t h e  cause of herd 
dec l ine?  It is important  t o  b r i e f l y  consider t h e  h i s t o r y  of 
oaribou and moose popu la t ions  i n  Nawfoundland. It is 
es t ima ted  t h a t  around 40,000 n a t i v e  caribou inhab i t ed  
Newfoundland a t  the  tu rn  o f  t h e  twen t i e th  century.  A 
dec l ine  i n  numbers began i n  1915 and by 1930 t h e r e  were 
epprorimataly 3000 remaining on t h e  i s l and .  However, s ince  
then  an inc rease  has occurred;  by 1967 caribou numbers Vera 
as t ima ted  a t  around 8.000 animals and by 1982 Newfoundland 
was conse rva t ive ly  eatimated t o  have 33,433 (Mercer e t  a l . ,  
1985:ZO). Moose were introduced t o  Newfoundland in 1878 and 
1904, and from the  l e t t e r  da te  t o  1960 moose nulnbees 
s t e a d i l y  increased (Mercer e t  a l . ,  1988:46). At  t h a t  time 
a decline begin, which continued until 1973. Than moose 
numbers began to increase, but around the late 1970's 
wildlira division estimates showed a blight decrease, whish 
continued until 1982, when moose began to increase. This 
trend continues today (Mercer et al., 1988:46; Mercer and 
strapp, 1978:229-230; Meroer and Manuel, 1974). It is 
significant to consider the explanations given by biol- 
ogiata for the draatic declines that occurred in the 
caribou and noose herds. Moore are believed to have 
declined rapidly after 1960 due to over-harvesting (both 
legal and illegal) and from over-browsings in inaccessible 
areas (Mercer and strapp, 1978:230). Caribou are believed 
to have experienced the dramatic decline due to over- 
harvesting and high predation by lynx on the calves 
(Bergerud et al., 1983: Peters and King, 1958). Signifi- 
cantly, in both cases over-harvesting w s  not the only 
factor believed to have precipitated herd declines in the 
past. 
By the early 1980,s reports indicate that wildlife 
biologists generallythovghtcariboupopulationsweredoing 
very well; as mentioned, Newfoundland was oonservatively 
estimated to have 33,433 animals (Mercer et al., 1985t20). 
Over-browsing essentially means that there are too 
many animals for the available food supply. This surplus 
means that food quantity and quality will diminish result- 
ing in a decrease in animals. 
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The Avalon Peninsula ca r ibou  herd had increased from 
approximately 700 animals i n  1967 t o  3,000 by 1979 
(Bergerud e t  a l . ,  1983:989). Moose populationsware thought 
t o  be experiencing a s l i g h t  dec l ine  i n  numbers i n  t h e  l a t e  
1970's (nercer e t  a l . ,  1988:46; Mercer, interview, r u l y  2 5 ,  
1990). As mentioned above, previous dea l inea  i n  b i g  game 
herds had been p rec ip i t a t ed  by  sore than i l l e a a l  over- 
harvesting.  why, i n  the  e a r l y  19BOrs, with caribou popula- 
t i o n s  est imated t o  be increasing and moose populations 
est imated t o  be experiencing on ly  a s l i g h t  dec l ine ,  wss a 
"war" declared on poaching? Why d i d  w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  
employees and government Min i s t e r s  claim poaching was 
rampant and ou t  of con t ro l?  naybe concern with t h e  dec l ine  
i n  noose numbers led t o  t h e  "war" on poaching.   his 
explanation does not  c a r r y  much weight because oaribou 
seemed to be t h e  main concern of claims-makers. Other 
reasons, such as a d e s i r e  t o  expand the outdoor t o u r i s t  
indus t ry ,  may have p r e c i p i t a t e d  the. poaching o f fens ive ,  as 
w i l l  be  disaussed below. An examination of the  eduoation 
sec t ion  and i t s  importance w i l l  now be presented. 
w e  Bducatioq 
Wi ld l i f e  eduostion had been recognized as highly important  
by t h e  1980'8 and t h e  establishment o f  the  information and 
education branch i n  1980 was a s i g n i f i c a n t  event f o r  t h e  
coming "war" on poaching. The mandate of t h i s  branch was t o  
inform the public about matters affecting wildlife 
resources and help foster attitudes and actions that ware 
in the best interests of the people and wildlife. Many of 
 government*^ initiatives launched in the "war" on poaching 
originated fromthis section. For example, the infornation 
and education branch launched formal trainin orograns and 
conducted extensive public relations work .:..ough media 
releases and speaking engagements. This branch had three 
sections and seven permanent members by 1982.' 
Conservation education was (and is) vital to big game 
management in Newfoundland. The recently retired, longtime 
director of the division stated that he would consider the 
creation of this section one of the highlights of his 25 
year career as director (interview, May 8, 1991). The 
addition of the education branoh in 1980 has to be seen as 
highly important when considering why a "war" on poaching 
@ c he three seotions of the education branch were the 
general education program, the hunter education programand 
the salmonier Nature Park. Its employees included a branch 
~oordinator responsible for "establishing direction and 
programs for the entire Branch"; a hunter education 
coordinator, responsible for "developing and implementing 
the Hunter Education Program'1; a Hunter Training Officer; 
and Salmonier Park staff (Newfoundland and Labrador. 
1983:lsl). salnonier Nature Park is an outdoor education 
centre and its most important role we. to increase the 
awareness of park visitors, preferably residents, of the 
provincefe rich wildlife heritage and the need to conserve 
it (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:lTO). The discussion 
in this chapter focuses on wildlife education generally. In 
the next chapter a more focused analysis of the hunter 
education program is presented. 
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was declared in 1982. mi. was made olear by the recently 
retired chief biologist: 
... if the people didn't cooperate, we'd be out 
of business. People have to cooperate...we'va 
only got fifty wardens. Now if the people did 
not cooperate with these wardens there's nothing 
they aould do, absolutely nothing ... the key to 
wildlife enforcement is public relations eaaen- 
tially, and to et people "on side" (interview, 
July 25, 1990).' 
This quote highlights an important point: with less than 50 
wardens, the chances of effectively policing 500.000 
people, scattered over more than 150,000 square miles, was 
slim. 
The importance of wildlife education had been recog- 
nized as early aa 1958 by the wildlige division: 
The public attitude towards game laws and their 
enforcement is one of the basic problems of 
wildlife conservation throughout the province 
and a program of public education is probably 
the only means by which this attitude may be 
changed ... conservation eduoation is not the 
provision of factual knowledge but rather a 
process of building up within the public mind an 
appreciation of the wildlife resource. It is the 
creation of a real, living philosophy suited to 
our times and needs, practical in its applisa- 
tion and carrying a true sense of values that 
will extend our wildlife reaourcs assets over 
generations (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1983a:160). 
The creation of an infomation and education section 
signalled a new initiative in wildlife management in the 
10 1n 1978 the chisf biologist was quoted as stating 
"If you don't have the cooperation of the people then 
yourre runkl There's nothing you can do" (The Evening 
-, September 14, 1978). 
province. Both hunters and non-hunters ware to be educated 
in wildlife conservation ethics." Hunters particularly 
were taught to behave like "true spotcanen." This also 
might be seen as a move by government to train hunters to 
police themselves. In a large province v i a  few wardens, 
huntere who wish to disobey the game laws have a good 
chansa of not getting caught. Young people were also 
targeted for education, the argument being that attitudes 
developing in young minds were more easily influenced then 
attitudes of middls-agedpeople (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1983a:161). Following this logic, a program was estab- 
lished. beginning in 1982-83, to integrate wildlife 
education into the province's school system. Finally, by 
1990, "projact wild" was being introduced to the province'= 
school system (interview, September 5, 19901. 
The creation of the position oP chief of information 
and education also created an official source, a "primary 
definer* of the poaching issue. This man was in a position 
to make claims about poaching and offer possible remedies 
for the problem. When interviewed, he stated that from 
'I In 1977, government attempted to innease its 
control of hunters with the introduction of a Huntar Safety 
program. This program required hunters to do a written 
capability test and a marksmanship test before they could 
apply for a big game licence. This demonstrates that 
government was inoreasing its regulation of reaident 
hunting. 
either e law enforcement, or a management point of view, 
without education there is not much hope of protecting 
wildlife. In Marsh 1981 this man made clear how important 
he believed his job was when he wrote: 
It is very clear that if more people do not gain 
a greater understanding and appreciation for 
wildlife, its future in this province is in 
jeopardy. That is why the job of this section ia 
one of the most important facing the wildlife 
division today (me Evenins Telesram, March 28, 
1981). 
The need to educate people about wildlife conservation had 
become his career, and he was in e position to have much 
influence in shaping the poaching issue. It seems probable 
that this newly created arm of the wildlife division may 
have tried to demonstrate its value and carve out a niohe 
for itself by acting vigorously in the area of poaching. 
That is, the education section had to justify its exist- 
ence, it had to show that it war needed and that it wae 
operating effectively. It seems probable that the recently 
appointed chief of education would have wanted to make hie 
presence felt by being highly visible in his area of 
specialization, which included the poaching issue. 
More support for my assertion that the creation of the 
education section played a key role in increasing awareness 
around the poaching issue is found in Freeman'B (1989) 
diecussion of state employed big game biologists. Freeman 
suggests that biologists are "like most other people in 
having s t rong  pe r sona l  f ee l ings  about i s s u e s  c l o s e  t o  then,  
including advancement i n  t h e i r  careers" (Freeman, 1989:95). 
  re em an goes on t o  suggest  t h a t  s t a t e  employed b io log i s t s  
m y  even misrepresent da ta  t o  r ece ive  p u b l i c  support  and 
ins rewed  funds during a period of i n t e n s e  competi t ion 
(Preeasn, 1989:loo). s imi la r ly ,  Beckee (1967) discussed 
how: 
... parsonnel of t h e  organization devoted t o  t h e  
problem tend  t o  bu i ld  t h e i r  l i v e s  and careers 
around its continued existence.  They became 
attached t o  " the i r "  problem, and any th ing  t h a t  
th rea tens  t o  make it disappear o r  diminish i n  
importance is a t h r e a t  (Becker, 1967 : l l ) .  
I f  poaching was worsening, t h e  education branch might have 
been given more funding t o  increase its e f f o r t s .  By t h e  
e a r l y  1980's t h e  p rov inc ia l  govarnment was en te r ing  a 
period of f i s c a l  r e s t r a i n t ;  so t h e  w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  and 
its education branch may have found i t s e l f  i n  a competition 
f o r  funds. I n  such a s i t u a t i o n  it is p o s s i b l e  t h a t  M a  
poaching problem may have been used t o  main ta in  e x i s t i n g  
l e v e l s  o f  funding. This is n o t  to suggest  t h a t  t h e  ohief  of 
sd~c.ti0" ac ted  cyn ica l ly ,  and s implyou t  o f  se l f - in te res t .  
The men may have believed i n  what he was doing,  t h a t  h i s  
assignment was an important and necessary one. The ch ie f  of 
edusation was i n  a new job, i n  a new sec t ion  of the 
w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion .  Wi ld l i f e  education had become a p r i o r i t y  
f o r  govarnnent, b u t  a t  the same t i n e  budgets were being 
cut .  I n  such an atmosphere, it i s  easy t o  see how M e  
poaching issue could have appeared very appealing to the 
education section. It is also important to consider that 
tourism bared on wildlife resources was a priority for 
government at this same time. The  omb bin at ion of thesa 
factors contributmd to ths smergenoe of the poashinq issue 
in tha early 1980's. Stage one in the natural history of 
poaching. Agitation, will now be presented. 
AGITATION 
Claims-making activities are the crucial aspects of this 
first stage. It is important to consider the ways con- 
plaints about poaching are raised. That is, what strategies 
are used to press claims, gain publicity and arouse 
controversy? These strategies affect the life of the issue 
and whether or not the issue will move into subsequent 
stages. The power of clains-makers and the types of claims 
are also significant factors to consider. The objective 
seriousness (the actual extent of the poaching problem) may 
have bean "relatively indepandent" of the successful 
developent of poaching as a problem (spector and Kitsuse, 
1977:113). Best (1987:llS) argues that rhetoric is central 
to claims-making activities. Thus, it is inportant to 
oonsider the words and arguments used to make claims about 
the poaching issue. since the argument of the thesis is 
that the poaching issue was linked to government's renewed 
interest in outdoor tourism, olaims about outdoor tourism 
are a l s o  examined. The d i scuss ion  begins by examining four  
ca tegor ies  of claims-makers: p rov ina ia l  government Minis- 
t e r s ;  w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  s t a f f ;  media personnel;  and p r i v a t e  
i n t e r e s t  groups. Then the  types  of olaime a r e  examined 
using Bes t re  (1987) framawork. 
~ v i n d s l  Goyernment Min i s t e r s  as Claims-makers 
Three Minis te r s  (Ron Dawe, Hal Andrews and Len S i m s )  made 
claims about poaching. There men were conseautively 
Minister  of c u l t u r e ,  r ec rea t ion  and youth, r e spons ib le  f o r  
w i l d l i f e  from 1980 t o  1982. How powerful a claimr-maker is 
depends on monetary aupport ,  s o c i a l  s t a t u s ,  knowledge, 
organization and s k i l l -  (R i t ze r ,  1986:9). The more of these 
a t t r i b u t e s  s claimr-maker possesses or can draw upon, t h e  
b e t t e r  t h e  chances helshe w i l l  be success fu l  i n  p ress ing  
h i s l h e r  claim (Spector and Kitsuse,  1977:143). Dawe, 
Ilndrews and S i m s  were a l l  extremely powerful  ind iv idua l s .  
All  were e l e c t e d  members of t h e  p rov inc ia l  House of 
Assembly and had t h e  support  of t h e i r  cons t i tuen t s .  
add i t iona l ly ,  a l l  had been made members o f  t h e  Premier's 
Cabinet .  They were o f f i c i a l  sources and would have no 
d i f f i c u l t y  i n  ga in ing  access t o  t h e  news media. In  f a c t ,  
Hall  e t  a l .  (1979:58) argue t h a t  t h e  media r e l i e s  heav i ly  
on t h a s e  i n  powerful  pos i t ions  because o f  cons tan t  p r e s s  
dead l ines  and "profasaional  demands of i m p a r t i a l i t y  and 
ob jec t iv i ty" .  Fishman (19ao:145) makes a sirnilarc olrgunent, 
wri t ing  t h a t  r e p o r t e r s  r e l y  on o f f i o i a l  sources t o  meet 
dead l ines  and avoid slander s u i t s .  
As Ministers,  t h e s e  men had the  knowledge and s k i l l s  
of w i l d l i f e  b i o l o g i s t s  t a  draw on. S imi la r ly ,  thsy  a l s o  had 
the organized s t r u c t u r e  of t h a  w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion  and 
government behind t h e i r  claims. Tha importance of z Cabinet 
Min i s t e r  as a claime-maker was made c l e a r  by Mr. simmr: 
Hell  t o  be  p e r f e c t l y  f rank  with you, i f  the  
Min i s t e r  d i d n ' t  have an i n t e r e s t .  t h e  chances of 
it ( t h e  1982 crackdown) ever ocFurring a t  t h a t  
t ime were somewhat sl im, very slim.. . i f  the  
Min i s t e r  doesn' t  f e e l  comfortable,  f o r  whatever 
reason, i n  t ak ing  it t o  h i e  cab ine t  co l l eagues ,  
maybe because he knows from calking t o  h ie  
oab ine t  colleagues on a d a i l y  b a s i s  t h a t  they 
don ' t  th ink  i t s  a big p rob l~m,  they ' r e  not 
prepared t o  p u t  up money f a r  it, 60 he'd be 
wasting h i s  t ime  bringing it t o  cab ine t .  So 
o l e a r l y  t h e  Min i s t e r  has t o  have t h e  commitment 
t o  do something about it. I don' t  t h i n k  t h e r e ' s  
any question about t h a t .  Na matter  how much 
p ressure  you g e t  from i n t e r e s t  groups,  o r  your 
own o f f i c i a l s ,  t h e  Minister ,  t h e  buck s t o p s  with 
t h e  Minister . .  . t h e  key t h e r e  would obviously 
have t o  be t h e  Minister  having t h e ,  ahh, wanting 
t o  do something about it, o r  having a commitment 
t o  do something about it (intarview, Apr i l  24, 
1991). 
Simms' comrosnts make E lea r  t h e  power Min i s t e r s  have. simms 
was an important  f i g u r e  i n  t h e  "war" on poaching, s ince  he 
wan t h e  Min i s t e r  who declared war. H e  was an extremely 
vocal  claims-maker and remained highly v i s i b l e  throughout 
h i s  t enure  as Minis te r  of w i l d l i f e  (1982-1984). S ign i f i -  
can t ly ,  simms' brother was highly involved i n  t h e  t o u r i s t  
industry.  For a x m p l e ,  he  was t h e  founding p res iden t  of t h e  
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Tourism Industry Associat ion of Newfoundland and Labrador 
(~umphrey, 1984:127). n his l i n k  between a government 
min i s t e r  and t h e  t o u r i s t  indus t ry  is important, s i n c e  such 
connections may have increased t h e  monetary support  t h e  
min i s t e r  aould draw on, thereby increasing h i e  power. Such 
a l ink  was a l s o  important  when one oonsiders t h a t  tourism 
baaed on w i l d l i f e  was being nurtured a t  t h i s  time. 
Wi ld l i f e  
Three powerful claims-makers from t h e  d iv i s ion  were a c t i v e  
i n  t h i s  stage:  t h e  d i r e c t o r ,  t h e  ohief  o f  r e sea rch  and 
management (both now r e t i r e d )  and t h e  chief  of information 
and education.  The d i r e c t o r  had s t a r t e d  wi th  t h e  d i v i s i o n  
i n  1951 as a n  a s s i s t a n t  w i l d l i f e  b i o l o g i s t  and was t h e  
b u r e a u ~ r a t r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  running the div i s ion  s i n c e  1965. 
He had t h e  knowledge and s k i l l s  of d i v i s i o n  employeem t o  
draw on, p lus  the  organization of t h e  d iv i s ion  i t s e l f .  H is  
power was made c l e a r  when t h e  1982 amendments (discussed i n  
t h e  nex t  chapter)  t o  t h e  Wi ld l i f e  Act were being debated i n  
t h a  House of Assembly. At t h a t  t i n e ,  the m i n i s t e r  respon- 
b ib le  f o r  w i l d l i f e  s t a t e d  any MHA could " . . . f ee l  free t o  
con tac t  myself or any member o f  the department, e s p e c i a l l y  
t h e  d i r e c t o r  of wi ld l i f e . . . "  (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1982b). By s t r e s s i n g ,  "espec ia l ly  the  d i r e c t o r . "  t h e  
n i n i a t s r  demonstrated t h a t  t h e  d i r e c t o r  was t h e  person t o  
t a l k  t o  about ma t te r s  r e l a t e d  t o  wi ld l i f e .  
Adding t o  t h e  power of t h e  d i r e c t o r  was t h e  f a c t  he 
was adv i so r  t o  t h e  Executive. For example he accompanied 
t h e  Ministers t o  p ress  conferences.  The d i r e c t o r  was the  
head c i v i l  se rvan t  r e spons ib le  f o r  w i l d l i f e ;  h i s  length of 
se rv ice  provided con t inu i ty  and s t a b i l i t y  t o  e l ec ted  
p o l i t i c i a n s ,  who o f ten  had a high tu rnover  r a te .  As 
mentioned, the re  were t h r e e  w i l d l i f e  Min i s t e r s  from 1980- 
84. These e lec ted  o f f i c i a l s  may not have had any background 
i n  w i l d l i f e  r e l a t e d  matters;  they c e r t a i n l y  could not have 
had t h e  f a m i l i a r i t y  wi th  t h e  d iv i s ion  s t r u c t u r e  and t h e  
process of wildlifemanagement t h a t  t h e  d i r e c t o r  possessed. 
The r e l i a n c e  of Min i s t e r s  on c i v i l  se rvan t s  f o r  advice was 
supported by t h e  comments o f  Simms, who, when asked why 
poaching was an i s s u e  i n  1982, replied:  
Wall, I t h i n k  t h e  answer's p r e t t y  obvious, 
because t h e r e  was a g r e a t  d e a l  of ooncern among 
t h e  p ro fess ians l  people i n  t h e  department, uh, 
t h a t  t h e  population of big game i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
was being eroded and a major reason f o r  it was 
t h a t  poachers were having a g r e a t  t i n e  of 
it.. . (Interview, April  24, 1991).  
Simms repeatedly s t r e ssed  t h e  concern ev iden t  among t h e  
exper t s  i n  the  d i v i s i o n .  More evidence t h a t  Min i s t e r s  g e t  
advioe froln soexperts8' came from t h e  Weqram'r presen t  
outdoor columnist. When discus~ingwhygoveenment seemed to 
I be doing l i t t l e  t o  he lp  WPO's f i g h t  poaching a t  the  end of 
t h e  1980'8, he t o l d  me: 
... Now you can ' t  blame the  Ministers,  bacauee 
t h e y l r e  only running t h e  department. Most of 
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them haven't go t  s clue.  They've only been given 
advice by t h e i r  deputies,  who are given advice 
by t h e  bureaucrats. And the re  bureaucrats  who 
are s i t t i n g  down t h e r e  running t h e  Division are 
mostly b io log i s t s .  .. ( interview, May 14, 19901. 
In  h i s  opinion, b i o l ~ g i e t s  influence t h e  Deputy Minis- 
t e r ( ~ ) ,  who in t u r n  influence t h e  Minister .  It  is s i g n i f i -  
osnt t o  no te  t h a t  t h e  Daputy Minister  f o r  t h e  department 
rssponaible fo r  t h e  w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion ,  from a t  l e a a t  1974 
t o  1988, was a former w i l d l i f e  b io log i s t .  Also, as men- 
t ioned t h e  d i r e c t o r  was a f o m e r  b io log i s t .  The research 
and management sec t ion  (i .e .  w i l d l i f e  b i o l o g i s t s )  were 
oonnected t o  the  Minister 's  o f f i c e  through t h a  long t ime 
Deputy Minister. For example, t h i s  men (Prank Manual) had 
co-authored a paper on moose management with t h e  f o m a e  
chief  b io log i s t  (Mercer and Manuel, 1971) and wi th  another 
former Division b i o l o g i s t  (Bergerud and Manuel, 1969). Thus 
t h e  w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion  was and continuer t o  be connected t o  
t h e  Minister 's  cha i r .  
The chief  biologist and t h e  chief  of education were 
a l s o  powerful claims-makers. Like t h e  d i r e c t o r ,  these  
ind iv idua l s  had s t a t u s  derived from t h e i r  r e spec t ive  
posit ions.  They were two of t h e  "experts  i n  t h e i r  f i e lds , "  
t o  whom former Minister  Silnms o f t en  re fe r red  when i n t e r -  
viewed. They had knowledge garnered from un ive rs i ty  
educations;  both could draw on the organization of t h e i r  
r e spec t ive  sea t ions  and the  resources of t h e  d iv i s ion  as a 
whole. These men might b e  thought of as the  owners of t h e  
poaching problem. Gusfield (1989) w r i t e s  t h a t :  
... knowledge is t h e  mandate f o r  a p ro fess ionfs  
l i c e n s e  t o  "own" t h e i r  s o c i a l  problem.. .To *ownsm 
a problem i s  t o  be ob l iga ted  t o  have information 
and ideas  about it g iven  a high degree o f  a t t e n -  
t i o n  and c r e d i b i l i t y ,  t o  t h e  exclusion of 
others .  TO "ownn a s o c i a l  problem, i s  t o  possess 
t h e  au thor i ty  t o  name t h a t  condit ion a "problem* 
and t o  suggest  what might be done about it. It 
is t h e  power t o  in f luence  t h e  marshall ing of 
pub l i c  f a o i l i t i a s - l a w s ,  enforcement a b i l i t i e s ,  
opinion,  goods and se rv ices - to  h e l p  resolve t h e  
problem (Gusfield,  1989:433). 
As owners of t h e  poaching problem, w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  
"experts" were i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t o  make claims abou t  what 
Bxactly t h e  problem was and how t o  f i r  it. 
Cusf ie ld  (1981:18) w r i t e s  t h a t  t h e  cons t ruc t ion  of 
f a c t u a l  r e a l i t y  r e s t s  on t h e  a u t h o r i t y  of r e sea rch  and 
s c i e n t i f i c  study. S imi la r ly ,  Heman and O'sull ivan's  (1990) 
work on t h e  "terrorism industry" a l s o  shows how r e a l i t y  can 
b e  cons t ruc ted .  They a rgue  t h a t  t e r ro r i sm has  been de f ined  
by e x p e r t s  and suppor t ive  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  t h e  western world 
i n  such a manner t h a t  v io lence  c a r r i e d  o u t  by western 
governments is of ten  r a t i o n a l i z e d  as oounter-terrorism 
(Hernan and O'Sullivan, 1990:lO). Bes t  (1989) w r i t e s  t h a t  
most claims-makers use s t a t i s t i s s  and t h a t  these  numbers 
need c a r e f u l  exanination;  he suggests t h a t  o f f i c i a l  
s t a t i s t i c s  r e f l e o t  t h e  o rqan iza t iona l  p r a c t i c e s  of t h e  
aganc i s s  t h a t  compile them. Wi ld l i f e  d i v i s i o n  expert-  were 
highlypoverfulclaims-makers. The s t a t u s  bestowed on t h e s e  
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men and the importance placed on scientific knowledge 
furthered their power. Also, as made clear above, the fact 
that a former biologist occupied the deputy minister's 
chair provided management staff with a conduit to the 
Ministerrs ear. 
me ~ e w s  Media 
The media are powerful claims-makers, an many sources have 
shown (Fishman, 1980; Ericson, Baranek and Chan, 1987; 
Lippert, 1990). Concentrstedmedia attention confers status 
and increases public concern around an issue (Hall et al., 
1978:62). Most of what people know about the world comes 
from the media (Maolean, 1981:5). Lippert (1990:420) 
suggests the media act "as both claims-maker and s form 
for other claims-makers." The news media play an important 
role in defining a problem; they shapes perceptions about 
a problem and also show which groups made claims (lippert, 
1990:420). The Canadian media are controlled by a very few 
extremely wealthy families (Maclean, 1981:140) and these 
media moguls hire editors who share similar views and 
ideals. This results in the media being homogenized, as 
people with similar ideas of whet is newsworthy and how to 
present it gravitate together (Maclean, 1981:124-130). For 
example, when the Dlaaram's outdoors Editor, was asked how 
important his column is to that paper he replied: 
It's important to the paper as the newspaper's 
philosophy is preservation of the environment; 
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~ ~ n s e r v i t t i o n  of w i l d l i f e ;  p ro tac t ion  of wild- 
l i f e ;  enhancement of salmon r i v e r s .  Tha t ' s  baen 
OUT. e d i t o r i a l  policy,  it favors  a l l  these  
th ings ,  end always has,  going r i g h t  back t o  t h e  
founding of t h e  paper. Mr. Harder war a g r e a t  
~ u t d o ~ r s m a n ,  and t h a t ' s  s o r t  of permeated t h e  
z%kq&m, r i g h t  s ince  t h e  t ime he founded t h e  
newspaper. Of course, a l l  t h e  Herders are g rea t  
outdoors people anyway. Even t h e  publisher today 
i s  a very avid fisherman, no t  so much a hunter 
but  he  is a salmon fisherman (interview, May 14, 
1990).  
quote suggests t h a t  i n  t h e  area of w i l d l i f e  prsserva- 
, a t  l e a s t ,  t h i s  p a r t i s u l a r  paper may no t  be ob jec t ive .  
Media e d i t o r i a l s  are an impportant source of complaints,  
s i n c e  they  o f t en  t ake  t h e  "pub l i c  voica," and olaim t o  
speak f o r  t h a  pub l i c .  This " represen t s  t h e  media i n  its 
most a c t i v e  campaigning ro le"  (Hall  e t  a l . ,  1979:63). An 
advert isement desc r ibed  the  - a s  "Dedicated t o  t h e  
wise use of resources" and went on t o  desc r ibe  t h e  paper as 
"your vo ice  i n  salmon enhancement, care of t h e  wilderness 
and conservation programs ( i n  t h e  SmVMEE, 19a5:67). 
Obviously, the was important both as a 
veh ic le  f o r  claims-makers, l i k e  w i l d l i f e  o f f i c i a l s ,  end as 
a claims-maker i t s e l f .  As t h e  above quote demonstrates,  t h e  
Te le r r raws  a d i t o r i a l  po l i cy  was (and i s )  very pro- 
oonse rva t ion i s t .  The f a c t  t h e  paper has an  outdoorb column 
demonstrates t h a t  t h i s  paper c a t e r s  t o  hunters/outdoor 
users. This  column was t h e  source  of important  claims about 
poaching. T h e p r e e e n t ~ o u t d o o r s  columnist  explained 
that the column format allows writers a free hand to say 
more or less what they want as long as no one is slandered: 
A columnist has much nore editorial licence, as 
you can imagine, than we'll say, a general 
reporter does, who only has to report the facts. 
Columnists can also give the facts hut also give 
hi9 opinion at the same time. So this is why 
it3s better to be a columnist than just a gen- 
eral reporter. 
me outdoor column's influence on readers was important. as 
S i m s  nade clear when asked if media people influenced 
government: 
... not all media influence qovernnent, but 
certain media, or certain individuals in the 
media ... there are Borne who have more credihil- 
ity than other. Those with the most credibility 
generally have the most influence on people's 
thinking. certainly writers like Ray Simmons, 
who I knew very well, and Bill Power, both on 
that issue i~oaohina) and on other issues often 
influenced ii. I lictened to them and read them. 
Columnists with the -were influential claime-makers 
in this first stage of tha natural history of poaching. The 
news media's relationship with offioial sources is such 
that news might be thought of as ongoing canmunication 
between journalists and influential sources (Ericson, 
Baranak and Chan, 1987:9). Media reliance on official 
sources helps frame ieeues and set the baundaries for 
further debate (Hall et al., 1979:58). In the case of the 
"war" on poaching, the news media unquestioningly accepted 
the alaims of wildlife and government officials concerning 
poaching, despite the fact that estimates of big game herds 
and of poaching involve a substantial margin for error. 
A useful tool for snalyzing the role of print-media 
columnists is Beckerls (1989) concept of the *eorusading 
reformer." The reformer is fervent, righteous and unaat- 
iefied with how existing rules deal with zone evil. The 
ref01'111er's ethic is that the problem "is truly and totally 
evil" and "any means are justified to do away with it" 
(Becker, 1989:Zl). Becker's analysis is similar to Cohenrs 
(1980) work on "moral panics." when "a oandition, episode, 
person or groups of persons emerges to beooms defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests" (Cohen. 
198o:g) .I2 The media play an important role in creating e 
moral panic as "sensational headlines, melodramatic 
voeabularyend thedalibsrate heightsning of those elements 
in the story considered as news" serve to increase concern 
over a problem (Cohen, 1980:31). 
The outdoor writer/olaimr-maker ~ a y  Simmons is a good 
example of a crusading reformer. He was a hunter and was 
highly active in st least three wildlife groups: the 
st.Sohnrs a d  and Gun Club, which he helped start, the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, and the 
l1 Moral panics are discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
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Atlantic Salmon Board. He m o t e  a weekly outdoors column 
for the -- and   he Newfoundland ~erald. ~e was 
espousing the benefits of conserving animal populations as 
early as 1975 in an address to the st. John,= Kiwanie club 
(The Evsnina Telerrram, January 15, 1975). His columns usad 
a variety of the persuasive techniques outlined by Maclean 
(1981) such as generalization, abuse of language, misusing 
statistics, meshing faat with opinion and excluding the 
details." His colunns carried such inflammatory titles 
as: '9810~dy carnage on Isad Saturday"' (- 
-, September 30, 1980) or "some wildlife still 
fighting a losing battleoo (Evenina Telearu, January 2, 
1981). If news consumers read only these large bold 
headlines, certain imager and ideas would have been 
established in their minds. In addition, through using 
phrases like "All over Newfoundland, men and wmen are 
taking up the cudgal on behalf of wildlife," (m Evening 
TeLQBml, April 4, 1981) Simonr attempted to giva the 
impression that he was part of a popular movement to save 
wildlife. Also,  by using the metaphor of battle, Simmons 
" Maclean (1981) gives an excellent analysis of the 
many bias and propaganda techniques often used in media 
reports (Maclean, 1981:30-43). Her discussion suggeststhat 
media reports be viewed critically and that the manner in 
which these reports are constructed often leads to an 
unsound argument baing presented to the news consumer as 
the truth. Van Dijk's (1988) analysis of news as discourse 
is another excellent guide for critically examining media 
reports. 
helped establish an atmosphere of declining wildlife 
populations under attack. clearly, wildlife columnists 
rpesifisally, and the news media generally, played an 
important part in agitating about poaching. 
Private Grouoq 
There was considerable claims-making activity in this first 
stage by private lobby groups. It is significant to note 
that actors were often members of more than one group, 
~ r e ~ t i n g  an inter-group network. Also, key state employees 
and media personnel were often members of the same groups. 
The various groups active from the late 1970'~ to mid 1982 
are identified in table 4.2 (p. 127). The tabla is incom- 
plete; however, it shows that many groups were operating at 
this time. 
These groups actively lobbied government, agitating 
about different issues. some groups, like the Newfoundland 
and Labrador Wildlife Federation (NLWF), had very broad 
interests, as specified in its Constitution and Bylaws: 
To join together as a Provinsial Federation the 
sportsmen of Newfoundland and Labrador for the 
exchange of information and united action for 
the promotion and conservation of fish, game and 
other wildlife resources (NLWF, 1983). 
Other groups nay have had more specific interests, such sr, 
the Trappers Association. Some groups lobbied specifically 
about the poaching problem, while others lobbied for the 
setting aside of wilderness areas, or the need to regulate 
~ l l  ~errain Vehiale (ATV) use on carib.9~ grounds.   he 
important point is that there was a large body of groups 
concerned with issues adjacent to the big game poaching 
issue. A government interested in protecting wildlife 
re~ouroes for economic reasons had a large pool of poton- 
tial allies to draw on in the coming "war" against 
poachers. Groups may hava found it beneficial to side with 
government as the government appeared to be taking an 
aotive interest in protecting the outdoors. Also, by siding 
with government, groups may have been better able to get 
their views heard about their particular issues. That is, 
group* like the Trappers Assooiation, or the Salmon 
P r e s e ~ a t i ~ n  A~b~oiation, nay have tried to "piggyback" 
their issues onto government's broader mandate. Also 
important to note is the link between the grmps and the 
tourist industry. Some groups had an obvious interest in 
wildlife related tourism; foe example, the outfitters 
associations. others like the Wildlife Federation may also 
hava been interested in promoting wildlife, as seen in the 
a b w e  quote from that group's constitution. still other 
groups, like the Salmon Preservation Association (SPAWN), 
had direct connections to the outfitting industry, as will 
be seen below. SPAWN may hava linked their desire to 
E O ~ S B ~ V B  salmon to the potentially great economic benefits 
it oould mean. Three of the most active groups in stage 
one, were the Salmon Preservation Association for the 
waters of Newfoundland, the Tuckamore Club and the Wilder- 
ness society. 
SPAWN Was highly important for several reasons. First, 
it had (and still has) the resources to publish an annual 
magazine, the-. which is sold throughout the 
province, and hence had the potential to influence many 
people. That is, this group was powerful because It had the 
ability to get its views heard. This was exemplified by a 
brief presented to the Premier, by SPAWN in Pebruary, 1980. 
This document primarily discussed the number River and 
salmon, but it also aalled for the recreation of a New- 
foundland Ranger Force to ensure "all types of poaching is 
(sic) sharply curtailed (in the -, 1982:lS). Also 
significant to note is that the founding president of 
SPAWN, Len Rich, went on to become provincial hunting and 
fishing development officer in 1984, responsible for 
invigorating the province's outfitting industry. By 1981, 
SPAWN had at least one fonnar outfitter on its Board of 
~irectors. nany of its members at this time were "commer- 
cial fishermen, outfitters or guides who depend on the 
annual salmon hamest to supplement their inoomes" (in the 
w, 1981:3). Its president in 1988 went on to become 
the first president of an umbrella group for aAL conserva- 
tion organisations in the province, the Salmonid Council, 
ertsblishedofficislly in Pebruary 1989. The 1989 president 
of SPAWN was the brother of the Premier. The president in 
1990 was the wife of an outfitter. Clearly, this group was 
connected to the outfitting industry and the provincial 
government. It would also become linked to the most 
powerful consarvation group in the province. 
The Tuckamore club was another important group. It was 
active as early as November, 1980, when the club's director 
wrote a letter to the editor of the oonoerning the 
island's caribou. This group was based in Corner Brook and 
lobbied to have wilderness areas protected. It is signifi- 
cant to note that the director of the club in 1980 would 
become a board member of the Salmon Preservation Associ- 
ation in 1981 (the $E,WGB, 198l:l) and was also a forner 
outfitter (me Evanins Telearam, March 21, 1981). This 
group received media coverage in 1981, when it suggested 
that a wilderness area be established on the southwest 
coast of the province, thus protecting the area's caribou 
(see for example:  he ~venina Telesram, January lo, 1981). 
At this time the club submitted a brief to government, 
whioh demonstrated the resouroes it could muster. It was 
supported by the Wildlands Society in this action. signifi- 
cantly, rural reeidente of the area the wilderness 
area called for by these two urban based groups. Residents 
of the Burgeo-Baie D'Espoir and La Poile areas presented 
p e t i t i o n s  a g a i n s t  t h e  wilderness area t o  t h e i r  MH&'s, who 
Subsequently presented these  p e t i t i o n s  i n  t h e  ~ousa of 
Assembly (see f o r  example: The Evenin. Tele-,  arch 6 
and 7, 1981). This  theme of loca l  oppos i t ion  t o  ou t s ide  
conservation groups would be repeated throughout t h e  war on 
poaching, as w i l l  be shown. 
Another prolninent group i n  t h i s  f i r s t  s t a g e  was the 
Wilderness Society,  e s t ab l i shed  i n  January,  1981, as a 
broad baaed env i ronaen ta l  group. Its major goa l  war t o  
preserve and p r o t e c t  t h e  na tu ra l  h e r i t a g e  of t h e  province 
( The Wilderness Soc ie ty ,  Octobsr-November, 1983: l ) .  This 
group was a powerful and highly v i s i b l e  claims-maker. I t  
had t h e  t'eEOUrCes and o rgan i sa t ion  t o  pub l i sh  e news le t t e r .  
I n  add i t ion ,  it possessed severa l  s i g n i f i o a n t  a t t r i b u t e s ,  
tha most impportent of which was its connestion to the 
w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n .  W.3 of t h e  groups founding members were 
the chief b i o l o g i s t  and t h e  head of inforlnation and 
education. As e a r l y  as March 1980, t h e s e  two men were 
t r y i n g  t o  h e l p  o rgan ize  a group Concerned wi th  "environ- 
mental  i s s u e s  and conservation concerns" (Newfoundland 
Natural  His to ry  Soc ie ty ,  March-April, 1980:PO). 
Table 4.2: Groups Active 1979-1982 
SPAWN 
SAEN 
tuck am or^ Club 
Goose Bay Rod 


















ma wilderness society was also connected to the media 
as the Telemram's outdoor columniet, Simmons, joined the 
l4 SPAWN is the Salmon Preservation Association for 
the Waters of Newfoundland and is based in Corner Brook; 
SAEN is the Salmon Association of Eastern Newfoundland and 
is based in St. John's; the NLWF is the Newfoundland and 
Labrador Wildlife Federation and is a province Wide 
umbrella group of m d  and gun clubs, hunters and anglers 
the NNHS is the Newfoundland Natural History Society, base6 
in st. John's; E M  is the Environment Resource Management 
Association and is based in Grand Falls. 
sooiety in January, 1981. The man who would eventually 
vrite an outdoor column for The Sundav Exnress, Tony 
Thomas, was also a member of this group. The wilderness 
Society began a bi-weekly column on May 1, 1982 in the 
Xejsgum (Wilderness Sociaty, October-November, 1981:8). ~t 
a lnseting of the society in 1981, it was suggested that 
column miters remain anonymous to allow government 
employeebto speak out without fear of retribution (Wilder- 
ness society, February 2, 1984). This newspaper colunn 
increased the power and status of the Society, allowing it 
to reach more people with its claims. Obviously the group 
war well organiead with access to skills and resources. It 
was a powerful claims-maker in this first stage. 
STAGE ONE CLAIHS 
Lippart (1990) asserts that Best's (19871 framework is 
usaful for analyzing claims. In this saction Best's 
analysis of rhetoric ib applied to the claims made about 
poaching from 1980 to mid 1982. As outlined in chapter two, 
Best (1987:lOZ) separates claims into three categories: 
grounds, warrants and conolusions. 
GZulJ& 
Grounds are the socially constructed facts upon which a 
claim is founded (Best, 1987:lOz). They are divided into 
three types: definitions, examples and estimates. A11 
claims-makers discussed above defined poaching in a similar 
way. All argued that poaching was widespread within the 
province and that it was seen as socially acceptable by 
many residents. Agitators often stressed that en attitude 
oe "it's okay to take what I want" was prevalent throughout 
the province. Suoh a claim is what 6e.t (1987) calla an 
orientation etatanent. An orientation statement specifies 
the boundaries of a problem (its domain) and also assesses 
the problem; in this Ease that poaching was endemic and was 
viewed as acceptable behaviour. Ministers and wildlife 
officials argued that poachinq was She factor keeping big 
game herds from expanding as they should (sae for example, 
Evenins Telemrw, January 22, 1981; March 28, 1981; April 
20, 1982; June 23. 1982; Atlantio Insictht, December 1980- 
January 1981). 
other claims-makers like media columnists, interest 
groups and the chief biologist raised claims about the 
detrimental effect of habitat loss on wildlife populations 
(see for example: The NewfoundlaDd Kerald T.V. week, 
February 2-8, 1980 and The Evenino Telesram, January 10, 
1981; zierler, 1980-1981). However, the problem was defined 
in such a way that (in the words of one Minister) "The main 
factor that is keeping our moose and caribou herds from 
growing as they should is poachingn (sae for example: 
v, March 28, 1981). Beat (1987) writes that 
definitions name a problem, making some issues relevant and 
relegating others out of bounds (Beat, 1987:loz). The 
problem that was keeping big game herds f m m  expanding was 
defined as poaching. Issues like habitat destruction were 
raised but were squeezed out of the picture. Perhaps ths 
1980 enactment of the Wilderness and Ecological Reserves 
Act made this possible, 88 government could counter any 
claims about habitat destruction by pointing to this 1980 
Act. Likewise, inadequate management was not raised as a 
possible explanation for declining big game herds, nor was 
the imprecision of big game science questioned. 
It is also important to consider that poaching was 
what Nelson (1981) calls a valence issue. Such an issue 
"elicits a single, strong, fairly uniform emotional 
response and does not have an adversarial quality" (Nelson. 
1984:2?). Those who argued poaching was a serious problem 
didnot face controversy or competing viewpoints because of 
the nature of the issue. Poaching was a "motherhood issue;" 
it was unlikely to generate formal opposition. Poaching was 
claimed to be a problem by a variety of olaims-makers, both 
within and outside the state. Powerful primary definers 
framed the issue in such a way that poaching was idantified 
as & problem affecting big game herds and deserving 
attention. Also, by arguing that poaohing was socially 
e.~ceptad by res iden t s ,  t h e  need fo r  increased educa t ion  
p rq ra rns  was reaffirmed. 
E m m P k s  
=he examples of poaching i n  t h i s  f i r s t  s t a g e  helped focus  
a t t e n t i o n  on t h e  problem. One way t h i s  was ecoomplinhsd war 
through t h e  use of a t r o c i t y  s t o r i e s .  Best (1987:106) w r i t e s  
t h a t  "opening with an eno t iona l ly - r ive t ing  'grabber' is a 
s tandard  j o u r n a l i s t i c  technique." S imi la r ly ,  Hall  e t  a l .  
(1979) a s s e r t  t h a t  crime by d e f i n i t i o n  is news, b u t  t h a t  
muoh crime is rou t ine .  However, l ink ing  violenoa t o  t h e  
crime inc reases  t h e  v i s i b i l i t y  of t h e  crime i n  ques t ion  
(Hall  e t  a l . ,  1979 :66-68). I n  t h i s  s t age ,  claims-makers 
used examples which r t r e r r e d v i o l e n c e ,  a t r o c i t y ,  b r u t a l i t y ,  
viseousnesa,  and wastefulness.  One such a t r ~ ~ i t ~  t a l e  
appeared i n  t h e  -. The repor t  d i scussed  how a 
poacher had c r ipp led  a cow moose, with  a shotgun s lug ,  
l eav ing  it t o  sueesr and even tua l ly  die.'' A "postmortarn 
revealed" t h e  poacher had a c t u a l l y  k i l l e d  t h r e e  moose as 
l5 A "slug" is e l e a d  b u l l e t ,  w i th  grooves on its 
r i d e r ,  designed t o  be f i r e d  from a smooth-bore shotgun. 
suoh a b u l l e t  i s  accura te  and e f f e c t i v e  up t o  about one 
hundred yards (Newfoundland and Labrador Wi ld l i f e  Feder- 
a t i o n ,  1985). During the  war on poaching, va r ious  groups 
and ind iv idua l s  c a l l e d  f o e  shotgun s lugs  t o  be banned. It 
was argued t h a t  t h i s  a m u n i t i o n  was used by b i g  game 
poachers,  masquerading as small  game hun te r s  and ca r ry ing  
shotguns.  It is i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t  as e a r l y  as 1910, 
complaints were being made about " s e t t l e r s  using s e a l  guns 
loaded wi th  s lugs"  (see f o r  example: The Evenlno Chronicle,  
February 18, 1910). C la ins  t o  have s lugs  made i l l e g a l  w i l l  
b e  discussed a t  more l eng th  i n  t h e  next chapter.  
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the COW W.6 pregnant with twin Calves (The Bvenino Tele- 
sean, March 12, 1981). When combined with the recent 
"caribou murders" (The Daily w, September 15, 1980) one 
can sea how atrocity became a referent for poaching. Other 
examples discussed the cunning of poachers who in winter 
painted snowmobiles white or wore white   lo thing (m 
Evenine Telearw, Harsh 27, 1982). Poachare were described 
in these examples as "doing as they pleased". or threaten- 
ing or roughing up wardens (Knight, 1981:68). nrinxing was 
also linked to poachers, who were described as "predatorso, 
(The Evenins Telaorarg, March 27, 1982; April 20, 1982). The 
examples used to typify poaching in this first stage were 
important in framing the issue. As Best (1989) makes clear, 
~ l a i m ~ - m a k ~ r ~  draw attention to examples which justify 
their claims, and they shape people's sense of the problem 
by illustrating a problem through examples. The example 
comas to represent the larger problem as claims-makers 
emphasize some aspeats over others; they promote spacific 
orientations to the problem and they Cocur on partioular 
Causes and suggest particular solutions (Best, 1989:xx- 
xxi1. 
Sstimates 
Estimates are important ~laimr because the "bigger the 
problem the more attention it can be said to merit"; 
clains-makers generally emphasize a problem's size (Beet, 
1987:106). TWO types of estimates made about poaching were 
incidence estimates and range claims. The former gauge the 
number of cases occurring, while the latter suggest the 
problem is endemic (Best,1987:106-108). 
As mentionad above, all alaims-makers emphasized that 
poaching was widespread. This is a form of range claim 
(Best, 1987:108). Often epidemic metaphors were used to 
make such oleins. In this way the clairns-maker could naka 
anyone feel as if they had a vested interest in the 
problsn. This was also an attempt to mobilize support for 
the "war" on poaching. claims were made by wildlife 
officials that hunters end ordinary citizens suffered 
because of poachers (see for example: The Eveninm T e l e a w ,  
September 1, 1982), while others, like members of the 
Salmon Preservation Association, olaimed that poachers 
"were stealing from everyone" (Knight, 1981:70). Similar 
claims were made by Minister Hal Andrews, who described the 
number of poashers apprehended as the "tip of the iceberg" 
(The Bveninq TeleqZgOl, April 20, 1982). Andrevs successor, 
S i m ~ ,  described "poaching as the most persistent problem 
plaguing the peovincels wildlife" (The Evenins Talearam, 
September 17. 1982). mother range claim made by wildlife 
officials was that poaching was having a significant impact 
on big game herds in this province. For example, the chief 
wildlife biologist stated: 
If our figures are accurate-and I think our 
figures ere pretty good-the herds should be 
increasing exponentially...We could have wall 
over 100,000 caribou on the island. if we could 
control the poaching (Eierler, 1980-1981). 
since the magazine article informed readers that there were 
estimated to be 25,000 caribou on the island at that time, 
the implication was that 75,000 were being lost to 
poachers. Similarly, s media columnist claimed one animal 
war poached for every legally taken animal (The Evening 
-, September 1, 1980). These last two estimates 
might also be considered incidence estimates as an estimate 
of the number of cases, incidents or psopla affected is 
contained in the claim (Best, 1987:loG). 
Neither the inaccuracy of big game science, or the 
problems associated with estimating the extent and affects 
of poaching were mentioned. GuhEield (1981:72) argued that 
single cause arguments are uaed to persuade; he goes on to 
write that when facing a hostile audience whose behaviour 
is to be controlled, en indisputable argument must be 
presented (Cuefield, 1981:80). To admit the facts are not 
Elear is oounter-produotiveto the claims-maker. similarly, 
Lippert (1990:423) mites that estimates of extent are 
often worded in "vague, imprecise ways" to increase their 
perruasivanass. Maclean (1981:35) asserts that politicians 
often pinpoint an enemy, in this case poachers, and thus 
set themselves up as being for something, in this case 
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wildlife conservation. Haclean (1981:35) alsodiscussesthe 
problematic nature of statistics and how they are often 
used incautiously by claims-makers. 
warrants are statements whioh "justify drawing conclusions 
from the grounds" (Best, 1987:109). They act as a bridge 
between the basic facts olaims are laid on (grounds), and 
the calls for action (conclusions). Warrants are "often 
implicit" and in them, values most often come into play. 
Frequently, claims are based on motherhood issuer. Nelson's 
(1984) previously discussed "valence issue" is an example 
of this. Best (1987:108-112) discusses six warrants he 
found in claims about nissing children, and two of these 
(value and inadequate policies) were found in claims about 
poaching. Warrants concerningthe value of wildlife and the 
inadequacy of policies were found in the poaching claims of 
all claims-makers, regardless of affiliation. All claims- -
makers in this first stage asserted that big game animals 
Were valuable and that existing policies and programs were 
unable to deal with the problem. 
Arguments that exieting policies were defiaient were 
made as early as 1978 by the first treasurer of the Salmon 
Preservation Association, Chas loughlin, in "An Address to 
the corner Brook Rotary Club." The main focus of this 
addraea was "the serious poaching problem" of salmon. 
Importantly, loughlin alro discussed protection of moose 
and caribou, and called for joint enforcement of inland 
fish laws and the provincial game laws by one force of men: 
What I would vinualiaa would be a Newfoundland 
Forest Ranger, a full time polioeman fully 
armed, possibly trained initially with the RCMP, 
and then branching out into game preservation. 
His would be a year round job. The Ranger 
would supplement the river warden by assisting 
in making arrests, following up on tips and, in 
the off rearan assist with moone and caribou 
conservation (Loughlin, 1978:59). 
In this same address it was stated that "penalties for 
poachers should be really stiff" (Loughlin, 1918:59) 
suggesting that he believed existing penalties were 
inadequate. His call for "highly trained, amed Rangers" 
suggests that he thought significant measures were required 
to fight poaching. Similar claims were made in a Salmon 
Preservation Association brief presented to the Premier in 
February 1980, which discussed the re-creation of Ranger 
Forsa (SEWNEB, 1982: 15). 
Government Ninisters alro suggested that policies were 
insuffiaient. For example one stated that: 
YOU oould have a wildlife officer for every 
moose and caribou on the island, but we would 
still lose animals through poaching (TA%Exdm 
-, January 22. 1981). 
Similarly, a media columnist wrota that hie column was "not 
meant to be critical of our meager Force of game wardenss' 
(me Evenina Teleqzm, March 27, 1982). TWO or the Minis- 
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t e r s  made claims tha t  they would increase f ines  f o r  
poaching, implying tha t  existing penalties were def ic ient  
(sea for example: The Bvenina Teleoram, January 22,  1981; 
September 17, 1982). By claiming exis t ing  policies were 
inadequate, olaina-makers presented warrants f o r  change 
(Best, 1987: l l l ) .  
The other warrant found in  t h i s  f i r s t  stage concerned 
t h e  value of wildlife.  One Minister claimed tha t  oaribou 
poaching was " to  the detriment of people on the  peninsulau 
(Port au port) (The ~vanino Telesram, January 22. 1981). 
This suggaats t h a t  a loss tasul ta  from poaching; i .e .  b ig  
game is valuable. Similarly, when the Minister who declared 
"war" on poaching was asked i f  t h e  promotion of t h e  
province as a 'sportsmen heaven' was connected t o  t h e  
crackdown on poaching beosuse a crackdown would mean more 




Other clsins-makers, such as amedia columnist and interest 
groups like the Salmon Preservation Association and the 
Newfoundland Natural History Society, also pressed the 
value of wildlife (sea for example: m m  
W, January lo, 1981; SF!Wm, 1982; me Evening 
Tslsczm, March 14, 1981). Clearly, claims were made about 
the potential value of Wildlife for the tourism industry. 
Claims-makers tried to persuade people that poachers took 
from *US," that "we" suffered as a result of poaching. 
wildlife division alains-makers also made ssveral 
etatsnentr which fall into this warrants category. Economic 
claims were found in the wildlife division's Annual Re~ort 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:130). However, other 
benefits of wildlife were also recognized. Wildlife was 
said to be valuable for "food, sport, recreation. tourism, 
culture, aesthetics, ~cience, education and nature's 
balance" and was most valuable for its contribution to the 
quality of life" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 19831:130). 
similarly, the director claimed there were future benefits 
to be had by allowing aninals to roam unmolested (T.k 
syeninq, January 22, 1981). Parallel claims were 
made by the chief of education branch who claimed animals 
were "a part of our history, culture and lifestyle" and 
that animals were part of "our rich heritage" (The Evening 
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-, Maroh 28, 1981). Such claims were perhaps an 
appeal to Newfoundland nati~nalism.~~hhe caribou was and 
is a symbolically important species within the province. 
Tor example, caribou adorn the colors of the Royal New- 
foundland Regiment. 
Not Only was caribou a eiqnifisant emblem, it was also 
v i ~ ~ a l l y  appealing. Freeman (1989) mites that "caribou 
occupy a special place in the mind of the Canadian public, 
for in important ways they symbolize the northern wilder- 
ness that is so quintessentially Canadian" (Freeman, 
1989:97). A6 made clear in chapter three, caribou was 
replaced by moose as the most important meat souroe for 
residents of the island. Therefore, it is inportant to 
consider why there was so much emphasis placed on caribou 
in the early 1980,s by claims-makers, especially since we 
know that caribou populations were generally believed to be 
stable and increasing at that time. As mentioned, one goal 
of w n q  All Our Res.ur.es was to increase caribou herds 
l6 The early 1980's witnessed the growth of a kind of 
neo-nationalism in Newfoundland. Tor example, a "Newfound- 
land culture" coursa was added to the province's high 
school curriculum. Paine (1981:3-4) suggested that the 
Premier at that tine, Brian Peckford, politicized Newfound- 
land sthnicity. Peckford described himself as a "born again 
Newfoundlander" (-a TTelearam. June 4, 1980) and 
presented himself as a defender and saviour of Newfoundland 
culture. Part of this was a "battle" with the federal 
government over control of offshore resources. A variety of 
acadanior offered interpretations of this "cultural 
 revival;^^ for example Paine (1981), overton (1985) and 
Jackson (1986). 
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t o  35-40.000 animals by 1985 (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1980:158). a he f i r s t  o le ins  around poaching focused mainly 
on caribou; f o r  example t h e  interview wi th  t h e  ch ie f  
b i o l o s i a t  ( z i e r l e r ,  1980-1981); t h e  Minister 's  olaims t h a t  
pub l i c  conoern was bes t  p ro tec t ion  f o r  t h e  islandr.  
caribou herds (The Evenins Tele-, January 22, 1981); or 
The Tuckamore Club,= concern with  west c o a s t  caribou (m 
Evenin. Teleqban, November 19,  1980). A 1958 d i sease  s tudy  
by t h e  department o f  lniner and resources on Newfoundland's 
caribou s t a t e d  t h a t :  
Caribou's worth l i e s  i n  its importance as nuoh 
sought trophy by na t ive  and fo re ign  sportsmen, 
and f o r  its a e s t h e t i c  importenoe ( P e t s r s  and 
King, 1959:4) . 
Similarly,  a 1987 p l 0 ~ i " ~ i . l  government p o l i c y  paper on t h e  
o u t f i t t i n g  indus t ry  a l s o  t a lked  about t h e  importance of 
oaribou t o  sportsmen: 
who are cha l l eng ing  world records o r  working on 
completing t h e  North American Grand Slam, the  
woodland ca r ibou  and t h e  Labrador ca r ibou  are 2 
of 27 requ i red  animals (Ear les  e t .  a l . ,  
1987:49). 
To a pruvince promoting i t s e l f  as a sporteman'e paradise,  
looking t o  i n s r e a s e  its outdoor t o u r i s t  industry,  t h e  
caribou wan an important  species.  
Supporting c la ims  about ca r ibou ' s  l i n k  t o  Newfound- 
landers '  h e r i t a g e  and c u l t u r e  were claims t h a t  w i l d l i f e  
might disappear a l toge the r .  For example, t h e  ohief  of 
education wrote "It t h e  ' r igh t  t o  hunt' a t t i t u d e  p e r s i s t s ,  
141 
there will soon be no wildlifa for anyone" (The Eveninq 
-, March 28, 1981). Media sources also claimed that 
animals were threatened with extinction (me Newfoundland 
Kerald, February 2-8. 1980) and that wildlife war 
part of all Newfoundlander's heritage (The Evenina Tele- 
-, Maroh 21, 1981). Such claims were an attempt to draw 
people in, to appeal to people's sense or being a Nawfound- 
lander. Other groups alao made similar claims, and thus 
contributed to the atmosphere of vanishing wildlife. For 
example, the Natural History Society wrote how "hope (was) 
dim for Eskimo Curlew" ( W e n i n s  Tern, August 11, 
IYal), while the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife 
Federation and the Newfoundland Trappars Association 
claimed the pine marten was in danger of becoming extinct 
(ZLELvenins Telesram, July 16. 1981). Freeman (1989:106) 
writes that the threat of biological extinction is a 
powerful motivating force: 
Extination implies irreversible finality, as 
well as invoking such emotive and accusatory 
notions as tragedy, ignorance, greed and human 
weakness. Clearly no decision-making officials 
or their advisors wish to stand sooused of 
permitting such failures to overtake common- 
property resouraes whose conservation is their 
direct responsibility (Freeman, 1989:106). 
claiming animals night be lost forever. justifiedthe calla 
for action. 
Conclusions 
Conclusions are " typ ica l ly  c a l l s  f o r  ac t ion  t o  a l l e v i a t e  o r  
e rad ica te  t h e  s o c i a l  problem" (Best ,  1987:112). ~ e s t  a l s o  
p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  clsirne-makers may have an  agenda with 
s e v e r a l  goals.  I n  h i s  work an missing ohildesn,  Best found 
t h r e e  conclusions: awareness, prevention and s o c i a l  con t ro l  
po l i c i es .  These t h r e e  oonclurionr were a l l  p resen t  i n  
poaching claims.  Al l  claims-makers, r ega rd less  o f  a f f i l i -  
a t i o n ,  t r i e d  t o  inc rease  awareness about t h e  poaching 
problem and a l s o  t r i e d  t o  e n l i s t  the  p u b l i c ' s  he lp  i n  
f igh t ing  poaching. Best found the  same r e s u l t s  i n  h i s  work 
on missing ch i ld ren .  L ipper t  (1990), in h i s  s tudy  o f  t h e  
emergenoe of ratanism, found t h e  "vast  ma jo r i ty  of con- 
c lus ions  emphasize awareness by pub l i c iz ing  t h e  claims i n  
the  media" (Lippert ,  1990:427). s i m i l a r l y ,  most poaching 
olaims-makers i n  t h i s  f i r s t  s t age  usad t h e  media as a 
veh ic la  f o r  pushing t h e i r  claims about poaching. 
The conclusion t h a t  it was important  t o  prevent 
poaching war a l s o  s t r e s s e d  by t h e  majori ty o f  claims-makers 
examined. Thie conclusion might be seen as stemming from 
the  warrants about t h e  va lue  of w i l d l i f e .  Wi ld l i f e  was 
valuable f o r  many reasons and belonged t o  everyone. 
Therefore,  it was inpor tan t  t o  prevent poaching t o  ensure 
f u t u r e  genera t ions  would be a b l s  t o  hunt and f i s h ,  t h a t  a 
p a r t  of Newfoundland's h e r i t a g e  and c u l t u r e  would no t  be  
l o s t ,  t o  s t o p  the  t h e f t  by poachers and t o  b e n e f i t  t h e  
province through t h e  many advantages abundant b i g  game 
herds could o f fe r .  
The f i n a l  conclusion found by Best (1987), a l s o  
discovered i n  t h i s  f i r s t  s t age  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  o f  
poaching, is t h a t  new s o c i a l  con t ro l  p o l i c i e s  ware Cal led  
f o r .  As shown above, a l l  claims-makers i n  t h i s  s t a g e  
conoluded t h a t  ex i s t ing  p e n a l t i e s  were too  l e n i e n t ,  t h a t  
t h e r e  was an i n s u f f i c i e n t  number of wardens, and t h a t  
inc reased  pub l i c  cooperation and involvement were necessary 
t o  i n h i b i t  poaching. Pub l i c  involvement and cooperation 
were needed by the  government because o f  t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  e f f e c t i v e l y  po l i c ing  a s c a t t e r e d  human popu la t ion  who 
had easy eceers t o  animals.  The chief  b i o l o g i s t  made t h i s  
c l e a r  when he was asked how important good information and 
educa t ion  was t o  h i s  jab: 
Oh it*= important, you cou ldn ' t  do a t h i n g  
without it ... You've got  to remember t h a t  it's 
people cooperating more than anything e l s e  
t h a t ' s  important .  
T h i s  was a160 p a r t  of t h e  new s o c i a l  oon t ro l  p o l i c i e s  
c a l l e d  f o r ;  i . e . ,  t h e  need f o r  conservation education.  
Various claims-makers, l i k e  i n t e r e s t  groups and media 
pe r sonne l ,  c a l l e d  f o r  increased education.  Some groups even 
began educa t ion  p r o j e c t s  of t h e i r  own, such as t h e  Wilder- 
ness Soc ie ty ' s  newspaper column, or t h e  salmon Prese rva t ion  
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Association's conservation contart for schoolchildren. As 
will be seen in the next chapter, education efforts were 
one of the main government actions undertaken in the "war" 
on poaching. 
-cries Nechanisns far Pressins Claims 
As outlined in Chapter one, spectar and Kitsure (1977:145) 
asserted that the way claims are made is highly important 
in determining whether or not an issue will expand. 
Similarly, Ritaer (1986:8) asserted it is important to get 
people to listen without alienating them. Also proninsnt 
are identifying the Eorrect audience to complain to and 
effectively handling the media (Spector and Kitsuse, 
1977:145). Due to the nature of the topic and the relation- 
ship between the prers and official sources, claims-makers 
had little trouble in pressing their claims. A11 claims- 
makers examined night be thought of as credible sources, 
whether they were a Minister, a biologiet or president of 
an interest group. In addition, many clains-makers had 
access to the prers. 
Poaching was a valenoe issue; the chances of alienet- 
ing people were slim. While there nay have been local 
underground opposition to claims, official responses from 
interest groups, media personnel and even member- of the 
Opposition party in the House of Assembly were supportive 
of t h e  idea  t h a t  something had t o  be done about poaching. 
claims-makers knew whom t o  conplain t o  and t h e  p roper  
channels through which t o  p r e s s  t h e i r  claims.  Groups 
complained t o  t h e  government through t h e  Premier,  t h e  
Min i s t e r ,  and bueeausrats  i n  t h e  w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion .  Given 
t h e  connections ou t l ined  batween t h e  Min ia t s r  and t h e  
w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n ,  va r ious  i n t e r e s t  groups, and t h e  p r e s s ,  
it seem. reasonable t o  conclude t h a t  much behind the saener 
lobbying took p lace .  T h i s  was o f t e n  a l luded  t o  by s u b j e c t s  
dur ing  in te rv iews .  At the  sane t i m e  a s s e r t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  
f u t u r e  o f  hunting was th rea tened  were d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  
hunting pub l i e  and t h e  genera l  pub l i c .  Such c la ims  ware 
sure t o  be  e f f e c t i v e ,  binca h u n t e r s  want continued hun t ing  
oppor tun i t i e s .  Suggestions t h a t  t h e  f u t u r e  of hun t ing  was 
th rea tened  were almost  guaranteed to mobilise support .  The 
genera l  pub l i c  would l i s t e n  because of t h e  na tu re  of t h e  
t o p i o ,  t h e  power of t h e  claimr-makers and t h e  methods used 
t o  press claims.  
S tage  one saw poaohing p u t  on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  agenda i n  
Newfoundland. It culminated wi th  con t roversy  end inc reased  
awareness ( spec to r  and Xi t suee ,  1977:148; R i t z e r ,  
19861103). However, t h i s  c o n f l i c t  d i d  not  a r i s e  from 
competing g r m p s  cha l l eng ing  t h e  c la ims  o f  o t h e r  groups. 
Most claims-makers agreed on t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  problem 
and how t o  so lve  it. While r esea rch  was unable t o  determine 
where exactly agitation around the issue first began, it is 
cleae that a oonsiderable amount originated from within the 
state. A probleln could remain at this point of heightened 
awareness and controversy; it could wither and die, or be 
rapidly transformed into the next stege (spestor and 
 itsu use, 1977:148). The 1att.r occurred in Newfoundland, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the first stage in the natural 
history of poaching. By 1980, the Newfoundland government 
had taken a renewed interest in outdoor tourism. Claims 
that poaching was a problem arose at this sane time. Often 
claims originated from sources intimately tied to the 
outdoor tourist industry. At the same tims, crucial changes 
were oocurring within the wildlife division, and there wee 
a growing conservation movement in the province. This 
complex array of factors came together in the early 1980's. 
resulting in controversy and heightened awareness about 
poaching. 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examiner stage two in the natural history of 
poaching, whish began in nid-September 1982, with the 
declaration of "war" on poaching, and lasted until 
December 1984. The first section discusses adaptations to 
the model, the poaching "war," the reported escalation of 
lawlessness in the province's countryside and the efforts 
of the department of development and the wildlife 
division. The second section outlines the active claims- 
makers, while the third analyzes the measures implemented 
by government during the "war." 
-
As outlined in the second chapter, Spector and Kiteusa 
(1977) assert that stage two occurs with official 
acknowledgement of the problem. This contrast. with stage 
one activities which were "almost entirely unofficial" 
(Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:148). Both of these assertions 
are problemtic when applied to the poaching issue in 
Newfoundland. Spector and Kitsure's definition of stage 
two apparently assumes that the original problem 
definition came from outside state agencies, and that 
these original problem definers will lose control of the 
issue (co-optation) in the second stage when official 
action (legitimation) OFCUT-S. This seemingly contradicts 
their assertion that governments may attempt to create 
one problem in order to divert attention from another 
(Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:156). As well, thair 
definition of the second stage assumes that no prior 
legislation existed in the problem ares. 
AS demonstrated in the previous chapter, much 
claims-making about poaching came from agents of the 
state. The wildlife division did not enter the debate in 
the second stage end then take control of the poaching 
problem as Ritzar (1986:ll) suggests happens in stage two 
activities. The wildlife division had been in existence 
previous to the 1980 ee-emergence of the poaching problem 
and was responsible for dealing with poaching long before 
1982. The state in Newfoundland, the provincial 
government, was one of the key agitators during the first 
stage of the poaching issue's career in 1980 and 1981. 
~gitation about the poaching issue originated from virhin 
gov ent, not just € m a  outrlde interest groups and the 
media. 
Whila the second stage of Spector and Kitsuse's 
(1977) model is somewhat problematic when applied to the 
poaching problem, it nonetheless serves as an excellent 
guide far assembling data. The separation between the 
first and second stages of the poaching issue might beet 
be thought of a. a matter of emphasis and not of rigid 
division. This having been said, stage two analysis will 
begin in mid-September, 1982, because at that time *warw 
was declared on poaching and lagirlativa changes were 
slated for introduction to the House of Assembly. First 
stage activities were often official, in the sense that 
claims often came f m m  state actors, or the state agency 
responsible for poaching. However, the declaration of 
"war" was an escalation in the issue, as laws governing 
poaching were strengthened. Obviously the poaching 
problem was legitimized prior to mid-septenber 1982, 
since game laws had existed since at least 1845. However, 
the declaration of "war" on poaching in 1982, signaled an 
intansification in the issue. At this tine, government 
made clear it rn acting. Speotor and Kitsuse (1977:148) 
write that: 
When governmental agenoiee or other official 
and influential institutions to whioh claims 
might be put respond to the complaints of some 
group, the social problems activity undergoes a 
~onsiderable transformation. 
Therefore, the September 1982 declaration of "war" is 
used as the start point of stage two. By declaring war, 
government was responding to alaims about poaching. The 
"war" on poaching will now be examined. 
The "waroo on Poachinq 
The offensive against poaching was big news in both 
St.Jahn8s newspapers publishing at that time. "Much 
harsher penalties promised for poachers," read the 
haadline in meEveninq [September 17, 1982). 
while The Dailv News (September 18, 1982) ran the 
headline "simms reveals all out eff0rt:New "war" on 
poachersl!." The article related how "The 
provincial government has declared "war" on big game 
poachers and Mr. Sinms, Minister of culture, recreation 
and youth, fired the first volley today" (The Evening 
-, September 17, 1982).   he lSegmz) raported that 
the Minister said he would be introducing amendments to 
the provincial Wildlife Act during the fall sitting of 
the House of Assembly. Existing legislation called for a 
first offender to receive a fine between $500.00 and 
$1000.00 or a prison term of from three to six months. 
Under the proposed amendments, fines for first offenders 
would ba not less then $1000.00 and not more than 
$5000.00. In default of papent, a jail term of not less 
than one nonth and not more than six months would be 
imposed. If the first offender was not fined st all, the 
courts would have to impose a jail term. A second 
offender would be redefined as somebody who had committed 
a second offence within a five year period after his last 
~~nviotion. A S P C O ~ ~  offender would receive a jail tern 
of from one to six months, plus a fine between $3000.00 
and $lO,OOo.oo. In default of payment, additional jail 
terms from two to six months would be imposed. 
Significantly, the conriscation and forfeiture of any 
vehicle used in any big game poashing insident was to 
bssme mandatory under the proposed regulations (a 
Evenina Telecran, September 17, 1982; The Deilv News, 
September 18, 1982; see also Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1982b:5473-5179). 
The Minister described poaching "as the most 
persistent problem" for the province's wildlife and he 
asked the public to get involved by helping government 
fight poaching (me Evenina Telearam, September 17. 1982; 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5475). He autlinad steps 
the wildlife division would be taking to combat poaching. 
Protectlo" efforts were to be increased by establishing 
checkpoints and using fixed-wing, helisopter and all- 
terrain vehicles for patrols. An information program was 
to be implemented to increase publio awareness about all 
aspects of wildlife management. Royal Newfoundland 
Constabulary and RCMP officers would also be enforcing 
the Wildlife A c t .  
Later that fall, the proposed amendments ware intro- 
dused by the Minister in the House of Assembly, where 
they were widely supported by both government and 
opposition members. For example, one opposition M W  
(Torngat Mountains-Labrador) wondered why government had 
not enacted legislative changes earlier "especially when 
you see that there really is a orackdown under the 
Wildlife A&." Another Labrador MHA (Eagle River) stated 
that "stronger tightening of the regulations" was needed 
(Newfoundland and Labrador. 1982b:5243-4). Even the 
Leader of the Opposition supported the government's 
initiatives, stating that Itthere is too muoh poaching, 
there is too much breelting OP the law as far  as wildlife 
is concerned" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5250). 
The bill was debated that fall in the Houae of Assembly 
and the new legislation given approval in principle (i.e. 
sesond reading in the House) on November 21, 1982 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 198Zb:5489). 
1n ~anuary, 1983 it reelned the state was escalating 
its "war" efforts. At that time, a news-conference was 
held, at which the Minister, the Deputy Minister and the 
director of wildlife introduced the implementation of a 
non-refundable five dollar fee on big game licences, 
whioh was to be used to improve the Hunter Education 
program and hire additional WPO's (D Eveninrr Telesram, 
january 25, 1983). 1n September, 1983 the province's 
hunter education program was broadened and rtrmngthaned, 
with the publication of me Newfoundland and I&?ES&Z 
m t a r  Education Manual (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1983s). This program expansion was to "?romota 
responsible hunter conduct, emphasize the importance of 
wildlife management, laws and regulations and to 
encourage the saro handling of hunting equipment" (Simms, 
1984:l). Also in October 1983, Operation SPORT (Stop 
Poaching Report Today) war begun on a trial basis in the 
corner  rook, Deer mke, Bay of Islands area (Simms, 
1984:3). This was a toll-free, twenty-four hour anonymous 
"hotline" for reporting poachers. The media reported 
these two initiatives as "a double-barreled effort", 
under the headline "Anti-poaching campaign stepped up" 
(The Evenina Telearalq, September 21, 1983). By the fall 
of 1984, Operation SPORT was made available to all rssi- 
dents of the province. ~ l s o  in 1984, a "drive" was initi- 
ated by government to reoruit and train instructors to 
deliver the hunter education course. A "series of work- 
shops" were to be held, starting in fall 1984, to teach 
new instructors and re-train veteran instruotors. It was 
government's goal to get 400 instructors a year 
delivering the course across the province (Sims, 
1984:2). 
Prom September 1982 until September-October 1984 the 
provincial  government and the  wi ld l i f e  d iv i s ion  seemed t o  
be a c t i v e l y  increasing t h e i r  e f f o r t s  a g a i n s t  poachers. 
Prom 1985-1986 ( s t age  th ree )  t h e  poaching i s sue  
contracted and received l i t t l e  media a t t e n t i o n ,  bu t  t h e  
"war" continued t o  k fought on a smaller  scale.  I n  e a r l y  
1987 (the beginning of s t age  four)  t h e  i s s u e  expanded 
once more, accompanied by an eeoe la t ion  i n  t h e  "war." 
Thus the  "campaignv aga ins t  poaching was lneintained 
throughout t h e  decade. For t h i s  chapter,  however, t h e  
main foous is the "war" e f f o r t  fmrp September 1982 t o  
December 1984. Before analyzing the  war, it i s  nscessary 
t o  desc r ibe  b r i e f l y  what was happening on t h e  p rov inc ia l  
scene i n  t h i s  period.  
d m = .  Outdoor Tourism and the- 
I n  t h i s  sec t ion  t h r e e  top ioa  are examined: f i r s t ,  t h e  
reported crime wave t h a t  occurred i n  t h e  province's  
countryside;  second, t h e  continued growth of the  outdoor 
tourism indus t ry ;  and f i n a l l y ,  the w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion .  By 
t h e  e a r l y  1980'8 it was widely believed t h a t  crime and 
violence were "increasing i n  trequency and becoming more 
s e r i o u s  i n  charac te r "  within t h e  province (Overton. 
1991) .' support  Lor t h i s  a s se r t ion  comes from t h e  House 
' overton's  (1991) unpublished work on concern about 
violence and c h i l d  abuse i n  Newfoundland argues t h a t  t h e  
l a t e  1970's and e a r l y  1980's saw growing concern t h a t  
crime and v io lence  vae growing in frequency and becoming 
more se r ious  i n  nature.  
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of Aasembly debate around the Wildlife Act amendments. 
The Opposition leader at that tine, Steve Neary, stated 
that: 
I do not know if there is a complete breakdown in 
law and order in this province, but crime reems to 
be increasing in Newfoundland and Labrador st an 
alarming rate. I do not know if...criae is out of 
control in thir province, but it would appear that 
way. There seems to be a dropping off of respect for 
law and order in thir province (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1982b:5246-5247). 
concern about poaching may have been related to this 
broader fear of crime. While the "war" on poaching was 
being waged, there was heightened concern expressed in 
the media about the state of affairs in the wilderness of 
the province. A general disintegration of law and order 
on the hunting grounds of the provinoe wes reported. 
  here was what Cohen (1380) might call a moral panic: 
societies appear to be subject, every now and 
then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, 
episode, parson or group of  persons emerges to 
becone defined as a threat to societal values 
and interests; its nature is presentad in a 
stylieed and stereotypical fashion by the mass 
media; the moral barricades are manned by edi- 
tors, bishops, politicians and other right- 
thinking p e ~ p l e i ~ ~ ~ i a l l y  accredited experts 
pronounce their diagnoses and solutions: ways 
of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted 
to. sometimes the object of the panic is quite 
novel and at other timer it is something which 
has  been in existence long enough, but suddenly 
appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic 
passes over and is forgotten, except in 
folklore and collective memory: at other timer 
it has more serious and long-lasting 
repercussions and might produce such changes as 
those in legal and social policy or even in the 
way the society conceives itself (Cohen, 
1980:9). 
Obviously there was heightened concern about poaching; e 
"warw had been declared. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, violent, atrocious examples were used by the 
media and official sources to shape the poaching issue in 
stage one. In this second stage, violenae and atrosity 
would again be used to frame the issue. However, media 
reports at this tima suggested an increase in a new type 
of violent behaviour and a disintegration of order. 
For example, one of the outdoor columns 
carried the headline "Great outdoors becomes more 
dangerous as hunters become Rora aggressive" (The Eveninq 
-, November 6, 1982). The writer, Simmons, had 
previ~~sly witten about the potential conflict between 
"old fashioned foot-slogging hunters" and "three-wheeled 
cowboysll (me menin. t w ,  October 30, 1982) .z  
Simmons' column of November 6 appeared less then two 
months after the "war" on poaching had been declared, and 
its title clearly stated that had become nore 
aggressive. Simmons alaimed the cause for this increased 
aggression was the "dwindling numbers of game animals" 
(The Evaninsl Talesram, November 6, 1982). An example was 
"Three-wheeled cowboys" refers to three-wheeled 
all-terrain vehioles (ATVgs). There is an obvious 
contrast presented between old fashioned, "loot-slogging 
hunters" and the new mobile "cowboy." ATv's increased the 
ranme of huntere. nakino remote areas much more 
then  given of a c o n f l i c t  between r a b b i t  ca tchers  and 
r a b b i t  hunters.  The former, mainly r e s i d e n t s  of o u t p o r t  
areas, used snares t o  ca tch  r a b b i t s  for consumption and 
s a l e .  The l a t t e r  group, mainly r e s i d e n t s  of St .John,s,  
hun t ing  with hounds, s h o t  t h e  same animals f o r  s p o r t .  
Obviously, a c o n f l i c t  of i n t e r e s t  ex i s t ed :  
... res iden t s  have s t r u c k  back a t  hun te r s  from 
E.renins Teleoram, November 6 ,  1982). .- 
c l e a r l y ,  t h e  s e t t i n g  of t r a w l  hooks t o  impale r a b b i t  
hounds was c r u e l ,  ha r sh ly  v i o l e n t  and unsporting.  
The violence seemingly esca la ted  t h e  nex t  year when 
it was repor ted  t h a t  "Hunters claim rnarers poisoning 
t h e i r  dogs" (The Evenin. C%kwzm, October 15, 1983)  
Three weeks e a r l i e r  Telaclrem readers  had been informed 
t h a t  s i x  moose had been s h o t  and l e f t  t o  r o t  i n  one area 
or t h e  province (The Eveninrr T e l e u m ,  October 6, 1983). 
Such wanton des t ruc t ion  was addrePsed by t h e  T e l e a r a w s  
new outdoors columnist ,  B i l l  Power ', who wrote t h a t :  
... hunte r s  and a n g l e r s  who be l i eve  i n  
sportsmanship end f a i r p l a y  ... should be d e s l a r e d  
an endangered apes ies .  There was a t ime i n  
Newfoundland when sportsmanship was such a 
n a t u r a l  th ing  to hunte r s  and a n g l e r s  t h a t  they  
d i d n ' t  even need a name f o r  it. I t  was p a r t  of 
--
' Power took over t h e  p o s i t i o n  fal lowing Simmons 
dea th  i n  February, 1983. 
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their nature and their culture and they didn't 
need to have it taught or explained to 
them...it is being replaced by somathing slien- 
GREED. caring and sharing, once the trademark 
of a Newfoundlander, are fast going down the 
tube along with a lot of other noble 
characteristics of the race such as pride 
independence, i?dustriourness and the work 
ethic (The Evenlna Teleqran. October 22, 1983). 
This writer believed that there was a change occurring in 
the very esrance of the Newfoundland character. Other 
examples from this period also claimed there was a loss 
Of hunting skills and sportsmanship, and an increase in 
lawless behaviour. In September, 1984, "Another oaribou 
slaughter" was reported (The Evenin4 Teleara~, September 
3 ,  1984). Two months later, wildlife officials were 
investigating the snaring of 39 moose (The E v e n i n s  Tele- 
m, November 20, 1981). 
The conflicts between sportsmen and subsistence 
hunters, including the violent confrontations and traps 
reported in the Wssicm, provided the backdrop against 
which the "war" on poaching was declared and fought. 
However, the unrporting behaviaur that was reportedly 
rampant throughout the province was important for other 
reasons. cohen (1980:ll-16) writes that the reporting of 
certain "faotr" car be enough to generate public anxiety 
about s problem, but when this coincides with perceptions 
that certain values need protecting, the basis has been 
laid for social problem definition. This is important 
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because as will be seen below, poaching was re-darined in 
this second stage. For a problem to be created, that is 
for the re-definition to occur, it is important that 
people perceive the problem to be worsening. The 
problem's aotval existence is not that important. The 
media's use of "sensational headlines, melodrsnatic 
Vocabulary and the deliberate heightening of thosa 
elements in the story considered as news" increases 
concern over a problem (Cohen, 1980:31). The use of 
powerfully synbalic imagery may help to further distort 
and exaggerate an issue. 
The picture painted of the province's outdoors 
shaped people's opinions and beliefs about what war 
occurring. Hasson (1981) has shown how a media campaign 
effectively shaped Canadian's opinions that unemployment 
insurance fraud "as widespread in the late 1970's-early 
1980'6 and that increased regulation was needed. 
similarly, rishman (1980:5) writes that the media not 
only inform people abolir crime waves, but assemble them. 
Piahman (1980:s) defines a crime wave as a theme in the 
news that is continuously and heavily reported. For a 
crime wave to exist around a particular problem. all that 
is needed is for s r n *  incidents to occur and there be 
considerable concern among the media's sources. Ericson, 
Baranek and Chnn (1987:22) make a similar argument. Crime 
waves help newspapers relate diverse inoidents under one 
similar theme; they are important in raising public fears 
and apprehensions about crime (Fishman, 1980:4-11). 
Obviously concern about big gana herds existed among the 
media's official sources, because a "war" on poaching had 
been deslared. Conflicts between rabbit rnarers and 
rabbit hunters could be incorporated under the theme of 
wildlife warfare and a breakdown in societal values. 
since concern about violence and crime was also high at 
this time, the raportad lawlessness in the countryside 
fit well with this theme. 
poachers as Polk Devils 
Cohen (1980:lO) defines folk devils as "visible reminders 
of what we should not be." Sinilarly, Chibnall (1977) 
quotes Box's (1971) work to argue that deviant behaviour 
occupies so much news space because it in "intrinsically 
instructiven as social rules are stated and people warned 
that violators will not be tolerated (Chibnall, 1977:xi). 
Hall et al.'s (1979) work on nugging in Britain showed 
how the concept of mugging was ilnported by the British 
press from the United States. However, not only war a new 
label imported for street crime (which had existed for 
oenturies), but the idea that a host of evils want hand 
in hand with street crime was also imported. As the 
mugging label was introduced, fear was heightened (Hall 
et al., 1979:21-28). In Newfoundland's countryside, a 
variety of unsavory behaviours reportedly accompanied the 
emergence of the new hunter. This was important in 
setting the stage far the re-definition of poaching. 
The images used to describe the canflists in this 
period contrasted the supposedly, friendly ethical 
sportsman of the past with the aggressive, "three-wheeled 
cowb~y" of the present. A picture war painted of the 
modern, mobile hunter willing to go to any lengths to be 
successful, including breaking traditional rules of 
behaviour and the game laws. This was important because 
as Duster (1989) points out in his work on drug laws in 
the United States, laws obtain their legitimacy in terms 
of come primary reference point - the moral order 
(Duster, 1989:29). state agencies are some oP the main 
means through which morality is regulated (Corrigan and 
sayer, 1985:5). The picture presented in the media of 
huntersr behaviour in this period was one of right and 
wrong. The impression war produced that hunters seemed to 
have moved away from the "proper" way of behaving. This 
legitimized the "war" on poaching and set the stage for 
further escalations by government in the war, 
specifically in the area of hunter education. 
E p O u f d a o r e  andthewaras on Poachinq 
As fear of lawless behaviour in the countryside was 
growing, the outdoor tourism industry continued to be 
developed on two fronts. Government undertook a series of 
steps in this period to develop outdoor tourism 
further.4 By far the most significant of these 
initiatives was tho department of development's hiring of 
a provincial hunting and fishing development offioer in 
October, 1984. when interviewed, this man related that as 
development officer he had many roles: 
Essentially I had four or five roles; ah, 
promotion of the outdoor product; creating a 
~ublic awareness of what the outfittinu 
industry was, its tourism potential and so on 
and so forth; and also lnonitoring the industry, 
doing some training and education of the 
guides, and the outfitters themselves in 
current business praotices, and I guess finally 
monitoring the facilities and the operations 
ensuring that they ware the best we could 
possibly make then (interview, June 13, 1990). 
The filling of this position was followed by the Minister 
of development's announcement that the province planned 
to implement commercial hunting of the George River 
Conditions for outfitters "ere improved further 
in 1983 and 1981. Far example, in 1983 a spring black 
bear hunt war held for the first tine. A vildlifs 
division brochure argued that several auxiliary benefits 
accompanied this hunt, one of which wan to be an "aid to 
outfitters who night oater to "on-resident sportsmen 
eager to hunt black bear" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
19850:s). me Minister of wildlife at that time also made 
clailps conserning the viability of the bear hunt (m 
Evenms TBheuran. January 25,  1983). 
caribou nerd in northern Labrador. The Minister reported 
that ten outfitters would be allocated licences in 1985 
(me Evenino ~ele-, November 27, 1984). The period 
from nid-1982 until 1984 saw government implement 
important changes in the outdoor tourist industry. 
Government's continued eftorte to expand the outdoor 
tourist industry were ascompanied by the persistent 
lobbying of pro-tourism slaims-makers. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, government had demanded outfitters 
improve their facilities in 1981. In response to thin 
demand, the provincePs outfitters "asked tor and received 
a five year guarantee on licence allocations beginning in 
1982" (Earles et al., 1987212) .5 The provincers 
outfitters made at least two nore reprssentatians to 
government concerning licence allocations that resulted 
in an increase in non-resident caribou licences and the 
opening up of a new area, Middle Ridga, to non-resident 
hunters (Earles et a l . ,  1987:13). Clearly the outfitters 
associations ware actively lobbying government to 
increase big game licences in the period 1982-1984. This 
lobbying resulted in nore animals being allooated to non- 
resident hunters. If government was interested in selling 
more licences to nnn-residents, than a "war" on poaching 
It is significant to note this guarantee on 
licence alloostions began the same year that "war" war 
declared on poaching. 
was perhaps one way to reach that goal. Moose licences 
sales to non-rasidsnts increased in this period (tabla 
5.1). 
Table 5.1: IOOSB LICEllCB BALES, 1976-1PaB 
year Y licences sold 
Resident No"-resident 
source: chief wildlife biologist 
The data in table 5.1 wsre gathered from the chief 
wildlife biologist when ha was interviewed an ~ u l y  25, 
1990. mowever, some of these figures are contradicted by 
numbers gathered from other sources.  or example, a 
government policy paper on the outfitting industry statme 
that &xZ lnoose lioenses were allocated for non-residents 
in 1381 (Earlea et al., r s a 7 : l z ) .  oats gathered from the 
wildlife statistician (June 11, 1990) shoved that from 
1986 to 1988 m, rn and moose licences were 
allocated to "on- resident^.^ Despite these 
contradictions there is a clear trend of increasing 
licence allacationa to "on-residents. It is signifisant 
to note that increasing licence allocations to non- 
residents st s time when resident licence allocations 
were being reduced was a potentially explosive political 
problem. The r'edtmtion in resident quotas corresponds 
with the stated motives of the "war," and may have been 
generated by concern with wildlife populations. However, 
as discussed in the preceding chapter, the wildlife 
biologist's were unsure as to how much poaching was 
occurring, or its effects on herd growth. It is important 
to consider that caribou populations were thought to 
exgeed 30,000 animals in the early 1980,s and were 
generally stable and increasing in Newfoundland 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:140; Mercer st al., 
1985:16-20). Moose populations on the other hand were 
thought to be decreasing slightly by the late 1970's 
(Mercer et al.. 1988:46; Newfoundland and Labrador. 
1983a:l34-139). To a government wishing to enlarge the 
Prom this table it is apparent that in the 1980's 
"on-resident quotas generally increasad. It is 
significant to note that from 1980 - 1981 resident 
licences Ware decreased by almost 1000. In that same 
period non-resident allocation= increased. In 1982 both 
resident and non-resident quotes were reduced. ~ow:ver, 
the non-resident reductions were relatively minor. 
Similarly, resident quotaa were reduced by almost another 
1000 in 1983, while non-resident quotas again experienced 
a minor cut. 
nan-resident noose hunt this posed a problem. Outfitters 
had received a five year guarantee on licence allocations 
beginning in 1982. At the same time, r~rident denand for 
big game licences was inoreasing (Wm's. 1990:30; Earles 
et al., 1987:lz). Thus the problem facing government was 
this: with noose herds thought to be erperienoing a 
slight decline, where were the licencan needed to 
allocate to non-residents to cone from? 
At this point it is appropriate t o  consider the role 
of the provincial department of development in this 
stage.' When Mr. Sinnos was asked if the ninister of 
developnent nay have been involved in the declaration of 
"war" on poaching, he replied "He w have been 
involved." S i m r  was then asked if the Minister, or the 
department of development, made representations to him 
concerning the need to expand the number of non-resident 
big gane licences: 
Oh sure. That's ongoing, year after year after 
year. I suspect it's still ongoing. I nean 
that's good economically end all the rest of it 
and in fact I think over the years licences 
have increased to outfitters, Newfoundland out- 
fitters. Sure, it would have been an issue then 
(interview. April 24, 1991). 
' This deDartnent continued to cultivate the 
outdoor touris; business, seen clearly in the "Hunting 
Camp U ~ e r s  survey" it conducted in 1982. This was an 
attempt to describe the outfitting industry and detail 
the factors that influenced selaction of an outfitting 
vacation (Earles et al., 1387:s). 
Similarly, the former provincial hunting and fishing 
development officer discussed the efforts of the 
department of development to secure more non-residant 
licences: 
... what's happened is we've expanded the 
number of non-resident licences. This has been 
a real, ah, real touchy thing with the wildlife 
division. Their priorities are bared on, number 
one, subsistence, or the food aspect of it, and 
nunber two, resident demand, and nunber threa, 
finally, the lowest on the totem pole is no"- 
resident demand. Okay, so what we've attempted 
to do is secure a minimum of ten percent of the 
total nunber of licences per year that would go 
to non-residents and be made available through 
outfitters (interview, June 13, 1990). 
From this comment it seems clear the department of 
development and tourism was making demands on the 
wildlife division to inorease the amount of non-resident 
li~ences available to mtfittera.' This assertion is 
supported by the conlnents of the former chief biologist 
who told me the wildlife division received pressure from 
above to produce more licences (interview, July 25, 
1990). It also seems clear from the former hunting and 
fishing davelapnent officer's ooments that the wildlife 
division was not cooperating as the department of 
From the abcve table, it seams that the departme F 
of development was unable to secure the 10% of liaences 
it sought. This may have been caused by opposition from 
within the wildlife division or may have been 
symptomatic of the overall phriod of lisence reductions. 
However, it is interesting to consider that as resident 
licence quotas were cut, the non-resident quotas edged 
Closer to the 10% the department of development was 
seeking. 
development might have liked; the wildlife division's 
firet priority was resident hunters. This is supported by 
the so-called "Waltere' Wildlife Policy" which the 
division operates under. n o  points of this policy are to 
regulate wildlife surpluses for "the use of the people" 
and "to provide uildlife...for the recreational needs of 
the people" (Mercer at a1.,1988:5). This oonflict between 
the demands of the department of development and the 
wildlife division's priorities will be discussed in morm 
detail in the following chapter. For now it is enough far 
the reader to be aware of this rift. 
A s  mentioned above, both government and vested 
interest groups wanted to expand the non-resident hunt. 
That is, they needed more big game licences for tourist 
entrepreneurs to sell to non-resident hunters. The 
problem faoing governlnent was that only a fixed amount of 
animals could be allocated for culling without 
jeopardizing the future viability of the herds. Due to 
budget reductions and the impresire nature of wildlife 
science, the exact size of big game herds was not known. 
That is, big game managers were unsure as to exactly how 
many animals there were, or how many were being lost to 
poachers. Thus, government facad s dilenma: how could 
"on-resicient lioence allocations be increased without 
jeopardizing stocks? Where ware the animals needed to 
immediately expand t h e  non-resident hunt t o  be  found? One 
way was t o  implement programs t o  inc rease  herds.  However, 
t h i s  would have been a long t a m  s o l u t i o n  and would not 
have produced t h e  necessary anirnels quickly enough. The 
f i g u r e s  i n  t a b l e  5.1 and t h e  o the r  numbers on non- 
r e s i d e n t  noose l i c e n c e  a l l o c a t i o n s  suggest  t h a t  i n  order 
t o  promptly increase non-resident l i c e n c e  a l l o c a t i o n s  (or  
a t  l e a s t  maintain them a t  e x i s t i n g  levels) government nay 
have reduced r e s i d e n t  a l l o c a t i o n s  and s h i f t e d  these  
licences t o  non-resident hunters.  The f i g u r e s  i n  t a b l e  
5.1 suggest  t h a t  from 1980 - 1983 r e s i d e n t  b i g  game 
quo tas  were reduced by approximately 2000, whi le  t h a t  
same period saw non-residenmt quotas inc rease .  Reducing 
quotas t o  r es iden t s  was p o l i t i c a l l y  dangerous and 
produced complaints (discussed i n  d e t a i l  in c h a p t e r s  6 
and 7 ) ,  as seen i n  l e t t e r s  t o  t h e  e d i t o r  and t h e  
formation of hun te r ' s  groups. However, government d i d  no t  
pub l io ly  s t a t e  it was redvcing r e s i d e n t  quotas and 
inc reas ing  (or maintaining) non-resident quotas;  it 
blamed t h e  reduction i n  r es iden t  a l l o c a t i o n s  on i l l e g a l  
hunting and declared "war" on poachers. 
I t  is possible t o  suggest  t h a t  the  "war" on poaching 
had two main e f f e c t s .  F i r s t ,  it may have reduced t h e  
number of animals " l o s t "  t o  poachers. While government 
and w i l d l i f e  managars were unsure exac t ly  how many 
animals were t aken  by poacher*, every e x t r a  animal meant 
another p o t e n t i a l  l i cence  s a l e .  A second e f f e c t  of t h e  
"war" war t h a t  it provided government wi th  e scapegoat 
f o r  its reduc t ion  of r e s i d e n t  quotas.  Government 
decreased the number of r e s iden t  big game l i cences ,  
pub l i c ly  s t a t i n g  t h i s  was done t o  help s t o c k s  recover  
from rampant poaching by r e s i d e n t s .  There was no mention 
of t h e  inc reases  and very minor r educ t ions  i n  non- 
r e s iden t  quotas (or o f  poaching by non-residents) .  That 
is, the  "war" was perhaps an  at tempt t o  q u i e t  unhappy 
r e s i d e n t  hunters.  As mentioned, t h e  number of r e s i d e n t  
hun te r s  was s t e a d i l y  increasing.  That is, t h e r e  was an 
inc raas inq  ras iden t  demand for b ig  game l i c e n c e s ,  a t  t h e  
same t i n e  t h a t  t h e  "on-resident hunt was being expanded. 
A "war" on poaching helped d i s t r a c t  a t t e n t i o n  away from 
t h e  s l e i g h t  of hand t h a t  accompanied t h e  expansion o f  t h e  
non-resident b i g  game hunt. 
me Wild l i f e  Division:  1982-84 
The w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  published a highly s i g n i f i c a n t  
document i n  t h i s  s t age ,  namely an W 1  Reooet fo r  t h e  
f i s c a l  yea r  19.31-82. Released i n  September 1983, it was 
important  because it war t h e  f i r s t  Annual Reoort produced 
by t h e  d i v i s i o n  s i n c e  t h e  l a t e  1960's (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1983a:164). The pub l i ca t ion  of t h i s  document 
perhaps suggested an increased team e f f o r t  by w i l d l i f e  
personnel in the early stages of the poaching war, demon- 
strating a more efficient and vigourous approach. 
However, the budget cuts discussed in the previous 
chapter oantinued to adversely affect the division. That 
is, tension existed between the stated policies and ths 
practical realities of wildlife management in the early 
1980's. 
For example, the Bud.et estimate for the division 
for 1982-83 WBE 4.5 million dollars (Newfoundland and 
Labrador. 1982c:176). The following year, 1983-84, the 
estimates were reduced to 4.1 million dollars 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983b:186). In 1984-85. the 
divisionrs budget was estimated at 4.3 million dollars 
(Newfoundland end Labrador, 1984b:284). This was a slight 
increase Prom the previous year, but war still less than 
1982-83. These budget reductions were referred to in the 
divisionrs 1983-84 Annual ReDort: 
This year despite all the shortcomings of econ- 
omic slumps, etc., we have provided e earvioa 
to the public that has excelled in many areas 
of endeavour and considering the resources at 
hand, our performance in some areas during the 
fisoal yea= 1983-84 was considered far advanced 
Budget reductions continued to affect the running of the 
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division. Cuts in funding meant it that it vas becoming 
nore and more difficult to determine exactly what was 
happening with aninal populations more difficult to 
proteot game and fight a "war" against poachers.' Small 
budget increases like the one in 1984 did little to 
alleviate the strain under which the division was aperat- 
ing. 
Despite these budget cuts, the different sections of 
the division were the source of many initiatives during 
the war. For example, the decision to reduce licence 
quotas war, based on the astimates produced by the 
division's biologists (Newfoundland and Labrador. 
1983a:116). The protection branch intensified its efforts 
in this stage. Far example, the number of investigations 
oarried out in 1982-83 was increased from the previous 
year in all regions except Labrador (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1983a:157). Tha proteotion branch also enlarged 
As discussed above, the wildlife division's count- 
inglestimating of the big game herds was hampered by 
decreasing budgets for airoraft tine. The division was 
increasingly being forced to rely on data gathered from 
hunters for estimating populations. For example, 
successful hunters are required to return the lower 
jawbone of the aninal for lab analysie. Similarly, all 
licenced hunters arc required to submit a return 
attachad to the big gene licence) indicating the number 
Lf davs hunted. the area hunted, the number and sex of 
return. 
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it. public relationb program, making 484 speaking 
engagements in 1982-81 compared with 431 in 1981-82 
(Newfoundland and Labrador. 1983a:163). Another 
initiative announced was the proposed hiring of 
additional protection staff from monies raised from the 
new five dollar application fss for big game licences 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:118) .I0 
l he infomatian and education section also magnified 
its efforts. In 1982-83. nine news items and three major 
g articles were prepared for release (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1983a:164). This section was also involved in 
the preparation of the Annual ReDorf (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1983a:164) and in two public surveys; the 
statistics Canada survey, referred to in chapter four, on 
the value of wildlife, and a study by a Memorial 
University graduate student prepared specifically for the 
wildlife division, and dealinq solely with this provinse 
lo The last major expansion of the protection staff 
had reportedly occurred in 1975 (The Eveninq Teleqrem, 
January 25, 1983). This was supported by the comments of 
the eastern region protection supervisor who told me the 
"protection branch really cane into its own" in the late 
1970'6 (Interview, June 13, 1990). Research found that 
there was no increars in protection staff in tha mid- 
1980'8. In fact from 1983 to 1990 the numbers of 
protection staff decreased from 45 to 36 officers (WPO's, 
1990:30). 
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Other steps taken by the information and education 
branoh demonstrate its importance. For example, there 
were advancements made in the hunter education program. 
The hunter education co-ordinator produced an important 
book in this period, The Newfoundland and Labrador Hunter 
m ~ a t i o n  Manual (1983) in student and instructor 
editions. It was the responsibility of the hunter 
education branch to serve volunteer instructors and 
pmvide them with the necessary support to deliver the 
hunter education couree (Simns, 1984:2). The information 
and education section also prepared a brochure for the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Wilderness and Ecological 
Reserves Advisory Council titled Carinq For our Soecial 
W .  However, the most significant product of the 
infomation and education section in stage two was 
operation SPORT (Stop Poaching Report Today). This 24 
hour anonymous phone line to report poachers was begun on 
the island's west coast in October 1983, and as mentioned 
above, made available to all residents of the province by 
" Hill's (1984) study, was an attempt to increase 
the division's knowledge of public perceptions and 
opinions toward wildlife, wildlife-related issues and how 
the attitudes of demographic and activity groups differed 
(Hill, 1984:iii). Significantly, the study found that 80% 
of respondents thought poaching was common in this 
province and it also recommended increased public 
education programs. 
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fall 1 9 8 1  (simms, 1984:5) .  The chief of education told me 
that this program was his idea, and a pamphlet explaining 
it was produced by the information and education section. 
clearly, this branch of the wildlife division had begun 
to show the influence it exerted in the realm of the 
poaching issue. 
CWLIUS-MAKERS IN STAGE TWO 
The description of the "war" on poaching given above 
focuses mainly on state initiatives. However, as in the 
first stage, there war considerable non-state activity. 
  he main point of this section is, first, to highlight 
changes in the way poaching and poachers were typified 
and, second, ta examine the opposition to government 
programs which arose In this period. Five categouies of 
claims-makers are outlined: provincial government 
Ministers; wildlife officials; media personnel; private 
groups; and finally, opponents of government. The 
majority of these clairns-makers had bean active in stage 
one, but some new ones emerged in this stage. Two of the 
most outspoken claims-makers from stage one were co-opted 
by government In this stage. 
There were two Ministers responsible for wildlife 
who made claims in this period. me was Len Simms, who 
had been the wildlife Minister at the end of stage one 
(mid-1982). Simne was highly a c t i v e  i n  t h i s  s t age ,  
holding news conferences and wr i t ing  a t  l e a s t  th ree  
l e t t e r s  t o  t h e  e d i t o r  concerning wi ld l i f e  management (see 
f o r  example: The ~ v e n i n a  Telearam. February 17. 1983; 
March 29, 1983; l ip r i l  6, 1984). I n  l a t e  1984. a 
Min i s t e r i a l  change occurred and the new Minister  of 
w i l d l i f e ,  Tom Ridsout, made a l l ega t ions  about poaohing 
(see for exampls me Evenins Tele-, November 20, 
1984). m e  Minister  of development a l s o  continued t o  
opera te  as e claims-maker. Addit ionally,  members of the  
opposit ion pa r ty  pressed poaching arguments. Many 
w i l d l i f e  o f f i c i a l s  a l s o  made poaching claims from mid- 
1982 t o  1984, for example, t h e  Deputy Minister  of 
c u l t u r e ,  r ec rea t ion  and youth, t h e  d i r e c t o r  of t h e  
w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion ,  t h e  ch ie f  p ro tec t ion  o f f i c e r ,  end t h e  
chief  o f  information and education. The eae te rn  region 
p ro tec t ion  supervisor became v i s i b l y  a c t i v e  as a c l a i a s -  
maker, as d i d  the  hunter education co-ordinator with t h e  
r e l e a s e  of Tge Hunter Education Manual (1981). 
The media and i n t e r e s t  groups played a key r o l e  i n  
t h i s  phase of the  war. The T e b g ~ 3 !  maintained i t s  s t rong  
anti-poaching stance i n  i t s  e d i t o r i a l s ,  a r t i c l e s  and 
columns (see f o r  example % E v ~ n i n a  Teleoran, September 
18, 1982; March 12, 1983; May 15, 1984). The o the r  St. 
John's rtewspaper publishing a t  t h a t  time, a l s o  covered 
the poaching "war" (see tor example ma Dailv News, 
September 18, 1982). The print media not only reported 
what was happening in the war, but became one of the main 
battleqrounds. The importance of the media in the 
creation of an issue is made clear in Lippert's (1990) 
work on how satanism besame an issue in Canada. He argues 
that the media act both as e claims-maXer and a forum for 
other claimn-makers (Lippert, 1990:420). Similarly, 
Hasson~s (1987) work on the "war" waged against 
unemployment insurance fraud by the Canadian Government 
also shows the importance of the media in a government 
led war. Hasson (1987) argues that government waged a 
media campaign which ehaped opinions about unemployment 
insurance fraud (Hasson, 1987:632). 
A variety of Interest groups pressed arguments 
concerning wildlife and poaching from mid-1982 until 
1984, for example, the Wilderness Society, the Salmon 
Preservation Association for the Waters or Newfoundland, 
the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, the 
TUCkamOre Club, the Gander Rod and Gun Club, the Canadian 
Wildlife Federation, the Tors Cove Outdoors Club and the 
Sslmonier Wilderness Association (see for example 
Evenina Teleararg, December 17 and December 31, 1983: 
EeAWWj, 1982-84; Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife 
Federation, 1985; end T h e m ,  April 23, 
1983; The Evenin. Telearan, September 25, 1982; m 
v, February 12, 1983; February 19, 1983; 
May 4, 1983; May 14, 1983). At least two new groups were 
formed in this period. One was the Avalon Hunters 
Association, established in May 1983.   his group lobbied 
to have slugs banned and small game seasons shortened to 
help control poaching. This group tried to rally other 
groups and grabbed media attantion (see for example The 
Eveninrr Telearm, May 4 and May 14, 1983). The same year 
a Regional Newfoundland salmon Council w a s  formed by a 
union between the Sslnon Preservation Association and the 
salmon Association of Eastern Newfoundland.  his ~egionel 
Counoil was part of a larger organization, the Atlantic 
salmon Federation, which was also established in 1983. 
The muin concern of this group was Atlantic salmon and 
one of its main funstions was the promotion of 
conservation measures (s.WINB, 1984:15). It is important 
to p i n t  out that the new claims-makers who became vocal 
in this stage were groups representing sportsmen. 
obviously sportsmen would support any efforts to erase 
something which threatens their aotivitieo, in this Ease 
poaohing. Other studies of wildlife conservation make 
Clear that sp~rtbmen are against poaching or any threat 
to the future of hunting (see for example; 1vas8 (1988) 
study of poaching in Maine; or Reiger's (1986) Work on 
American sportsmen and the origins of oonseevation). 
Ritzer (198s) writes that through co-optation groups 
are absorbed into the structure of an organization to 
avert threats to the organization's structure. Ritzar 
(1986:ll) goes on to suggest that opposition can be 
silenced or greatly reduced by putting claims-making 
~ritics on the team, thereby roaking them share the burden 
of responsibility for decisions and increasing their 
stake in supporting the organization rather than opposing 
it.This process could be seen at work in this stage when 
two important claims-makers from stage one were drawn 
into government. The first war the president of the 
Tuckamore Club, Dr. Barry May, who war appointed to the 
Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisclry Council. 
Significantly, this Council had direct links to the 
wildlife division, as the chief of infomation and 
education was a member of the Council (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1981b:lll) and the wildlands biologist its 
Executive Secretary (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1983a:l54). The other person co-opted by government was 
the founding president of the Salmon Preservation 
Association and the editor of the spwm& As mentioned 
above, he became hunting and fishing development offioer 
in October, 1984 (interview: June 13, 1990). Both these 
men had, from 1979 until mid-1982, called on government 
to address the poaching problem. These appointments were 
perhaps a move to silence these highly vocal agitators. 
claims About Poschinq 
some claims were unchanged from stage one. For example 
public cooperation was still called for by the Minieter 
(see for example Newfoundland and Labrador, 198ab:5487); 
by wildlife officials (The Eveninq Talaqram, October 6 ,  
1983); and by columniets (The ~venins Telearam, narch 12, 
1983). However, as mentioned, stage two raw a reported 
intensification of violence and brutality on the part of 
poachers. Claims indioated there was a 3eterioration of 
law and order in the countryside. 
However, one significant change in the nature of 
claims about poaching was that poaching was now claimed 
to be oarried out for black market sale, often by 
organized groups of poachers. That is, it seemsd to be 
getting more dangerous in the countryside as a new type 
of poacher emerged.  or example, both Wildlife Ministers 
made claims of this kind (see for example: The Evening 
-, January 25, 1983; November 20, 1984). Media 
oolumnirts made similar claims. One wrote that while 
poachers came from "all walks of life" they shared the 
characteristi~s of greed and stupidity. This man went on 
to claim that poachers ware selling meat and killed 
whenever they ran "short of beer moneym (Dx3xm.h 
Tple.ra., March 12, 1983). Interest groups, like the 
wildlife   ad era ti on also claimed poaching was being 
carried out fo r  economic returns (Newfoundland and 
~abrador Wildlife Federation, 1985b:l). The President of 
the Gander Rod and Gun Club olaimed that poachers on the 
Gander River were very clever and were using highly 
sophisticated gear to supply local restaurants with 
salmon (The Evanins Telesram, September 25, 19RZ). Other 
claims-makers raised the idea that poachers were 
operating in gangs or crowds. For example, the Minister 
made such a clailn (ma Evaninm Talewarn, November 20, 
1984) as did an opposition MHA (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1982b:5479). Such claims suggested that 
poa~hers were now organized and contributed to the 
atlnosphere of potential danger. 
Claims were also made which suggested that poachers 
were reacting violently and that enforcement agents were 
under attack. Recall that violent examples had been used 
in the previous stage to support claims and grab people's 
attention. Hall st al. (1979) assert that linking crime 
to violsnc~ increases the visibility of the crime in 
question: 
Violence represents a basic violation of the 
person; the greatest personal crime is 
'murder', bettered only by the murder of a law- 
enforcement agent ... Violence is also the 
ultimate crime against property and against the 
state. It represents a fundamental rupture in 
the social order. The use of violence marks the 
distinction between those who are fundamentally 
a soc ie ty  and those  who are 
i t . . . v io lenue  t h u s  c o n s t i t u t e s  a a r i t i c a l  
threshold i n  soc ie ty ;  a l l  ac t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
criminal  ones, whish t r ansgress  t h a t  boundary, 
are, by d e f i n i t i o n ,  worthy of news a t t e n t i o n  
(Hall e t  a l .  , 1979:68). 
Claims-nakers i n  t h i s  second stage l inked  violence t o  
t h e i r  poaching claims. For example, when t h e  Wi ld l i f e  Act 
amendments were being debated in t h e  House of Assembly, 
t h e  l eader  o f  t h e  opposit ion party t a l k e d  about the: 
... a t t a c k s  and a s s a u l t s  t h a t  a re  being made on 
the  w i l d l i f e  o f f i s e r s  i n  t h i s  province ...... t h e  
next t h i n g  a w i l d l i f e  o f f i c e r  w i l l  bd r i s k i n g  
h i s  l i f e  t o  enforce t h e  laws of t h i s  Province 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 198ib:5246-5250). 
The Telesrarn covered t h i s  violence a g a i n s t  enforcement 
agents.  I t  r epor ted  t h e  Eastern Region Pro tec t ion  Super- 
v i so r ' s  c l a ims  t h a t  a man had been charged with 
Z.~6aUlting a WPO a f t e r  a l l eged ly  t r y i n g  t o  avoid e 
roadblock manned by a two-man nIght p a t r o l  1-
lkbs?sn, October 6, 1983). An essay w r i t t e n  by the  
executive v ice -p res iden t  of t h e  Canadian Wi ld l i f e  
Federation claimed t h a t  poachers were "1n many instances 
prone t o  use violence t o  avoid de tec t ion  and 
apprehensiona8 (The ~ v e n I n s  Taleoram, February 12 ,  1983).  
A salmon Prese rva t ion  Associat ion e d i t o r i a l  d i scussed  the 
need for improved equipment f o r  r i v e r  guard ians ,  who, it 
was suggested,  faced "potentiall:' deadly encwnte rn  with 
desperate men" (sE&,WB, 1983:3). S imi la r ly ,  t h e  
outdoor8 oo lunn i s t  wrote haw the  " l a m e n  were outnumbered 
and ou t l a s ted  by t h e  outlab- ' (-a, 
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Poaching h3d undergone a d e f i n i t i o n a l  transformation 
as t h e  i s s u e  moved from s t a g e  one t o  two. I n  t h e  previous 
chap te r ,  poaching was defined by claims-makers as being 
widespread and s o c i a l l y  acceptable.  In  t h i s  reco-d s t age ,  
claims argued t h a t  poaching had gone beyond s o c i a l l y  
accepted subs i s t ence  poaching. Th i s  change i n  tha  d e f i n i -  
t i o n  of t h e  problem is understandable. Both Spec ta r  and 
Ki t suse  (1977:148), and Ri tze r  (1986 : l l ) .  a s s e r t  suoh a 
transformation occurs when a problem moves from s t a g e  one 
t o  s t age  two, claims-makers in t h i s  s t a g e  begea t o  
c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  poaohing problem i n  a new way, which 
Best 's  ( 1 9 8 9 : ~ ~ )  work on t y p i f i c a t i o n  he lps  u s  t o  
understand.  Bes t  (1989) de f ines  t y p i f i c a t i o n  as: 
... an i n t s g r a l  p a r t  of s o c i a l  problems 
construction.  claims-makers inev i t ab ly  
charac te r i ze  problems i n  p a r t i c u l a r  vays:They 
emphasize some aspec t s  and n o t  o the r s ;  they  
promote s p e c i f i c  o r i e n t a t i o n s ;  and they focus 
on p a r t i c u l a r  causes and advocate p a r t i c u l a r  
so lu t ions  (Bert ,  1989:xxi). 
Claims-makers had begun t o  narrcw t h e  focus o f  t h e  
problem; poaching was now def ined  as market poaching. 
poachers were claimed t o  be soph i s t i ca ted  and v io len t .  
poaching was being t y p i f i ~ d  i n  s new way. Given the  
I' It is s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  note t h e  continued use of 
western metaphors. Reca l l  t h e  previously mentioned 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between "three-wheeled cowboys" and ald- 
fashioned hunters.  
nature of poaching, one might suspect that when these 
novel claima about poaching were made against the 
backdrop of an increasingly dangerous outdoorn, that 
people would rally behind government efforts to eradicate 
the problem and increase tourist benefits from the 
outdoors. This did occur in some instsnoes, as seen in 
the formation of the Avalon Hunters Association and the 
Regional salmon council. However, not everyone supported 
government, as will now be seen. 
Qpooeition claim 
As discussed above, the provincial government had a broad 
base of support to draw on in its "war" efforts. However, 
a "war" implies that there are two rider; the allies and 
the enemy; good guys and bad guys, if you will. As men- 
tioned, government Ministers, wildlife officiale, media 
personnel, end interest group representatives made 
similar claims about the nature and extent of poaching 
and how to ameliorate it. These four categories of 
claim~-nakers might be considered the allies in this war. 
A "war" implies that an enemy has been recognized and is 
under attack. Who was the enemy in the poaching war? 
Poachers of COU~SB, but also those people who did not sea 
big game as a sporting resource and wilderness as 
something special to be preserved; in short, the 
Scattered population of Newfoundland, Who often Opposed 
the establishment of rildlire reserves and who did not 
obey the game laws or sporting code of ethics. The "war" 
on poaching was partly an effort to address this 
opposition, change attitudes and mobilize support. In 
addition to opposition from the genaral public, 
govarnment may have faced resistance from the protection 
branch of the wildlife division. This section may not 
have supported the oontention that poaching was rn 
factor limiting big game hard growth. The recently 
retired director of the division told me that for the 
protection Staff to have agreed with such an assertion 
would have been equivalent to then raying "we're not 
doing our job" (interview, May 8, 1991). Disagreements 
between protection staff and research and nanagement 
staff (i.e. biologists) becomes important in stage four 
and are discussed at more lsngth in chapter seven. Foe 
now it is sufficient for tha reader to know that the 
protection staff may have felt threatened by accusations 
that poaching was rampant. 
An example of the public opposition facing 
government arose in late 1982 over an ecological reserve 
proposed for the watershed of Western Arm Brook on the 
north west coast of the Great Northern Peninsula. The 
federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the 
Wilderness and Eoological Reserves Advisory Council were 
in favour of the reserve, whereas area residents, through 
their local Development Association, OppDbed it (Z!!s 
menino Telesran, December 23, 1982). nore opposition to 
government emerged in this period from the ranks of All- 
Terrain Vehicle (ATV'S) owners who Eaared loss of outdoor 
freedone and access to the oountrysida. Some of these ATV 
owners were considering forming an assosiation (m 
~veninrr Teleqraln, February 19, 1983)." As mentioned 
above, some people had linked poachers to ATV's. It is 
significant, therepore, that at least some ATV owners 
reacted against such charger and mobilized. Opposition 
also appeared in unsporting behaviour such as the snaring 
of moose or the setting of traps to maim rabbit hounds 
discussed above. 
opposition to government was also expressed through 
letters to the editor. One such letter, a copy of which 
had been addressed to the Minister responsible for 
wildlife, opposed the proposed Bay Du Nord Wilderness 
Area. This letter claimed that "a few high profile 
personalities" would be given "carte blenche" use of the 
area (me Evenina Telearam, September 28, 1983). Other 
letters to the editor called for the curtailment of non- 
'3 ~colqical reserves end ATV use are used simply 
as examples of opposition to government policy concerning 
wildland management. Both issues could be analyzed 
individually, however. spaoe constraints prevent this. 
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resident aport hunting so m a t  the licences could bs 
distributed to residents (me Eveninn Talesrnm, October 
8, 1982); or that the licence reductions implemented as 
part of the "war" on poaching were unjust and punished 
innocent hunters (The Evenin- Telemram, Harsh 5, 1984). 
Another letter claimad moose quotas were too high and 
were an example of "wildlife mismanagement" (- 
-, March 26, 1984). Significantly, on- newspaper 
editorial also opposed government's expansion of sport 
hunting. It argued that non-resident hunting should be 
cancelled "so that whatever licences are taken up with 
this can be allocated instead to people who need meat on 
the table" (me Dailv News, September 18, 1982). It was 
claimed that the licencing quota system did consider the 
food gathering activities of outport families. 
Ironically, this editorial appeared on the sane day that 
"war" was declared on poachers. Clearly, a large body of 
people opposed government's actions. This is significant 
and would lead government to attempt to undermine and 
weaken opposition. 
ANALYSIS OF THE "WAR" ON POACHING 
In this section the state,s tactics in the "war" are 
discussed. It is argued that tbu "war" efforts consisted 
of a oombination of ooercive maneuvers and more subtle 
consent generating tactics. 
Hunter Education 
As discussed above, the establishment of an information 
and education branah of the wildlife division was highly 
important with regard to poaching becoming an issue (i.a. 
*warm being declared). If we consider the crime wave that 
War thought to be occurring in the province's countryside 
at this time and the poaching "war" that was being 
fought, a picture of chaos, lawlessness, lack of 
sportsmanship and struggle emerges. This conflict saw the 
State and its allies (the media and interest groups) 
pitted against poachers end those people who opposed new 
regulations and policies governing wildlife and 
wildlands. 
A 8  made clear above, one of the canclusime reached 
by the majority of claims-maltere in the first stage was 
the need for an education program. The reported 
escalation of violence and disorder in this second stage 
added weight to claims about the necessity of hunter 
education. The expansion of the hunter education program 
perhaps steamed from those first stage claims. m a t  is, 
the tactics grew out of what was seen as the problem. The 
education program aimed to teach what the 
c01umni~t ass~rted Newfoundlanders' had lost - 
sportelnanship (The Evenins ~ele-, October 22, 1983). 
It was also c means to weaken opposition, oontrol 
people's actions on the countryside and regulate the 
taking of game. 
The Purpose of the Hunter Education Manual (1983) 
released in this second stage was: 
... to put afield safer, more responsible end 
knowledgeable hunters. Hunter Education 
programs contribute to a greater awareness end 
enjoyment of wildlife resources, an improved 
oonservation ethic, a greater understanding of 
wildlire management issues and an appreciation 
of the role the hunter has to play in these 
issues (Newfoundland end Labrador, 1983c:3). 
It is significant that this w mentioned the 
"conservation ethic." Ethics are standards of conduot and 
moral judgement. They imply a sense of right or wrong. 
The second section of the #BUEA, "Hunter ~thics," 
discussed the importance of following both the written 
and unwritten hunting laws. It began with a quote from 
famous conservationist Aldo Leopold: 
A peculiar virtue in wildlife ethics is that 
the hunter ordinarily has no gallery to applaud 
or disappr~ve of his conduct. Whatever his 
acts, they are dictated by hie own conscience, 
rather than by a mob of onlookers. It is 
difficult to exaggerate the importance of this 
fact (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983c:7). 
The also discussed how undarstanding big game 
management, game laws and sporting codes was as important 
as safe handling of firearms. It stated that the hunter 
nmst develop a c d e  which will make him a good hunter. 
This code can be called a hunter's ethics" ((Newfoundland 
and Labrador, 1981c:l). The lm!g3l listed sir rules 
"which should be part of the hunter's code of ethics." 
These included obeying game laws, supporting conservation 
efforts and acquiring the skills to ensure "clean 
sportananlike kills" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
l981o:7). The Manual went on to state: 
TO be a safe and ethical hunter, you must 
observe all game laws...Those who break gane 
laws are criminals. A true sportsman obeys the 
unwritten or moral laws as well as the written 
ones... The true sportsman wlll take only the 
gane he will use even if it is less then the 
bag limit...A true sportsman has not lost his 
rer~ect...A hunter with a firm code of ethics 
wouid report poachers and even be villing to 
testify in court because he knowe how important 
it is to obey laws and to preserve wildlife and 
the environment. Slob huntera...don't care how 
or what they shoot...They have created a 
problem for the true sportsman by presenting an 
imaae of the "hunterH that has stirred a lot of 
emoEions. Anti-hunting feelings. .. have been 
growing.1t is now up to the true sportsmen to 
present the correct picture of the hunter 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 19830:7-8). 
Clearly, the W was an effort to influence hunters, 
behaviour. specifically, it might be viewed as an effort 
to get hunters to police themselves and regulate hunting 
bahaviour. The ethical hunter portrayed in this book 
starkly contrasted with the new breed of '0owboy"fpoachar 
said to be roaming the provinsers oountryside. 
The importance of this hunter education program to 
the state's "warw efforts cannot be overstated. Some 
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points make clear the importance of hunter education. 
First, the wildlife division was being adversely affested 
by budget reductions. For example, aircraft time was 
decreasing. Aircraft tine was (and is) important ear both 
oounting and patrolling the herds. second, given the 
inpossibility of effectively policing a scattered human 
population over the vast land mass of the province, the 
government's interest in big game as an economic 
resource, the existence of interest groups sharing 
government's view, and widespread resident opposition 
make clear why education had become important to 
government. Since there were so few WW's, people had to 
be taught to obey the game laws and regulate the 
bahaviour of other hunters. 
The effectiveness of the education program was 
ensured in same cases because hunters as a group are open 
to manipulation. Hunters want to be able to continue 
their activities. Lurid (1980) arguer that the benefits 
that sportsmen "derive from game are directly 
proportional to its abundance" (Lund, 1980:109). That is, 
hunters want an abundance of game. If hunters are faced 
with reductions in licences quotas, if thase reductions 
are blamed on poachers, and if the state is educating 
hunters about the "properos way to behave when hunting, 
one might expect hunters to rally behind government. This 
happened in this second stage with the Avalon Hunters 
Association. As discussed, this group lobbied government 
to ban certain types of ammunitbon (i.e. slugs) and 
shorten seasons (The Evenina Teleqram, May 14, 1983). 
Other hunter groups, such as the Canadian wildlife 
Pedsration, also called for more eduoetion (- 
-, February 12, 1983). 
carnoy'r (1984) discussion of the Grsmscian concept 
of hegemony is useful for analyzing the state run hunter 
education program. Drawing on the works of Marx, Grarnsci 
developed a view of the state which he defined as: 
... the entire complex a€ practical and 
theoretical activities with which the ruling 
class not only justifies and maintains its 
dominance, but manages to win the active 
consent of those over whom it rules (in Csrnoy. 
1984i65). 
Thus, for Grsmnsi, the state acts in a manner whioh helps 
perpetuate the existing class structure. Marx's concept 
of bourgeois hegemony besame one of the central themes in 
Gramssi's view of capitalist society (Carnoy, 1984:66). 
Carnoy (1984) writes that hegemony, to Gramsci, 
"naant the ideologisal predominance of bourgeois values 
and norms over the subordinate classes" (Carnoy, 
1984:66). Carnoy goes on to write that hegemony, as put 
forth by Gramsci, has two meanings: 
... first, it is a process in civil society 
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whereby a fraction nf the dominant class oxer- 
ciees control through its moral and 
intellectual leadership uvor other allied 
fractions of the dominant class...Second it is 
the relat.ionship between the dominant and the 
dominated classes. Hegemony involver the 
successful attempts of the dominant class to 
use its political, moral, and intellectual 
leadership to establish its view of the world 
as all-inclusive and universal, and to shape 
the interests and needs of subordinate groups 
(carnoy, 1984:7o). 
SO for Grmrci, dominant class control was maintained 
through the shaping of the interests and needs of 
subordinate classes. The state is an apparatus of 
bourgeois control and shapes the consciousness of the 
dominated (Carnoy, 1984:76). Gransci wrote that "The 
entire function of the state has been transformed; the 
state has beoome an educator" (in Carnoy, 1984:74). 
If we view the poa~hing "warw as an expression of 
class struggle in the province, then Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony is highly useful. Big game and wildlands had 
become aeonomis commodities to those involved in the 
outdoor tourist industry; both the state and private 
entrepreneurs. The increasing control end regulation of 
these comodities by the state was largely opposed by 
residents of the province. A class conflict aver wildlife 
resources emerged. Since the state was a baurqeoia state, 
it acted to maintain the dominanoe and control of the 
leading classes. It did this through a combination of 
coercion and consent. One means ta get the consent of 
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reeident hunters was to educate them to behave properly. 
 hat is, the state attempted to shape the consciousness 
of hunters end undermine apposition to polioies regarding 
wildlife. This would have made policing mora affective, 
as more ethioal hunters went afield, thus decreasing 
poaching and providing more animals for allosation to 
non-residents. 
A fundamental Marxist concept is that the state does 
not represent the common good but is the political 
expression of class structures found in production 
(carnoy, 1984:47). The state is "...an essential means of 
class domination in capitalist society" (carnoy, 
1984:17). Another fundamental Marxist concept is that 
"the state in bourgeois society is the repressive arm of 
the bourgeoisie" (Csrnoy, 1981:50) .I4 The lack of 
clarity in Marx's work on the extent to which the state 
is an inatrumsnt of doninant class rule led Marxists to 
present several arguments why the state should be thought 
of as a ruling class instrument. First, personnel of the 
state tend to belong to the same dominant class in 
-.  - - -- - - - -. . - -. . - -- .. . . - -. . -. .- - -- - - - - -- - 
behalf of the bourgeoisie is much debated. The roots 
this debate lie in the works of Marr, who oscillated 
his writings between crude instrumentalism to a mora 
Subtle view of the state being relatively autonomous 
class rule (see foe example: Jessop, 1982; Held et a. 
1983; or Knuttlia, 1987). 
from 
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society. Secondly, the state is dominated by the economic 
power of the capitalist class, end finally, given the 
state's position in the capitalist mode of production, it 
cannot be anything but a class state (Carnoy. 1984:52). 
Due to the conflict and controversy found in class 
societies, some form of repression is necessary. The 
state assumes this role. taking over s primary function 
of society, law enforcement (Knuttlia, 1981: 98-99). Laws 
are enaoted by states to serve certain purposes for 
certain groups. Laws define what is acceptable and 
unacceptable in society. Criminal law, in effect if not 
in intent, serves upper class interests (Thio. 1983:16). 
The rule of law is at the heart of bourgeois oulture; law 
is the elaboration of the necessities of bourgeois 
civilization backed with the inmenee physical force of 
the state (Corrigan and Sayer, 1981:40). Modern justice 
procedures are the legitimated practices of moral and 
political control, which develop in response to class 
conflicts spawnad by the domination and exploitation of 
one class by another (sumner, 1982:lo). The law serves 
capital, regulating class conflicts. 
w s a n i r a t i o n s  and the stat$ 
lund'a (1980) work on American game laws argues that the 
unitad states federal government cooperated with the 
separate states to facilitate their sport goal.: "... hi.-
torically the federal government has activaly furthered 
the cause of aport" (Lund, 1980:81). That is, a close 
relationship exists between govsrnment and sporting 
organizations. This argument is supported by tha 
cuiaalines for w i l u  ~olicv in which stated 
that greater involvement by private groups and non- 
government organizations was necessary for effective 
conservation (csnsda, 1983;s). rt IS also important to 
consider the social composition of these sporting groups. 
Reiger's (1986) work on the conservation movement in 
America, argues that: 
... conservation ... began as an upper class 
effort...Anerican sportsmen, those who hunted 
and fished far pleasure rather than commerce or 
necassity ware the real spearhead a€ aonserva- 
tian (Reiger, 1986:21). 
lves (1988:283-2851, in his work m the game laws of 
Maine, supports Reiger's a.sertion, while Altherr'. 
(1978:7) study of the development af the Amsrican-Hunter 
Natu~alist movement makes a similar argunant. As 
mentioned, those interestad in wildlife conservation 
vIewe(1 hunting as a reoreational activity. In 
Newfoundland, by 1982, eportsmensr organizations, such as 
the salmon Preservation Association for the Waters of 
Newfoundland, oslled for increased pr~tection and 
conservation education. ~t the same time such groups were 
connected to and called for the sxpansion Of the outdoor 
t.urism indus t ry  based on w i l d l i f e  rasourcee. r e  we 
consider such groups i n  l i g h t  of Reiger 's  (1986) work, 
t h e n  they might be desc r ibed  as middle c l a s s  
organizations.  Near the end of t h e  1980's a warling c l a s s  
hunters '  group emerged (dirsussed i n  chapter seven). 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  t h i s  group,  d e s p i t e  being high ly  vocal ,  
wan v i r t u a l l y  ignored by government. The province's  game 
laws are now examined, DeEoluse they r e f l e c t  t h e  soercive 
dimension o e t h e  s t a t e s =  s t r a tegy .  
b w s  and w i l d l i f e  ~eaoul-ses 
oame l avs  are administered by the  s t e t a ,  b u t  t h e  s t a t e  i s  
not  a neu t ra l  mediator of c l a s s  c o n f l i c t .  While laws are 
a t o o 1  of class dominance and o p p r e ~ s i o n ,  they  cannot be  
seen as a simple r u l i n g  c l a s s  instrument, as Thompson's 
(1975) Work an poaching laws i n  eighteenth cen tu ry  
England makes c lea r :  
That is. laws must appear equa l  and jus t ,  i n  o rde r  t o  
maintain t h e  e x i s t i n g  s o o i e t a l  order.  I n  eo doing, laws 
serve the  dominant c l a sses .  
The rev i s ion  of t h e  Wi ld l i f e  Act was m s t a t e  
i n i t i a t i v e  of t h i s  second s t a g e  and Of the  e n t i r e  "war" 
on poaching. o tha r  work on w i l d l i f e  lawe sugges t s  t h a t  
t h e s e  laws serve t h e  wealthy powerful ssgnents of soc ie ty  
(see far  example: Ives, 1988; Car te r ,  1980; or Hay, 
1975) .  As  d i s c ~ s h ~ d  above, key s t a t e  a c t o r s  were ~ f t e n  
d i r e c t l y  connected t o  some of t h e  most vosa l  i n t s r e s t  
groups a g i t a t i n g  about poaahing. Some of t h e s e  groups had 
connections t o  t h e  outdoor tourism industry.  O,,"iou.ly, 
t h e  groups who claimed more p r o t e c t i o n  was needed fo r  b i g  
game had ves ted  i n t e r e s t s  in t h a t  game. Sportsmen and 
o u t f i t t e r s  both had i n t e r e s t s  i n  decreasing posshinq and 
inc reas ing  herds. Both groups were a b l e  t o  in f luence  t h e  
s t a t e  through t h e  connestions of va r ious  agents.  
What is h igh ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  about the  l e g i s l a t i v e  
changes enacted during t h e  pe r iod  nid-1982 t o  1984 war 
t h a t  t h e r e  were a c t u a l l y  two amendments t o  t h e  w i l d l i f e  
Act, 8 i11  NO. 4 and B i l l  No.  7 0  (Newfoundland and 
Labrador. 1982b:5239 and 5262). B i l l  No. 70 was t h a  muoh 
pub l i c ized  amendment which increased t h e  s e v e r i t y  o f  
pana1 t i e s  f o r  big gem8 poeahing. The other,  less 
publ ic ized  amendment t o  t h e  Wi ld l i f e  ~ c t  was sill NO. 9 
whioh Was introduced in t h e  House of Assernbly by t h e  
Min i s t e r  a €  Wi ld l i f e :  
Theus is, a t  t h e  p resen t  time, M r .  Speaker, no  
provision i n  t h e  W i l d l i f e  Act f o r  the  i s sue  and 
s e r v i c e  of s ~ m o n s e s  by Wi ld l i f e  o f f i c a r s .    his 
is presen t ly  covered under the  sumnary 
J u r i s d i c t i o n  Act of t h e  Department of J u s t l c e ,  
b u t  beOauBe it i s  o f t e n  d i f f i c u l t  t o  conclude 
oases aga ins t  non-residents and so on whare 
prosecution ac t ion  i s  des i reab le ,  we f e l t  t h a t  
it would be d e s i r a b l e  t o  have t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
c lea red  up end have it included i n  our own a c t  
80 t h a t  t h e r e  w o u l ~  be no doubt about it 
whatsoever (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1981b:52%9-5241). 
=he Winister  continued t o  d i scuss  sill NO. 4 ,  r e l a t i n g  
how it provided f o r  the m v r o r f e i t u r e  of i tems t h a t  have 
been se ized  i n  cases where the  person who is summonsed 
resides outside the province" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1982b. 1982:5241). The Minister also discussed the number 
of non-residents charged with poaching: 
The precise numbers, incidently. as to the 
number of non-residents prosecuted are not 
readily available but we do not think there are 
very many cases involved... o e vi 1 on b 
non-residents are detected (w 
many of them are relatively innocuous and are 
first offenses (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1982b:5242]. 
This quote is significant since it demonstrates that 
there were "on-residents charged with poaching. This 
olaim, like Bill No. 4, received little publicity during 
the "war" on poaahing. 
 ill NO. 70 was signiricant since it was the basis 
of the vswarto and greatly increased the penalties for 
posohing. Bill No. 4 was eignificant in that it o n e  more 
demonstrates that government was increasing oontrol and 
regulation of "on-resident tourist hunting in the early 
1980's. Of FOU~PB, Bill No. 4 also fit in with the stated 
notives of the "war." More importantly perhaps, Bill No. 
4 waa significant for the lack of press coverage it 
received; it was reported in Xhe menin. Telearaq, 
November 20, 1982 but in a small column with the 
relatively placid headline nY4ildlifa Act made stronger." 
Tho Minister's statement that more non-resident violators 
Vera apprehended was highly significant, since this claim 
was not pressed oiten in the "war" on poaching. Some did 
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make such claims, lor example, the Telerrramts outdoors 
columnist claimed non-residents from Germany and Italy 
only took the antlers and very little neat ore animals 
(The Eyenina Tele-, September 25, 1982). However. the 
vast majority of clairns about poachers focused on 
resident poachers. 
Ives' (1988) work on the poaching "war" in Maine 
demonstrates how game laws were used to transform 
wildlife resources into a sporting resource. lves writes 
M a t  by 1883, tough new game laws had been enacted and 
M e  means for effective enforcement of these laws 
provided. Some sportsmen and outfitters opposed the 
intrusive new regulations. However, the brunt of the new 
laws fell on local hunters who were of the opinion that 
these laws "favorad the rich at the expense of the poorm, 
(IV~S, 1988367-68). Ives went on to argue that the harsh 
new game laws: 
... marked the and of the old days and old ways 
in the woods of Maine...and while there would 
be still plenty of resistance and growling, the 
shape of things to come was clear. The future 
belonged to the sportsman, ba he from Maine or 
from away, and the thrust of the legislation 
would be to guarantee him a quarry. To put it 
another way, game was to be thought of less as 
e crop to be harvested than as an attraction to 
hunters, who would, of oourae spend 
considerable monev for the chance to oursue it 
(Ives, 1988:73). 
IYBS is arguing that both resident and non-residsnt 
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sportsmen were the benefactors of the new game laws. and 
that these laws defined wildlife resources as a sport 
commodity. overton (1980) makes a similar argument, 
suggesting that game laws enacted in Newfoundland a .  .<:a 
end of the nineteenth century defined caribou as a 
tourist resource. This resulted in considerable oonilist 
between settlers, who relied on ~aribou for food, and the 
state, which acted in the interests of the tourism 
industry (overton, 1980:PO). 
The amendments to the Wildlife Aot in Newfoundland 
in 1982, signelled a move toward a new era in 
recreational hunting in the province. The state had taken 
a renewed interest in the outdoor tourism industry and 
sport hunting by residents. As discussed in chapter 
three, game had been defined as a sportingltourist 
resource by the end of the nineteenth century. However, 
in rediscovering game as an economic commodity and in 
attempting to insresse recreational sport hunting, the 
state faoed opposition from many residents. 
While some sporting organizations and groups 
actively lobbied government to ad9ress the poaching 
problem and expand sport hunting, many also opposed 
licenca cuts, wilderness reserves, new legislation and 
expansion of the non-resident hunt. Therefore, the state 
implemented an education program to shape resident 
hunters' attitudes and actions. Stage two in the natural 
history of poaching ended in December 1984, and it is 
fitting that just prior to this, Operation SPORT had bean 
implemented on a province-wide basis. At the end ae stage 
two, sport hunting had been established as the only form 
of acceptable hunting in the province. Hunting was now 
fully transeornad into a recreational activity for both 
non-resident and resident sportsmen. This second stage in 
the natural history of poaching might be summarized 
briefly in two words: coercion (in the form of harsh new 
game laws) and consent (in the shape of new education 
programs). 
S u m A F s  
The second stage in the natural history of poaching 
lasted from September, 1982 until the end of 1984.  It is 
not a coinoidence that the "war" on poaching occurred at 
a time when the government had taken a renewed interest 
in ovtdo~r tourism and when organizations of sportsmen 
and tourist entrepreneurs called Eor increased protection 
and more licenoes. It is also significant that the 
wildlife division war called on to wage a "war" on 
poaching at a tine when it was suffering from decreasing 
operating budgets. 
This stage witnessed the redefinition of poaching 
and concluded with the establishment and province-wide 
implementation of Operation SPORT. Ritzer (1986:12) 
writes that stage two culminates with the establishment 
of some institutionalized means for dealing with the 
problem of poaching at least complaints about the 
problem. In this case Operation S W R T  was that 
institutionalized means. spector and Kitsuse (1977:150) 
assert that when institutions, such as Operation SPORT, 
are created, a racial problem cannot disappear so easily. 
stage two is complete when complaints about a problem 
become routinized and the problem becomes domesticated. 
me implementation of operation SPORT saw bumper stickers 
and wallet sired information Cards produced in the 
eportsnrsn'e oolor, bright orange. The anti-poaching 
program was moved into the everyday world of traffic jams 
and people's pockets. The program was widespread. 
Government could point to Operation SPORT and claim "we 
are doing something about poaching; place your somplaints 
here." As well, the anonymous phone line might be an 
example of government's recognition of the impossibility 
of effectively policing wildlife and an effort to get the 
public to shoulder the burden of enforcing game lawe. 
Hunters, through the education program, were trained how 
to behave; the anonymous phone line made it possible for 
the same hunters to report poachers. The next chap? 
examines stage three in  the natural history of poaching 
which ensonpaseed the years 1985 t o  early 1987.  
CRAPTER SIX 
STAGS TKRBE: BUPEAUCBITIBATION AND REACTION 
INTRODUCTION 
This chap te r  examines the  period from 1985 t o  nid-June 
1987. NO new d e f i n i t i o n  of poachers or poaching emerged i n  
t h i s  t h i r d  s t age .  The poaching i s sue  seemed t o  g e t  l o s t  i n  
1985-1986. For example, media coverage of t h e  i s s u e  
c o n t r ~ o t e d  i n  1985 and 1986 and then expandedvigorously i n  
e a r l y  1987. At t h i s  t i n e  it was repor ted  t h a t  t h e  a t ro -  
E ~ O Y S ,  b r u t a l  behaviour of poachers had returned.  Oftan 
these  r e p o r t s  were accompanied by large photographs (Tha 
eveninsalesram. February 28, 1987; The Packst ,  March 18, 
1987; me Eveninq Tels-, Marsh 18, 19871.' 
spec to r  and Kitause (1977:152) a s s e r t  t h a t  s t age  t h r e e  
a c t i v i t i e s  are concerned W i t h  o rgan iza t iona l  procedures 
and methods of dealing with c l i e n t s  and t h e i r  complaints." 
Stage t h r e e  a ~ t i ~ i t i a ~  see claims made aga ins t  t h e  agency 
o r  agencies r e spons ib le  f o r  dea l ing  with the imputed 
cond i t ions .  c l a ims  i n  t h i s  s t age  are no t  concerned v i t h  t h e  
imputed cond i t ions  thenselver,  but  v i t h  the  s t a t e ' s  
handling of t h e  problem (Spector and Ki t suse ,  1977:152). 
R i t ee r  (1986) p resen t s  t h e  same argument, while Nelson 
(1984) uses a var ian t  of it i n  h e r  discussion of 
"approashes t o  agenda se t t ing"  (Nelson, 1984:22-23). 
As i n  t h e  previous ohapter,  however, t h e  da ta  on t h e  
poaching i s sue  do no t  pe r fec t ly  f i t  t h i s  t h i r d  stage.  There 
Were c la ims  made about the  poaching problem i n  stage t h r e e  
by various group- and ind iv idua l s  across t h e  i s l and  
(&plmER, 1985; Tha Evening Telesran,  Septenber 21, 1985; 
October 5 ,  1985; September 27, 1986; me Western s t a r .  
February 10, 1987; me sundav Exerass, Maroh 22, 1987; ThP 
M, March 18, 1987). Thus Spector and Kitsuse 's  (1977) 
t h i r d  s t a g e  is, a t  f i r s t  glance,  problelnatic when app l i ed  
t o  the  d a t a  o n  poaching. As mentioned above, t h e  even t s  
t h a t  t a k e  p l a c e  i n  t h e  r e a l  world are o f t e n  confused and 
jumbled. Such inc iden t s  cannot simply be f i t t e d  i n t o  
p e r f e c t l y  nea t  s t a g e r .  
Although c la ims  ware made about poaching a t  t h i s  time, 
t h e  focus of t h i s  chapter is t h e  claims t h a t  were di rec ted  
aga ins t  t h e  hand l ing  of t h e  problem because: 
... t h e  important  and d i s t i n c t i v e  fea tu re  of 
s t a g e  3 s o c i a l  problems, then,  is t h a t  t h e  
208 
claims are  not concernad d i r e c t l y  with t h e  
imputed conditions asserted i n  stage 1. Rather, 
the  claims are made against the organizations 
established t o  ameliorate. eliminate. and ather- 
" i i i - i i i n i i  these-conditions (spsctbr and K i t -  
s u ~ e .  1977: 1521. 
This stage vitneesed much claims-making against the  
bureaucratichandling of the  poaching problem; for  exampls. 
by media columnists (The surdav Exnrerr, March 22, 1987) .  
Such claims w i l l  be discussed in d e t a i l  below. 
I t  i s  important t o  remember t h a t  in  the  previous two 
stages, key s t a t e  actore had been some of t h e  most vocal 
claims-makers. I t  i s  appropriate, therefore, tha t  i n  t h i s  
stage W P O ~ S  mobilized, reacting against t h e  way the  "warv 
was being fought and run. Complaints were lodged against 
the  bureaucratic handling of t h e  poaching problem E?XA 
as well as Prom outside t h e  s ta te .  Complaints were 
a160 levelled a t  the  s ta te ' s  management of the outdoor 
t o u r i s t  industry. I n  many cases claims-makers who opposed 
the  of outdoor tourism had previously been a l l i e d  
with t h e  s t a t e  agains t  poaching. Obviously, there  had been 
01aim8 against t h e  handling of t h e  o u t f i t t i n g  industry 
before t h i s  s tage ,  as outlined i n  previous chapters. 
However, in  t h i s  stage, opposition claims took on a new 
form as res is tance  was widespread and of ten  organized. As 
gavernment,a intentions i n  the  area of w i l d l i f e  resources 
became c lear ,  resistance increased. Following from t h i s ,  
claims d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  both t h e  handling of t h e  poaching 
problem and t h e  ou tdoor  tourism indus t ry  w i l l  be  examined. 
Before beginning t h i s  analysis., a b r i e f  sketch of t h e  
w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  end outdoor tourism i s  p resen ted  t o  frame 
t h e  argument. 
The Wi ld l i f e  Division and t h e  outdoor Tourism 
The w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  produced several documents i n  1985, 
d e s p i t e  opera t ing  under continued budget reductions 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1985a. 1985b and 19850). These 
budgetary problems and t h e i r  adverse e i d e - e f f e c t s  were 
acknowledged i n  t h e  Grean Paner on Huntins (1985). Another 
example of t h e  e f f e c t s  of budget c u t s  on w i l d l i f e  manage- 
ment and p r o t e c t i o n  was seen i n  WPO's p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a 
s t r i k e  wi th  o t h e r  government employees t o  p r o t e s t  wage 
r e s t r a i n t  (Phe, September 26, 1986). BY 
t h e  end of t h i s  t h i r d  s t age  i n  May. 1987 WPO's beoame the  
moat vocal  and p u b l i c l y  v i s i b l e  w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  claims- 
makers. 
At t h e  same t ime  t h e  w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  was suf fe r ing  
these  cu t s ,  t h e  development o f  t h e  outdoor t o u r i s t  indus t ry  
continued. As i n  o t h e r  s t ages ,  a v a r i e t y  of non-state 
astors and groups p ressed  claims ~ 0 n c e r n i n g  t h e  b e n e f i t s  of 
outdoor tourism. Pot example, t h e  Salmon Preservation 
A s s ~ o i a t i o n ,  t h e  Wilderness Society and t h e  
outdoors columnist all pressed such claims (m~m&%, 1985; 
The Evenincr Telearam. January 19 and narch 16, 1985). 
Government also continued to expend this industry, as seen 
clearly in the rs1eass of the Discussion Pane= on commer- 
cial Huntina and Fiahincl EamDe in the Province oE Newfound- 
La& (Earles et al., 1987). This paper was prepared by the 
primary government departments which dealt with the 
ovtfitting industry (forest resources and lands; culture, 
recreation and youth and tourism). It di.cu.sed many 
options to increase the ePEiciency and banefits aE the 
industry. Tho W on Cams stated that: 
the challenge to government is to find a balance 
between protecting the aconoloic viability oE the 
outfitting industry and meeting the resident 
demand far wildlife Yesources (~arles et 
a1.,1987:1). 
Significantly, the document was tabled in the House of 
Assembly by Ian Sims, who as Minister of wildlife had 
declared "war" on poaching in 1982. sinma, by 1987, was 
Minster of forest resources and lands, the department which 
initiated this document (Labrador OutPittera, 1987:14) .  It 
may not be mere ooinoidence that the sane man who had 
declared "war" on poaching was Minister of the department 
responsible Ear the preparation and tabling aE this policy 
paper on the outfitting industry.   ha document was signifi- 
cant Ear two reasons; first, it demonstrated that govern- 
ment was t.ighly interested in wildlife resources far 
tour i sm and. sscond, it generated cons ide rab le  controversy 
around t h e  outdoor t o u r i s t  indus t ry .  
Simms inv i t ed  pub l i c  d i scuss ion  on t h e  ~ a o e r  on 
euggert ing it was prepared f o r  pub l i c  oonsumption. ~ o w e v s r ,  
t h e  formar p rov inc ia l  hunting and f i s h i n g  development 
o f f i c e r  suggested t h e  Eansr- was n o t  in tended  f o r  
p u b l i c  comment. ~r t o l d  m e  t h a t  the:  
... discuss ion  paper on t h e  o u t f i t t i n g  indus t ry  
Created a l o t  Of E11ror among some o f  t h e  media 
who perceived it as being a t h r e a t  t o  t h e  aver-  
: ~ ~ d s ? ~ f ~ ? m ~ h ~ i m ~ ? ~ t ~ d d k ~ s ~ ~ ~ ~ o " , ~ p ~ ~  WE:: 
several options.    he problem was A, what do we 
d o  about t h i s ?  ~ h e s e  are some poss ib le  op t ions ,  
and it l i s t e d  four  or f i v e .  One might have been 
p r i v a t i z e  lands.  ~ i d n ' t  mean it w a s  going t o  
happen, jus t  a t o p i c  fo r  discussion.  Or ig ina l ly .  
it was designed f o r  people i n  t h e  outdoor indus- 
t r y ;  c h a r t e r  a i r c r a f t  people,  o u t f i t t e r s ,  
guides,  r e a l l y  n o t  f o r  genera l  consumption 
(interview, June 13,  1990). 
This quote i s  important ,  s i n c e  it h igh l igh t s  t h e  pub l i c  
oppos i t ion  which arose a g a i n s t  the  Peller on Carnos. 
The comments of t h e  former w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  d i r e c t o r  
supported t h e  foener  hunting and f i s h i n g  o f f i o e r , ~  claims.  
The r e t i r e d  d i r e c t o r  was one of t h e  au thors  of t h e  
and, when interviewed, ha d i s t ingu i shed  between a 
"white paper" and a "green paper." H e  defined t h e  l a t t e r  as 
one prepared  f o r  pub l i c  discussion.  H e  s t a t e d  t h a t  he 
though t  t h e  P a ~ e r  a n  Carn~g was a "white paper,  which i s  
used t o  formulate po l i cy  ac t ion"  ( in te rv iew.  May 8 ,  1991). 
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when interviewed, t h e  former d i r e c t o r  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  W 
was not t h e  r e s u l t  o f  any ou t s ide  in f luence ;  
government agencies dea l ing  wi th  t h e  o u t f i t t i n g  indus t ry  
g o t  toge the r  i n  an a t t empt  t o  b e t t e r  o rgan ize  t h e  regula- 
t i o n s  cancern ing the  industry.  The f o m e r d i r e o t o r  a s s e r t e d  
t h a t  t h e  PaDer on c a m s  was an at tempt to r a t i o n a l i z e  t h e  
inadaquacies o f  these  varying regu la t ions .  H e  r epor ted  t h a t  
h i s  inpu t  t o  t h e  Ewer on C s may have been influenced by 
ou t s ide  i n t e r e s t s ,  l i k e  o u t f i t t e r s ,  c o l l e c t i v e l y  o r  
ind iv idua l ly  making represen ta t ions  t o  him, bu t  t h e  
document o r ig ina ted  from within government ( in te rv iew,  May 
8.  1991). One n igh t  wonder why t h e  Min i s t e r ' s  ao t iona  and 
s t a tements  o o n t r e d i c t e d t h e s e t w o  high ranking bureaucra t s?  
I was unable t o  answer t h i s  question.  However, given t h e  
i n t e n s e  pub l i c  r eac t ion  t h e  PaDee  on C a m s  generated,  t h e  
con t rad ic t ion  hetween t h e i r  comments is s i g n i f i c a n t .  Having 
o u t l i n e d  the  baokground con tex t ,  s t age  t h r e e  c la ims  are now 
analyzed.  
CONPLAINTS AGAINST OUTDOOR TOURISM AND POACHING 
Res i s t anse  t o  government's continued expansion of t h e  
outdoor t o ~ r i s m  industry took on a new form i n  t h i s  s t age .  
Government's polioy paper on t h e  o u t f i t t i n g  i n d u s t r y  
genera ted  widespread concern and angry r e a c t i o n  among 
ind iv idua l  r e s i d e n t s ,  i n t e r e s t  groups, the news media and 
governlnent agencies.  
There were oases of opposit ion which resembled t l lose 
c l a i m  made i n  s t a g e  two. Par example, r e s i d e n t s  of t h e  
p rov ince  continued t o  oppose moves t o  p rese rve  wild 
areas.' However, i n  t h i s  s t a g e  organized groups and 
former a l l i e e  of government began t o  oppose t h e  expansion 
of t h e  outdoor tourism indus t ry .  For example, t h e  Pres iden t  
of t h e  Salmon Associat ion of Eastern Newfoundland rapor ted-  
l y  claimed t h a t  a t o u r i s t  r e s o r t  (Governor's Park) being 
es tab l i shed  on t h e  Sa laon ie r  River might nega t ive ly  impact 
on salmon, s ince  only a small  buffer zone was proposed 
between t h e  r i v e r  and t h e  r e s o r t .  S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  t h e  
T~~WI-BI",S outdoors columnist shared ruoh worries (m 
Evenin. Teleoram, June 1, 1985).' 
Grounds. Warrants and Conalusions 
Grounds are the socially constructed, basic Pacts which 
serve as the foundation of an argument (Best, 1987:104). 
Grounds consist of definitions, examples and numeric 
estimates. As mentioned above, some claims-makers did presa 
the benefits of outdoor tourism; however, considerable 
opposition arose against the outdoor tourism industry in 
this stage. A variety of claims-makers complained that an 
expanding outdoor tourism industry wmld endanger resid- 
ents' traditional hunting and fishing rights, and that 
resources which belonged to resident. were being given to 
non-residents through outfitters. Similar claims had been 
expressed in stage two. However, they took on an increased 
vigour in this stage. 
For example, the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife 
Federationes response t o  the wildlife division's 
pane= on Hunting (1985) claimed that: 
It is important to point out that claims-makers were 
concerned with the adverse side-effects of the proposed 
tourist lodge and not tourist development per se. However 
it still exemplifies the tensions surronding the expensio; 
of outdoor tourism. 
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... non-residents bring a certain amount of new 
dollars to the province but not enough to jus- 
tify an increase in "on-residents licenoes...Our 
Fedaration is cognizant of the fact that aut- 
fitters depend on tourists for part of their 
income. However, we strongly recommend that no 
more outfitters be licenced or no more camps be 
approved due to the fact that we are dealing 
with a finite resource. A resource that belongs 
first to the people. No one guaranteed the 
outfitters a right to acquire a certain number 
of licences (Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife 
Federation, 1985s:2). 
clearly, thewildlife Federation opposed increasing licence 
quotas for non-residents. This group asserted that outfit- 
ting was not so beneficial to the province's economy that 
residents should suffer as a result. The Wildlife Feder- 
ation not only defined the domain of the problem of outdoor 
tourism, but also gave an assessment of the probleivs 
extent. That is, this was an orientation statement (Best, 
1987: 105). It was claimed all residents suffered as 
resources were sold to "on-residents. 
The Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation also 
prepared e detailed response to the paoer on Camos (1987) 
in which it again questioned the economic viability of tha 
outfitting industry, arguing that it generated very little 
"new money" within the provinoe (Newfoundland end Labrador 
wildlife Federation, 1987: 1). This Wildlife Federation 
dOCUmBnt also claimed that the "NewEoundland outfitting 
system is a mess," end that "a culling out of poor oper- 
ators should immediately take place" (Newfoundland and 
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~abrador Wildlife Federation, 1987:s-8). The Wildlife 
~ederation claimed that a11 non-resident moose and caribou 
hunting an the island be (my emphasis) and that 
only bear hunte be permitted on the island (Newfoundland 
and Labrador Wildlife Federation, 1987:6-7). The Federe- 
tion's proposal arguedthatno epeciel land tenure benefits 
be given to outfitters since the land belonged to "all 
Newfoundlanderen (Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife 
Federation. 1987:4). 
Claims-makers within the state apparatus also opposed 
expanding the outdoor tourism industry. For example, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the former provincial 
hunting and fishing development officer stated that non- 
resident hunting was last on the wildlife division's 
priority list. He also said that the department of develop- 
ment's attempt to secure more non-resident big game 
licences was " a real, ah, real touchy thing with the 
wildlife divisim" (interview, June 13. 1990). That is, the 
former hunting and fishing developnent officer's comments 
suggest that the wildlife division was recalcitrant in 
allocatingnore "on-resident big game licences. support for 
this assertion can be inferred from the above mentioned 
"Waiters' Wildlife Policy" which the wildlife division 
Operates under. Two points of this policy are to regulate 
wildlife surpluses for "the use of the people" and "to 
provide wildlife...for the recreational needs of the 
people" (Mercer et a1.,1988:5). 
The turbulence of the relationship between wildlife 
and development was made clear by the treasurer of the 
Labrador Outfitters Association who stated that there is 
"not much spirit of cooperation between them" (different 
departments). She went an to describe the relationship 
between the different departments as a catch twenty-two 
situation (interview, Aug\ugust 15, 1990). In a presentation 
to the provincial government the Labrador Outfitters 
Association disoussedthe opposition they faced from within 
government: 
If we (Labrador outfitters) could pass an objec- 
tive ommsnt in support of the Newfoundland 
Outfitting industry, it doer appear that there 
are bureaucrats within the governmental struc- 
ture who are unwilling to open additional 
licenoes even in areas where biologists have 
determined the region could support an increased 
licence ouotal The same holds true for Labrador 
where it ;as determined we could support a moose 
hunt in the southern fly-out zones (where very 
little resident pressure exists), yet somebody 
~n government blocks this progress (Labrador 
Outfitters, 1987123). 
The Labrador Outfitters clearly believed there were come 
state ~ L f i ~ i a l s  who were against an expanded non-resident 
hunt. 
More opposition against the expansion of the outdoor 
tourism industry came from the media. For example, in a 
column titled "Hunting, Fishing Righte Endangered?" the 
Te1earae)s outdoor columnist, Power, argued: 
power claimed outfitters were attempting to gain land 
ownership rights. Ha then quoted a passage from page 22 of 
the ~aaer to support his argument that outfitters 
were trying to gain private ownership of land: 
The public of Nawfoundland has always enjoyed 
virtually unrestricted acosss to hunting and 
fishing seaas. conflicts, however, arise when 
residents and non-residents compete for the same 
resource in the same area. outfitters find this 
particularly difficult. For example, paying 
clients are quicK to question why they nust pay 
substantially more to wait in line for a fishing 
spot, As a result, suggestions have been made 
that outfitters should be given exclusive fish- 
ing and/or hunting rights to defined areas (23s 
Evenma &&AL%& March 21, 1987) 
Power concluded this column by stating private ownership or 
leasing might be the answer to poaching, and he warned 
readeX8 to be prepared for the day it might become reality. 
That is. this writer defined the peoblen in the same manner 
as the Wildlife Federation and those government bureauorata 
who opposed e burgeoning outfitting industry: loss of 
residentsr rights. Significantly, just two years previous 
to the releaee of the PaDer on CaaDs, this same writer had 
callad for increased tourism based on wildlife resources 
like brown trout and black bear. He now strongly opposed 
the outfitting industry, exemplifying how s former ally of 
government was alienated by policy proposals on the 
outfitting industry. 
opposition to expanding outdoor tourismwar also round 
in letters to the editor concerning the Paoer on CarnDs. One 
letter titled "Recreation freedoms under attack," claimed 
that Newfoundlanders' freedom to hunt and fish were "under 
bureallcrati~ attaok" by the policy considerationsdiscusred 
in the PaDsr on cams (The menina Telearam. April 10, 
1987). The writer argued that: 
This document suggests that (a) most of our best 
salmon rivers or parts thereof be reserved for 
outfitters catering to American and European 
tourists in the hope of earning more money. 
Locals would be driven from these rivers by the 
outfitters owning there leases; (b) prime cari- 
bou and noose hunting areas would likewise be 
controllsd by commercial camp owners and your 
access to even pick a handful of berries would 
be forbidden. Your present right to catch e 
trout in our ponds and lakes would be controlled 
and your rights sold to vested outside inter- 
ests, along with ... rights to shorelines and 
lakefronts (The Rlaninq Telearam. April 10. 
1987). 
A similar letter, "Betraying our heritage" asserted that 
"The options wtlined in (the Paper on CB~DE). ..are e 
direct refleation of influence by vested interests and an 
imminent threat to our freedoms and heritage" (The Evening 
-, May 28, 1987). This writer went on to describe 
the "nefarious acts contemplated" by the Paoer on C a m s .  
Yet another letter. "Getting the shaft," claimed government 
was planning to give prime hunting and fishing areas to 
outfitters, and that "government wants to look after Mr. 
Non-Residentao (The Evenins Teleuram, Nay 16, 1987). Another 
letter titled "Our heritage is not for sale," charged 
government was covering up its attempts at altering 
existing public use of crown lands end waters (The Evening 
-, May 25, 1987). This sample of letters exemplifies 
some of the public opposition to the government policy 
papr and shows that people perceived the paper as some 
sort of plot on the part of outfitters and government, a 
plot whish they claimed would result in loss of residents' 
rights.' 
The opposition olailne outlined above, all defined the 
problem with a growing outfitting industry in the same 
' Statements about "our heritage" and "our resources" 
=an be placed in the context of a decade-lons campaisn bv 
Prenier Brian Peckford on the ifsue of- controi o? 
resources. The development plan plqnaakna All our Resources 
(198a) exemplifies this. Another example is the battle 
Peckford fought against the Federal government over control 
of the oil fields off Newfoundland's coast. Peokford and 
his government linked the issue of 'rights to resources* to 
Newfoundland's sense of idsntitv. However. in the case n~ 
- , . -. . . . .. .. 
wildlife rsrources it seems gokernment ran into its own 
rhetoric. Government wanted to divert wildlife resources to 
non-residents, while residents perhaps tookthe rhetoric of 
control and rights to resources seriously. Paine (1981) 
provides a good overview of Peakford's rhetoric. 
manner; residents' lose of rights. S U C ~  claims had been 
pressed in stage two, but on a much lesser scale. Clains- 
makers now argued that the side effects of increased 
outfitting were potentially far-reaching. A11 residents 
were labelled as potential victims of inoreasing 
privatization of land and wildlife resources. This is a 
type of definition Best (1987:108) calls a range claim; 
residents were portrayed as potential victims of an 
expanded outfitting industry. In making such an argument. 
claims-makers could make everyme in the audience feel they 
had a vested interest in the problem. Given the opposition 
against the outfitting industry discussed in stage two, 
such claims, when pressed by credible sources, like the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federetian, or e vell- 
known media columnist, would be highly effective in 
mobilizing popular support. 
Heightened awareness and prevention were conclusions 
outlined by Best (1987:112) and both can be seen in the 
alaims opposing the expansion and management of the 
outfitting industry. The conclusions, or cells for action, 
reached by claims-makers like the Wildlife Federation were 
quite abrupt; cancellation of all non-resident sport 
hunting on the island. In t h i ~  way, it was argued, lass of 
residentsr rights would be prevented. ma aotivitiea of 
groups like the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Feder- 
ation, and media personnel raised awareness of the problems 
they believed were associated with an expanded outfittiwg 
industry. 
These conslusions were based on several warrants. As 
stated above, warrants act as bridge6 betwean qrounds and 
conclusions, and justify the drawing of conclusions from 
the grounds. In warrants, values mast often come into play 
(Best, 1987:108-109). Some of the warrants found in claims 
against the expansion of the outfitting industry were the 
value of resources, historical continuity, and rights and 
freedoms. Clsims-makers argued that residents oontributed 
more to the economy in pursuit of wildlife and hence should 
not lose rights to non-residents (such as the Nawfoundland 
and Labrador Wildlife Federation claims outlined above). As 
well. claims-makers asserted that residents' rights of use 
and access to land, water and wildlife resources were 
aonsistent with past polioies (for example the Telearampe 
columnist and letter writers discussed above). Other 
claimr-makers argued that privatizing lands and waters 
would infringe on the rights and freedoms of residents 
(again see the Telecrral's colmnist or letter writers 
discusead above). 
However, not all the claim voiced in this stage about 
the outdoor tourism industry opposed its expansion. Some 
complained about the handling of the industry, but called 
for it. cultivation. For example, the Labrador outfitters 
claimed that the Labrador outfitting industry was an 
eoonomically important segment of the tourism sector, whish 
generated much revenue, created many jobs and was one of 
the potential "keys to ending the current ecronomic condi- 
tion of the provincen (Labrador OutEittere, 1987:l-13). The 
Labrador Outfitters made many claims concerning govern- 
ment's management of the outfitting industry. They claimed 
outfitters had to struggle with "confusing regulations;" 
that crown land regulations and watershed rights needed 
amending to favour outfitters better; that there was a lad 
of coordination between various government departments; 
that one department should handle inspections of camps; and 
that all non-residents be legally bound to use an outfitter 
above the 52nd parallel, virtually all but southern 
Labrador (Labrador Outfitters, 1987:l-13). 
Obviously, this group had much to cain from a growing 
outfitting industry and made claims which would ultimately 
benefit their businesses. However, the Labrador Outfitters 
were m r e  of residents resentment toward outfitters and 
their clients. The Outfitters made this clear in their 
response to the paDar on Cam- (19871, writing that they 
were 'lcautious...in suggesting anything in terms of 
solutions that would cause irritation to the resident" 
(~abrador outfitters. 1987:3).  hey went on to rtraos that 
"the Labrador Outfitters are unanimove as to NO RIDHTS 
BEING TAKEN AWAY PROM THE RESIDENT" (Labrador outfitters. 
1987:29). =hie rubminsion was prepared by the ~abrador 
Outfitters for submission to government, not for public 
ralease. Outfitters recognized the conflict between 
themselves and residents, yut stressed they did not want to 
lassan residents, rights. r his seemingly refutesthe claims 
made by the aadia, groups and individuals of outfitters 
plotting with government to privatize waters and lands. 
clearly, outfitters would benefit from private ownership of 
resources and may have tried to smooth things over by 
emphasizing they wanted no lose of resident rights. 
~ouever, outfitters oalla for "exclusive rights to their 
watershed areasms (~abrador outfitters, 1987: 33) seemingly 
contradiots this because residents would stand to lose 
rights or access if watersheds were privatized.   his 
supports the way the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife 
Federation defined the problem of an expanding outfitting 
industry. 
other claims-aakars in this period also supported an 
expansion of the outdoor tourist industry, but pressed 
complaints about its management. For example, the President 
of the Atlantis Salmon Federation. Lse Wulff, ~laimed that 
sport salmon angling generated huge amounts of lnoney when 
compared with t h e  commercial f i she ry ,  and ha c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  
salmon t o  be made a game f i s h  by t h e  Canadian government: 
There i s  no reason no t  t o  l i s t  t h e  At lan t io  
salmon as a game f i s h  because we have given 
animals such as moose. caribou,  bea r ,  and deer 
game s t a t u s ,  which means they cannot be hunted 
f o r  commercial s s l e - so  why can' t  t h e  same be 
done fo r  salmon (The E v e n i n q ~ e l e m ,  du ly  27, 
1985). 
While t h i r  claim was d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  government of Canada 
and concerned salmon, it is s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  t h i s  research,  
s i n c e  s p o r t  angling is an important  p a r t  of the  o u t f i t t i n g  
indus t ry  i n  Newfoundland. Wulff went on t o  c la im t h a t  
p ro tec t ing  salmon from poachers would always be a problem. 
un less  p r iva te  ownership of r i v e r  sec t ions  was allowed.' 
It  i s  a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  no te  t h a t  Wulff had worked with 
t h e  government o f  Newfoundland i n t h e  1940rn, p romot ing the  
country 's  w i l d l i f e  resources and had a l so  owned an  o u t f i t -  
t i n g  operation.  
Other claims-makers a l s o  pressed t h e  b e n e f i t s  of 
outdoor tourism, but  complained t h e  indus t ry  war being 
Riparian and leasehold r i g h t s  had e x i s t e d  i n  
Newfoundland u n t i l  t h e  1860's. The p r i v a t e  ownership o f  
r i v e r  ~ e c t i o n s  was r a i s e d  i n  1950 i n  a study of t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  of t h e  tourism indus t ry  (Overton, 1991:24). 
P r i v a t e  ownership of, r i v e r  sec t ions  was re-addressed i n  
1987 i n  t h e  &Iscusslon PaDer on Commercial Huntina a N  
Fish ina  Cams. I n  1990, it would once more a r i s e  i n  
proposed l e g i s l a t i v e  changes,  discussed i n  chap te r  seven. 
Again t h i r  supported t h e  way t h e  Newfoundland and Labrador 
Wi ld l i f e  f edera t ion  defined the  problem of expanded 
o u t f i t t i n g ;  1068 of r e s i d e n t s ,  r i g h t s .  
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ilnproperly run. For example the Wilderness Society, in one 
of  it^ c ~ l ~ n s ,  ~laimed that: 
wiidepness heritage (The Evenim_Telearam, 
January 19, 1985). 
It is important to point out that the writer of this 
particular column had owned and operated an outdoor tourism 
company since 1984. Ha would go on to be awarded the 
Governor General's Award for Conservation at the annual 
meeting of the Tourism Assoc;iation of Canada in 1991 (m 
Telssram sunday, may 11, 19911. This again highlights the 
maintenance of links between the outdoor tourist industry 
and interest groups. 
The caribou and black bear biologist with the wildlife 
division also pressed many claims in this period about the 
potential benefit0 of an expanded black bear hunt (nee for 
examP1e:Ths gvenina Teleclrem, nay 24, 1986). However, 
outfitters were apparently slow to capitalize on this hunt. 
For example, during the 1984 spring bear hunting season 
only four licences were sold to non-residents (Newfoundland 
and Labrador, 1985~: 6). In an effort to popularize bear 
hunting, which he claimed could be very benefisial for 
tourism, tha bear biologist enlisted the help of a black 
bear outfitter from the United states to address two 
meetings of t h i s  province's  o u t f i t t e r s .  At t h a t  t i n e ,  the  
Telearamrs outdoors co lumnis t  reported t h a t  t h e  black bear 
b i o l o g i s t  had been: 
... spearheading s campaign t o  have t h e  black 
bear elevated t o  genuine big-game s t a t u s  i n  
Newfoundland and Labrador b u t  so f e r  hasn ' t  been 
a b l e  t o  convince the  commercial o u t f i t t e r s  t o  
a c t i v e l y  promote b lack  bear hunting. Moat of 
them still consider bears nothing more than  
nuisance animals or vermin, mostly because of 
t h e i r  e a t i n g  h a b i t s ,  which inoludar an ocoa- 
s iona l . .  .meal a t  a dump (The Eveniaq Telearan,  
May 1. 1985). 
Th i s  w r i t e r  claimed t h a t  o u t f i t t e r s  were l e s s  than  i n t e r -  
e s t e d  i n  t h e  bea r  as s spor t  animal and had t o  b e  convinoed 
of its value.  Obviously, t h i s  b i o l o g i s t  had an i r t e r e s t  i n  
an expanded bear hunt, s ince  bears were h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
However, h i s  e f f o r t s  are an example of a parson who was not 
p leased  with t h e  way t h i s  p a r t  of t h e  outdoor t o u r i s t  
s a c t o r  war being run. 
As shown, there were a v a r i e t y  of claims-makers who 
supported t h e  expansion of t h e  outdoor tourism indus t ry ,  
bu t  who a l s o  complained a b o u t  t h e  way t h e  i n d u s t r y  was 
be ing  managed. Often, these  p ro -ou t f i t t ing  claims-makers 
argued t h a t  outdoor tour i sm m s  economically v i a b l e  and 
h igh ly  important  t o  t h e  province's  economy and t h a t  land 
r e g u l a t i o n s  needed amending t o  al low o u t f i t t e r s  p r i v a t e  
ownership. some pea-outfittingclaims-makers s u g g e s t e d t h a t  
p r i v a t i z i n g  resources and l e g a l l y  binding non- res iden ta t .  
h i r e  o u t f i t t e r s  would make w i l d l i f e  law enforcement mare 
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efficient. For these pro-outfitting claims-makers, the 
problem war often defined as one of unfair competition from 
local people, complicated in part by outdated land pol- 
icies. Using the warrant of the value of the outfitting 
industry, pro-outfitting claims-makers often claimed that 
outfitting could provide jobs, a huge influx of money 
ependinq tourists, and thus serve as an ecanomir; motor. 
Baaed an such warrants, pro-outfitting claimr-makers 
Concluded that new social control policies ware needed, in 
which land regulationswould be amended to allowoutfitters 
private ownership of tracts of the countryside, including 
land bordering freshwater bodies of water. Having outlined 
the claims pressed against the handling of the outfitting 
industry, an examination of claims made concerning the 
management of the poaching problem is now presented. 
$$ 
Wildlife division employees, media personnel and interest 
groups all reacted against the manner in which the poaching 
problem was being dealt with. These claims-makers all 
defined the problem as a lack of resources. For example, in 
the W e n  PaDer on tul&hg (1985) the reeearch and manage- 
ment section of the wildlife division stated that: 
... information required to improve habitat and 
increase available food supplies, to harvest 
animals in a way to make the best of their 
breeding potential and to understand natural 
losses and o w h i n o  is far from adeauate (my 
emphasis) .... At prarent we do not have tha funds 
to either adequately determine the sire of our 
moose and carlbou populations, or address the 
important questions about haoirat, reproduction, 
and natural losses. Heanwhlle the Increased 
demand for hunting, loss of habitat to roads, 
industrial ~roiects and certain loqaina sctiv- 
ities are ail butting new stressedon-our big 
game populations at s time when money to manage 
them is becomina scarce. Bio oame research is 
very expensive. :." (~ewfoundiaAd and Labrador, 
1985a:3). 
That is, wildlife biologists, through this Green PaDer, 
stated they were under-funded to carry out their work 
properly. It is significant to note that it was claimed 
(admitted] that the division's understanding of poaching 
was "far from adequate." similarly, the division'e noose 
biologist m o t e  that the 1985 internal report on moose 
poaching he prepared was: 
... oronntad bv wildlife division concern for 
losbes 'of noise and caribou, and no apparent 
means to gauge how many animals were actually 
taken illegally. Ati well, field staff expressed 
opinions about specifio infractions, but again 
no actual numbers were available for these 
~ - - - - -  ~- 
loosea (Oosenbrug, 1985:l). 
This biologiet's olaia that there were "no apparent means 
to gauge" how much poaching war occurring was highly 
significant, since it highlights the dilemmas biologists 
faced in estimating the amount and effects of poaching. As 
mentioned, Speotor and xitsune (1977:152) assert stage 
three claims arc not concerned directly with the imputed 
~onditions or stage one; therefore, the claims of these 
biologists clearly fit this definition. 
~ h e s e  biologist's claims are a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t  when 
considered i n  l i g h t  of t h e  very s p e c i f i c  claims made i n  
s t ages  one and two, concerning t h e  adverse e f f e s t e  of 
poaching. At t h a t  t i n e ,  s p e c i f i c ,  one-way arguments were 
presented which suggested t h a t  b i o l o g i s t s  had a good idea  
of how much poaching was occurring and its e f f e c t s  an herd 
growth. However, by t h e  mid-1980's. w i l d l l f e  b i o l o g i s t s  
were admitt ing they were unable t o  gauge haw many animals 
were l o s t  t o  poachers. As suggested above, w i l d l i f e  
b i o l ~ g i s t s  never possessed t h e  maana t o  assess aocura te ly  
t h e  e x t a n t  and e f f e c t  of poaching on b ig  game herd-, y s t  
they  went alongwithgovernment 's  anti-poacrhing oampeign i n  
t h e  e a r l y  1980's. Why d i d  b i o l o g i s t s  make s i m p l i s t i s  and 
apparen t ly  inaccurate statements regarding poaching i n  the 
e a r l y  1980rs? Why d i d  they not challenge t h e  naive views 
and s i m p l i s t i c  arguments presented by government o f f i c i a l s  
e a r l i e r  i n  t h e  decade? Perhaps w i l d l i f e  b i o l o g i s t s  were 
prepared t o  go along with t h e  "war" on poaching whi le  they  
thought it would lead t o  a strengthening of t h e  w i l d l i f e  
d iv i s ion .  That is, w i l d l i f e  staEE nay have believed t h e  
r h e t o r i c  espoused by government Ministers i n  t h e  e a r l y  
e tages  o f  the  "war" t h a t  t h e  rnore men, money and equipment 
would be pumped i n t o  w i l d l i f e  management. However, by the 
mid-1980,s it was apparent  t h a t  t h i s  would not  happen. 
Funding was decreasing and they were asked t o  do more with  
1885. All the "war" on poaching meant for wildlife biol- 
ogists was more work and increased aggravation. 
Similarly. WPOrs also pressed complainte against the 
manner in which the poaohing "war" was being conducted. 
However, poaching had become a part of a larger set of 
issues for WPO's. This beoame evident at the end of this 
stage, when they made a representation to government in 
May, 1987 after an annual meeting (WPO's, 1990:2). A W W  
who was involved in this representation told me the 1987 
meeting raised the same concerns as the 1990 brief: officer 
safety, equipment, manpower and salaries. He also stated 
I that the Protection Officers Association, established in 
stag-e four in Ootober 1988, was "two years in the making." 
m a t  is, the Association was being set up in 1986, the same 
year that WPOrs were on strike. This is clearly another 
example of WPO~sdissatisfaction. Obviously, the division,^ 
protection staff was not happy with the way government was 
00nduoting the "war"; they were dissatisfied with the 
resources they were given to control poaoning. Like 
wildlife biologists, WPO's were asked to do more with less. 
significantly, the "war" made WPO's jobs more dangerous. 
When it became d e a r  that wildlife protection was not high 
m government's priority list, WPOre militancy increased. 
Both St. John's newspapers publishing in the mid- 
1980'a, also made claims concerning the way the poaching 
problem was being handled. The majority of this media 
coverage defined the problem as a lack of resources, which 
added to and strengthened the claims of wildlife biologists 
and urnr=. POT example, s Tsle.ran editorial ~laimed that 
the number of WPO's in Labrador was inadequate to catch 
many poachers (The Evenin- T e l e w a m ,  April 22. 1987). 
Similarly, the outdoors columnist with the Tekg?am when 
writing about poaching by users of All-Terrain vehicles 
claimed that "effective policing is just about impassible" 
(The, FebFebry 28, 1987). A month later 
this same man nade more explicit claims: 
These lawbreakers must be stopped somehow but 
it's impossible with less than 50 wildlife 
protection offioarr on the island and only nine 
in Labrador responsible for more than 150,000 
square miles of territory. 
We need more wildlife protection officers, 
and we were supposed to get them for paying a 
yearly $5 fee to apply for a big game licence. 
Ha6 anyone seen them yet? (me Evenlnol Telsaram, 
March 14. 1987). 
other newspaper writers nade similar claims regarding the 
inadequacy of wildlife protection efforts. For example, the 
outdoor columnist with the Sundav Exoress wrote that: 
Unfortunately, it is next to impossible to 
apprehend more than a small percentage of these 
poachers. 
The wildlife division cannot afford enough 
protection officers, and the necessarily limited 
number of helicopter patrols by wildlife and 
police detect only a few of the many violations. 
It would require a veritable army of wardens, 
and e fleet of aerial observers to do the job 
properly. 
Newfoundland cannot afford the level of 
protection it needs. 
But neither can we afford the level of 
losses now being perpetrated on our wildlife. 
They Cannot stand up to this kind of human 
predation and deliberate slaughter. 
so what. then. is the answer? 
The telephone'is an obvious one (me Sunday 
EXPLWS, March 22 .  1987). 
Thus, both these miters claimed there were too few WPO'S 
to address the poaching problem. As mentioned, media 
coverage of poaching influenced WPO's. The claims made by 
these writers supported and reaffirmed WPO's argumentsthat 
they were under-Eundedand furthered the dissatisfaction of 
protection officara at this time. 
Interest groups also complained that enforcement was 
inadeymate. The Mealy Mountains Conservation Committee 
(KMCC) argued that Labrador war a haven for poachers 
because game laws were not enforced (The Evenino Teleora, 
April 21, 1987). The chairman of the MUCC, had been the 
president of the Goose Bay Rod and Gun Club, active in 
stage one. The chairman claimed that government did not 
provide the necessary protection far wildlife in Labrador 
and he described the provincial game laws as "absurd". When 
interviewed in August 1990, he told me that there are very 
few WP0'8 in labrador and that helicopters are needed for 
patrols, but funding ie not available to buy the expensive 
air time (interview, August 17, 1990). This man also 
234 
ols ined  t h a t  t h e  lack of w i l d l i f e  p ro tec t ion  i n  Labrador 
was due t o  p o l i t i c s :  
... p o l i t i c s  is a b ig  factor. . .Labrador has no 
p o l i t i c a l  c l o u t  i n  the  House of Assembly, ae it 
only has f o u r  M.H.A.'s. Wi ld l i f e  r e sources  have 
go t  t o  s u f f e r  ( interview, August 17 .  1990). 
H e  was vehement t h a t  Labrador and i t s  w i l d l i f e  resources 
are los ing  o u t  i n  an unfa i r  p o l i t i c a l  game. 
o the r  i n t e r e s t  groups a l s o  claimed t h a t  t h e  poaching 
problem was being improperly handled, including t h e  
Newfoundland and Mbrador Wi ld l i f e  Federation,  t h e  Labrador 
O u t f i t t e r s  and the Newfoundland Natural  History Society.  
The l a t t e r  group, i n  a l e t t e r  t o  t h e  Min i s t e r  r e spons ib le  
for w i l d l i f e ,  argued t h a t  continuing t h e  ban on Sunday 
hunting would "g ive  needed s t r e n g t h  t o  t h e  o f t e n  d i f f i c u l t  
pos i t ions  of t h e  p rov inc ia l  w i l d l i f e  o f f i c e r s "  (Konte- 
vecchi,1987:146). While t h e  focus of t h i s  claim was on  
continuing t h e  ban on Sunday hunting,  t h e  " d i f f i c u l t  
pos i t ion"  of WPO's al luded t o ,  sugges t s  t h a t  t h i s  group 
thought WPO's had a l e s e  than easy  tile i n  at tempting t o  
enforCe t h e  W i l d l i f e  Act. I n  con t ras t ,  t h e  Newfoundland and 
Labrador Wi ld l i f e  Federation war q u i t e  e x p l i c i t  and abrup t  
i n  suggesting t h a t  t h e  poaching problem was being improper- 
l y  handled. I n  a l e t t e r  t o  t h e  Canadian Wi ld l i f e  Se rv ice  
(dated 1987, 11, 01) t h e  p res iden t  of t h e  Wi ld l i f e  Fader- 
a t i o n  claimed t h a t  enforcement of t h e  Migratory Birds 
Convention Act was inadequate, and s e a b i r d s  were being 
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improperly managed and protected in Newfoundland. Similar- 
ly, in their response to wildlife's Green PaDer on Huntinq 
(1985) the Wildlife Federation claimed more protection 
officers were necessary, as was better training of existing 
officers and increased protection efforts (Newfoundland and 
Labrador Wildlife Federation, 1985a:a-5). Labrador Out- 
fitters claimed that their "enforcement needs were not 
being met" and suggested several alternatives to government 
to improve enforcement (Labrador Outfitters, 1987:16 and 
36). 
lndividuels also made claims concerning the handling 
of the poaching problem. One letter to the editor claimed 
that the ninister responsible for wildlife was "playing 
into the hands of poachers by increasing quotas and 
extending open seasonsn (Tbs Evenins Telearam, April 16, 
1987). A man from a small community on the Bay de Verde 
peninsula wanted to organize a volunteer wildlife officers' 
corps to prevent the destruction of wildlife in the area 
(-a Telearam, February 28, 1987). Implicit in this 
offer was the notion that wildlife was unable to protect 
big game animals. 
As seen in the claim pressed against the state's 
hanaling of the poaching "war," the majority of claims- 
makers defined the problem as one of inadequate resources. 
A var ie ty  of ind iv idua l s  and groups claimed t h e r e  were too  
few WPO's, BUppOrted by too few government d o l l a r s .  chas ing  
t o o  many poachers. Best (1987:112-113) Eaund t h r e e  main 
conclusions i n  t h e  claims surrounding t h e  missing ch i ld ren  
problem, which a r e  a l s o  ev iden t  i n  complaints a g a i n s t  t h e  
handling o f  t h e  poaching i s sus  i n  s t a g e  th ree .  These 
conclusions,  or c a l l s  fo r  se t ion ,  suggested by claims- 
makers va r i ed  considerably.  For example, t h e  mresslq 
outdoors columnist  helped increase p u b l i c  awareness and 
encouraged t h e  p u b l i c  t o  h e l p  s t o p  poaching by g e t t i n g  
involved through opeeation SPORT. 
some claims-makera emphasized t h e  importance of 
preventing poaching, while o the r s  c a l l e d  f o r  new s o c i a l  
con t ro l  p o l i c i e s .  For example, t h e  Telesram's outdoor 
columnist and t h e  Mealy Mountains Conservation Committee 
c a l l e d  f o r  h i r i n g  more WPO's; s t i l l  o t h e r s  suggested 
volunteer wardens as a poss ib le  s o l u t i o n  t o  poaching ( t h e  
man from t h e  Bay d e  varde Peninsula made such a c la im) ;  
o the r s ,  l i k e  t h e  Labrador O u t f i t t e r s ,  sugges ted  l e g a l l y  
binding non-residents t o  h i r e  o u t f i t t e r s  would make 
enforcement more e f f e c t i v e .  These va r i ed  conc lus ions  were 
based on d i f f e r e n t  warrants. Perhaps t h e  primary warrant  
used t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  c a l l s  Eor a c t i o n  was t h e  value of 
w i l d l i f e .  Claims-makers o f t en  s t r e s s e d  t h e  i n t r i n s i c  and 
monetary va lue  cf  b i g  game resources. Another important  
warrant  used was t h e  "blameless victim." P i c t u r e s  of t h e  
dead f e t u s e s  and discarded heads of b ig  game animals 
reportedly k i l l e d  by poachers supported c a l l s  for ac t ion  t o  
p ro tec t  "defenselrrrs  aniic.1~" from "s laugh te r"  (Bes t ,  
1987:108-112; Van Dijk ,  1989:281). 
Thus, by AprilIMay 1987, t h e r e  was considerable 
claims-making a c t i v i t y  concerning both  government,^ 
handling of t h e  poaching problem an3 its management of t h e  
outdoor tourism indus t ry .  Complaints concerning poaching 
tended t o  argue t h a t  government could not  a f f o r d  the  l eva1  
of pro tec t ion  needed and t h a t  WPO's were under-funded, 
understaffed and inadequately equipped t o  do t h e i r  jobs. 
s imi la r ly ,  b i o l o g i s t s  claimed they were i l l -equipped t o  do 
the Work assigned them. At t h e  same t i n e ,  t h e  management of 
the  outdoor tour i sm indus t ry  was reac ted  aga ins t  by a 
v a r i e t y  or claims-makers. Many ind iv idua l s  and groups 
opposed t h e  expansion of t h i s  indus t ry ,  whi le  some sup- 
por te r s  of t h e  indus t ry  suggested it was being improperly 
managed. The p r o v i n c i a l  government a t  t h i s  t ime faced a 
c r i s i s ;  not on ly  was the re  widespread oppos i t ion  t o  t h e  
expanding outdoor tour i sm industry,  bu t  many of i t s  former 
a l l i e s  had been a l i e n a t e d  by t h e  po l i cy  paper on o u t f i t -  
t ing.  At t h e  same t i n e ,  government was inundated with 
claims t h a t  t h e  poaching problem was being improperly 
handled. Significantly, WPO's became increasingly militant 
in this period. 
The mobilization of WPO's in this period, specifically 
the representation made to government in May, 1987, marks 
the conclusion of stage three. As outlined in the initial 
discussion of the natural history model, stage three 
aotivities are said to generate an air of distrust of 
governmental procedures and a lack of confidence in the 
institutions responsible for the management of the problem 
(Speotor and Kitsuse, 1977:153; Ritzer, 1986:ll). The 
outcome of the third stage in the natural history of 
poaching saw disillusioned and alienated WPOts, mobilize, 
and begin protesting against the way in which the poaching 
"war" was being handled and the manner in which the 
wildlife division was being run. This is the beginning of 
the folirth stage in the natural history of poaching. 
SUEUVLRY 
This chapter has discussed the third stage in the natural 
history of poaching. It has been suggested that the 
poaching issue seemed to get lost in this stage, as the 
true intentions of government became clear and generated 
opposition. It has been argued that the state's handling of 
both the poaching problem and the outdoor tourism industry 
were the Iocus of complaints. The most significant event of 
t h i s  stage was the increasing v i s i b i l i t y  of WW's and t h e i r  
subsequent mobilization as a united group. The next chapter 
w i l l  discuse the fourth stage in  the  natural history of 
poaching, focusing on t h e  formation of three new groups, 
including a WPO's Association and an umbrella organization 
for i n t e r e s t  groups. 
CHAPTER SBVEIP 
STAGE POOR: RBBHERGENCE OP MOVEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examiner the fourth stage in the natural 
history of poaching, which cornmenoad in June. 1987 and is 
still unfolding. The focus of the analysis is the 
formation of three new lobby groups and their attempts to 
create alternative solutions to the imputed problem. The 
poaching data fit well in this stage of Spector and 
s its use'^ (1977) natural history model. This stage saw a 
renewal of interest in the poaching problem, continuing 
from the trend bsgun at the end of stage three. As 
mentioned in chapter two, stage four occurs when some 
group(s) become disillusioned with government rules and 
regulations and begin to base their activities on the 
notion that "it is no longer possible to work within the 
system" (Spector and Kitsuso, 1977:153). Three new 
claima-making groups became involved during this stage 
and fooused their activities on developing new procedures 
for handling the problem. stage four did not have to 
occur; problems develop unevenly and movement from one 
stage to another is highly problematic (Spector and 
Kitsuse, 1977:142). Stage four might have been averted 
if, for example, government had hired more WPO's and 
given them a raise. This did not happen. 
spector and Kitsuse (1977) assert that stage four 
problems may develop in two directions, both of whish see 
groups base their activities on the notion that it is 
pointless to work within the existing system. One might 
be characterized as "value-oriented," the other as 
"interest-oriented" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:151). 
Value-oriented claim-making groups seek to establish 
alternative institutions to benefit all society, while 
interest-oriented groups want to enact changes which will 
chiefly benefit manbars of their group. This 
characte~ization or fourth stage claims-makers will be 
used to investigate the activities of the three groups 
established in this stage. Before ~0Imen~ing this 
analysis, media coverage of stage four is briefly 
considered. 
mv Events and Issues from Media Coverase 
As discussed in chapter six, the first five months of 
1987 raw an marked increase in media coverage of the 
poaching issue throughout the province. This increased 
coverage was maintained during the rent of 1987 end into 
the last years of the decade.' Three significant events 
I Foe example, two front page stories concerning 
poaching appeared in the Teleqya. on November 28, 1987 
and November 5 ,  1988; two Teleqrae editorials ooncerning 
poaching appeared (m March 19 and December 6, 1988. In 
1989 at least lo articles which dealt with poaching were 
were discovered in media coverage of the issue. Pirst. 
poaching underwent a definitional change. Poachers 
reportedly had become even mare violent and dangerous. 
Poaching was still reported to be occurring for illegal 
sale. However, it was posited that posaher'e reactions 
had been transformed. For example, the !~kbgmn reported 
that: 
... the docile reaction of poachers may be 
changing and that has some wildlife officers 
concerned (The Evenin0 Telesram, March 19, 
1988) . 
similarly, the outdoor columnist claimed that a 
new type ai poaching. "dear-jacking," using s spotlight 
to hunt at night, had come to Newfoundland 
m u n d l a n d  Herald, November 17, 1990). 
Related to this changed reaction of poachers war the 
second important point of this stage, the formation oE 
three new interest groups. The Wildlife Officer's Associ- 
ation was established in October, 1988. This Association 
run in the -. The following year (1990) sew at 
least 39 reports, editorials or colurans concerning 
poaching appear in the m. Poaching was big news in 
other newspapers across the province in 199a: The Western 
.&ax in Corner Brook had at least 5 pieces concerning 
poaohing. The Paoket in Clarenvilla had a front page 
story on poaching an April 3, 1990. The Sundav Exorers 
reported that Newfoundland's WPO's were the most 
assaulted in Canada and that Fisheries Officers had been 
armed (November 4 and May 27, 1990). The Labradorian 
reported that poaching violations had increased by 70 
percent (~ugust 14, 1990). 
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subsequently became very vocal and received much media 
coveraga (see for example: The Eveninrr Teleqram, ~ovenber 
5 ,  1988 or The Evenina Telesram, August a 3 ,  1990). The 
other new groups which entered the "war" were the 
Salmonid Fishery Council of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
and the Newfoundland and Labrador Hunters ~ights 
Association (HRA), which were formally established in 
February, 1989, and November, 1989 respectively (Salmonid 
Council, 1989; me Evenins Telesram, ~ovamber 11, 1989). 
The Council is a provinoe-wide ulnbrella organization for 
all conservation/interest groups and by may I, 1990 the 
Wildlife Federation &both Outfitters Associations had 
become affiliate members of it (interview, June 27, 
1990). The Hunters Rights Association was led by a man 
convicted of a poaching offence, hunting on Sunday. This 
group presented itself as a working class organization 
and lobbied to have hunting on Sundays legalized, arguing 
that no Sunday hunting discriminated against the person 
who worked 6 days a week (see for example: The evening 
-, November 11, 1989). 
The third significant element found in media 
coverage of this final stage was co-operative 
enforcement. This type of wildlife protection and 
enforcement involved different government agencies, 
including the federal department of fisheries and oceans. 
the RCMP, the Canadian Wildlife Service, the provincial 
wildlife division, & private interest groups working 
together to fight poaching. For example, one newspaper 
headline read "Co-operative enforcement helped curtail 
illegal hunting last year" (The Northern P a ,  January 10, 
1990). ~t was elao reported that: 
co-operative enforcement Work by wildlife and 
fisheries officers, along with increased public 
assistance, Were rasponsible for curtailing 
illegal hunting activities in 1989...Last year 
saw the wildlife division take a different 
approach to its work. Special teams of enforce- 
ment staff from the wildlife division and the 
department of fisheries and oceans were placed 
in various locations (Tha, Jmnuay 
10, 1990). 
Co-operative enforcement was also discussed by the Tele- 
outdoor columnist: 
-st year, ~ a c k  Marshall and Leinus Fitzpatrick 
of fisheries and oceans gulf region, Clarence 
Maloney, western region wildlire enforcement 
supervisor. and RCMP and RWC (Royal 
Newfoundland Constabulary) officials, got their 
heads together and formulated a blitz plan to 
combat poaching in the western area. 
The mostly undercover patrols worked 
admirably, for both fish and wildlife 
protection, resulting in a 40 percent increase 
in charges over the previous year (The Eveninq 
m, April 14, 1990). 
Having briefly outlined the contours and main points of 
this stage in the natural history of poaching, it is 
important to oonsider briefly the broader provincial 
context during this period. 
This stage 6eW a continuation of the budget cuts present 
throughout the "war." An example was the RCMP's removal, 
in early 1989, of its 55 migratory bird coordinators from 
Atlantic Canada. This was detrimental to migratory bird 
protection, since R M P  officers had been laying up to 
ninety percent of migratory bird charges in the Atlantic 
provinces (Eastern Woods and waters. 1989 spring). The 
RCMP does have a Pedaral Enforcement section which is 
responsible for migratory bird protection, however, a 
Corporal with this section told ma that migratory birds 
are now e secondary concern and little work is done by it 
(intervlow, July 19, 1990). These cuts affected WPO's 
since they would now be forced to fill this void left by 
the RCMP. 
It seems likely that budget reductions oontributed 
to the increased co-operation between various government 
enforcement agencies which emerged by 1990. Interviews 
conducted from May to August, 1990 with wildlife, RCMP, 
department of fisheries and oceans. and Canadian Wildlife 
Service personnel Pound that these agencies vorK together 
to enforce the various fish and game statutes within the 
province. The idea of joint federal-provincial 
enforcement had been raised as a policy consideration in 
the provincial governnent's policy papr an outfitting 
(Barles et el., 1 9 8 7 ) .  Given that all government 
enforcement agencies were suffering budget cuts and that 
more enforcement was being celled for, it is not 
surprising that vseious government agencies began to work 
together to prevent poaching. It is significant to note, 
however, that much of this ca-operative enforoement work 
was just public relations. For example, one of the 
r~gional wildlife supervisors and two wpo's, in separate 
interviews, told me that the close relationship reported 
in the media between wildlife and fisheries was, in the 
words of one WPO, "more of a publicity thing." 
The period from 1987 to 1991 also witnessed 
continued efforts to expand the outdoor tourism industry. 
A significant example of government's efforts to promote 
the province's outdoors was the creation of s new 
position with the department of dovalopnent, manager of 
outdoor product development. This position is an 
enlargement of the former hunting and fiehing development 
officer position (interview. July 23, 1990) .' Another 
significant example of government's interest in outdoor 
tourism was exemplified by its Economic Recovery 
commission publicly recognizing outdoor adventure tourism 
as one of eight development sectors. Both the chairman of 
the Recovery Commission and one of its directors made 
' It is significant to note that the first parson 
appointed to this position was the former hunter 
education coordinator with the Wildlife Division. 
claims reported in the local media concerning the 
benefits of outdoor tourism (see for example: me evening 
m, September 25, 1990; February 4 ,  1991). The 
recognition of outdoor adventure tourism as a development 
sector by the Economic Recovery Comniasion demonstrates 
the importance placed on outdoor tourism. The comments of 
the manager of outdoor product development support this 
line oi reasoning. He told me that hunting and fishing 
outfitters generate the largest per capita tourism 
revenue, as the person who comes here to hunt or fish 
spends more on a per capita basis than any other tourist. 
He vent on to tell ma "that's why government is so 
anxious to increass that sector as there's potential for 
so much revenue to be generated" (interview. July 23, 
19901. 
At least two highly significant pieces of touriet- 
related legislation ware also introduced in the period 
1987-1991. One dealt specifically with non-residant 
tourist anglers and the other with the province's Lands 
Act. Both had been raised as policy considerations in the 
Discussion PitDar on Cam% (1987). In May, 1990 new 
GuidejFishing regulations were introduced at a press 
conference by the Ministers of development, and 
environment and lands. The new regulations stipulated 
that: 
A non-resident shall not hunt, taka or kill big 
game in any part of the province without 
employing and baing accompanied by a licenced 
guide ... Within the island portion of the prov- 
ince and south of 52 degrees north latitude in 
Labrador a non-resident shall not angle in any 
waters set out in schedule 1 of the 
Newfoundland Fishery Regulations or any other 
waters more than 800 metres from a provincial 
highway unless accompanied by a licenced guide 
or a direct relative who is a resident. North 
of 52 degrees north latitude (all Labrador 
except the southern-most portion) a non- 
resident shall not angle for any species of 
fish in any inland waters without engaging the 
services of an outfitter ... (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1990:281). 
These amendments would benefit those involved in the 
outdoor tourist industry, since in most cases non- 
residents were now legally bound to hire an outfitter or 
guide. The manager of outdoor product devaloprnent stated 
that the new Guide Regulations were an effort to control 
tourists arriving in Newfoundland self-contained and 
fishing without a guide (interview, July 23, 1990). Thus 
it seems plausible to suggest that the new Guide 
Regulations were partly an erfort to make non-residents 
s!+e@ money within the province. Another explanation 
might be that government recognized it could not 
adequately protect resources and tried to involve the 
private sector. Por example, groups such a. the salmonid 
Council and the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife 
Federation had been complaining about "on-residents using 
canning facilities to remove large quantities of trout. 
A ascond significant piece of leginlation emerged in 
1990. nil1 53 was "an act to ~evire and consolidate the 
Law Respecting Crown Lands, Publio Lands, and Other rands 
of the province," and it generated much publio 
aantroversy. Tor example, in January and February. 1990 
at least 27 pieses, not including letters to the editor, 
dealing with the proposed amendments appeared in the 
xdssx.m. A clause in this proposed revision would have 
given government the power to grant title to lands 
adjacent to rivers and ponds "ithi" the province. 
The proposal was widely opposed in a way that 
resembled the opposition against the outfitting industry 
discussed in the previous Ehapter. This reaction defined 
the problem as one of loss oP rasidenfs' rights and 
specified that these legislative amendments were the 
result of outfittars lobbying. Tor example, the leader of 
the Opposition party desaribed Bill 51 as "the Outfitters 
Bill," stating publicly that it was ahv?ously 
government,s response to lobbying by the province's 
outritters ( m e  eveninq ~eieqrsn, ~ebruery 18. 1990) .  
Another example of the opposition to Bill 53 is found in 
an editorial: 
That i~ what we will see in Newfoundland if 
this provision of Bill 53 is not thrown out: 
riverbenks leased out to entrepreneurs and 
accessible on+y to people who are prepared to 
pay (The Evenlnrr Telearam, January 2 9 . 1 9 9 0 ) .  
when asked about the subject, the Telesram's outdoor 
columnist stated that "people who are setting up hunting 
camps, want buffer zones to protect them from locale" 
(interview, May 1 4 ,  1990) .' Having outlined the 
baokgro~nd context, the examination of stage four in the 
natural history of poaching continues with special 
attention to the three new interest groups established in 
this period. 
' other opponents included the St. Johner Rod and 
Gun Club; the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife 
Federation; the Hunter's Rights Association; the salmon 
Association of Eastern Newfoundland; the wildlife 
division's black bear and caribou biol?gist; and many 
individuals (see for example: Ev no Teleoram, 
February 7; 8; 9; 10; 20; 21; %a). Public opposition 
was such that government established a resource 
legislation review committee to receive publio input on 
the bill. ~t hearings in Corner Brook and Goose Bay 
represantatives of both Outfitters Asaooiations denied 
having lobbied foe private ownership of land around 
waterways (see for example: The ~ v g n i n o  Telearam, March 
7 .  1990). 
THE WILDLIFE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
A lLew Lobby GrouD Enters the "War" 
This fourth stage witnessed the continued growth of WPO's 
dissatisfaction, as seen clearly in the establishment of 
the WPO's Assooiation inioctober, 1988 (interview, June 
29, 1990). The fornetion of this Arsociatjon was highly 
significant, since WPO's are the "front lina troops" in 
the "war" against poaching. wildlife offioers are 
responsible for apprehending poachers and the fact these 
men formed an Association to collectively represent 
themselves exemplifies their dissatisfaction. The 
formation of this group was a logical outflow from the 
events outlined in the previous three stages, as WPOrs 
grew successively more discontented with their work 
situations end thair plaaeraent within the wildlife 
division. 
As mentioned above, stage four sooial problems can 
develop in either value-oriented or interest-oriented 
directions (spector and Kitsuse (1977:154). It is 
important to consider whether the WPO's Associati~n was 
(and is) a value-oriented group or an interest-oriented 
group. When discussing these two concepts, Speetor and 
Kitsuse argued that: 
The alternative institutions created by value- 
oriented social problems seek to establish 
those institutions, not only for their members, 
but for society at large. The primary concern 
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of intereat-oriented activity is to create a 
viable solution for the members of the group, 
reguiring only a negative relation to the 
established system, th.t is, to be allowed to 
pursue, without hassle or harassment, their own 
 solution...^ successful value-oriented group 
would establish its program an & 
institutional form and, thus radically 
transforn the existing system. In contrast, a 
suoceesful interest-oriented group would remain 
apart, always vulnerable to the possibility of 
the revocstion of tolerance or indifference on 
the part of the established system that is a 
condition of maintaining the alternative 
(spector and Kitsuse, 1977:154). 
rt f01l.w~ that the wPora ~asocistion was an interest- 
oriented group. one need not look too closely to see that 
the changes oalled for by the *PO'S Association would 
ohiefly benefit its members. certainly WPors might argue 
that polisy alterations were needed so thst they oould 
perform their duties better and hence seeve the publio 
more efficiently. Yet, these madific.tiane would most 
certainly provide .a1utions to the perceived problems of 
Association members. 
The comments of a WPO who was heavily involved in 
the fornation of the Association support. the assertion 
that it was an interest group. This officer claimed that 
WPO'S needed the .association to lobby government foe 
changes to serve and protect wildlife better, and to 
proteot themselves (Telephone Interview. April 11, 1991). 
He stated thst it would be unlikely for a single WPO to 
get e seating with the Minister and Oaputy Minister. 
However, t h e  A s s ~ ~ i a t i o n ' s  ExeoutiYe can. The &=soc i a t i on  
is not a ba rga in ing  u n i t ,  s i n c e  WPO's are p a r t  o f  t h e  
Newfoundland Assoc i a t i on  of P u b l i c  Employees. The 
~ r s o c i a t i o n  ic; a lobby group and t r i e s  t o  g e t  a c t i o n  on 
i s s u e s  l i k e  manpower, S i d e a m a  and comnmunication systems.  
This  a f f i c s r ' a  oomments a l s o  make clear t h a t  forming an 
Assoc i a t i on  was an a t t emp t  by WPO'S t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  
P.WBI. 
As mentioned above, the power of a claims-making 
group depends on monetary sup po r t ,  s o c i a l  s t a t u s .  
knouledga, o rgan i ea t i on  and s k i l l s  I R i t r e r ,  198G:9).   he 
WPO'a Assoc i a t i on  could draw on  t h e  s t a t u s  of t h e i r  
p o s i t i o n s  as w i l d l i f e  o f r i s e r s  and on t h e i r  union f o r  
s u p p o r t  and s k i l l s .   or example, t h e  s k i l l s  and resources 
o f  t h e  NewPoundland Assoc i a t i on  of Pub l i c  Employees were 
used to p repa re  and  submi t  t o  government t h e  p r av ious ly  
mentioned ~ r i e f  ~ e a l i n o  with t h e  Concerns o f  w i l d l i f e  
-tion o f f i c e r s  i n  Newfoundland and Labrador  
P r e sen t ed  bv t h e  Newfoundland Associat ion o f  p u b l i c  
EmDlavees (WPO*a, 1990). By e s t a b l i s h i n g  an  Assoc i a t i on ,  
WPO'O i n c r ea sed  t h e i r  power and presented a u n i t e d  v d o e  
On t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  concerns. Spec to r  and K i t s u s e  
(1917:141) a s s e r t  t h a r  t h e  l a r g e r  a g roup ' s  membership, 
t h e  more e f f e c t i v e  w i l l  b e  its olains-making a c t i v i t i e s .  
Thus, by u n i t i n g ,  WPO's i n c r ea sed  t h e i r  claims-making 
An example of t h e  power of t h i s  group was seen i n  
t h e  media coverage it received.  Spector and ~ i t s u s o  
(1977) suggest  t h a t  t h e  handling of t h e  p ress  and o t h e r  
media a f f e c t  t h e  success of a claim.' The WPO's 
Association was ab le  t o  ha la  media a t t e n t i o n  t h r ~ u g h o u t  
t h i s  s t age .  For example. i n  November, 1988 t h e  
gave f r o n t  page coverage t o  t h e  claims of t h e  f i r s t  
P res idsn t  oe t h e  wPoSs assoc ia t ion  under the  l a r g e  
heedline "wi ld l i f e  oee ice ra  want f irearmsss (The Eveninq 
m, November 5 .  1988). At l e a e t  t h r e e  o the r  f r o n t  
pegs s t o r i e s  concerning t h e  claims of WPD,D w e r e  r un  by 
t h e  ITheevsnfn.~a, August 1 3  and 31; end 
September 1, 1990). In  add i t ion ,  a t  l e a s t  f i v e  
e d i t o r i a l s  i n  t h i s  period d e a l t  wi th  W P O * ~  (zhe ~ v c n i " ~  
-, March 1 9  and December 6 ,  1988; Ju ly  27;  August 
31. 1990 and September 28,  1991). Also, one f u l l  ~ a o e  and 
one half  page repor t  on t h e  t r a i n i n g  of WPO's by t h e  
l o o a l  po l i ce  f o r c e  were a l s o  publiehed  he 
lk-, January 29 and February 4 ,  1991).  nai , ; taining 
its presence i n  t h e  media allowed t h e  TWO*= t o  reach a 
broad audience with t h e i r  c l a ims  and keep t h a i r  i s s u e s  
"hot." As well ,  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  access t h e  medie may have 
i n ~ z e a s ~ d  t h e  leverage or t h e  WPO'S in dea l ing  with 
government. ~ovarnnent may have been constrained by t h e  
t h r e a t  of WPO's "going public" with t h e i r  claims.  
I n  add i t ion ,  WPOas = l a i n s  were supported by t h r e e  
prominent loca l  outdoor w r i t e r s  (The Evenina Tel" ",, 
DBCBmber 17, 1988; The Newfoundland Herald, September 2 2 .  
1990; The SUndaV Exoress. Nmvember 13, 1188). The 
qraa's outdoors columnist  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  was highly 
supportive.  For example, h i s  ca1umns ca r r i ed  head l ines  
l i k e  "Wildlife o f f i c e r s  need p ro tec t ion"  (- 
-, December 17, 1988), or, "Wildlife OCficers' 
Cornplaints Legitinrate: Dig a l i t t l e  Deeper, ~ r .  ~ r e m i e r "  
(The N e n i n q  Talgaram, September 2 9 ,  1990). When t h i s  
w r i t e r  was interviewad, he s t a t a d  t h a t  he  has "a g r e a t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  with the f i e l d  people" (WPo's) and t h a t  he  
"knows most of them personally.' ( interview. May 1 4 .  
1990) .    his c l o s e  re la t ionsh ip  c e r t a i n l y  made p ress ing  
claims e a s i e r  f o r  the Wm's Aesooiation.  
me period 1987-1991 a l s o  witnessed o the r  maneuvers 
by RPO'S. FOZ- example, they  made a t  least two 
represen ta t ions  to government, one i n  Hay, 1989 and t h e  
another i n  November. 1989 (WPO'a, 199021-21. I n  August- 
September, 1990 the  WPOrr Assoc ia t ion  went pub l i c  wi th  
t h e i r  rromplaints. h t  t h a t  t ime  t h e  newly e l ec t ed  
p res iden t  grabbed medie a t t e n t i o n  by making c l a ims  
the poor work s i t u a t i o n s  or WPO'S  he meninlr  
-, huguse 21 and 31, 1990). Whan d i scuss ing  t h e  
a c t i o n s  of t h e  p res iden t ,  one o f f i c e r  advised t h a t  "we 
were hacked i n t o  a comer, you've g o t  t o  f i g h t  when 
you're i n  t h a t  s i t u a t i o n "  [ in t e rv iew,  Apr i l  11, 1991) .  
m o t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  move undertaken by WPO'. was t h e  
p resen ta t ion  t o  government, i n  l a t e  November 1990, of  t h e  
previously mentioned b r i e f  dea l ing  with t h e i r  canoerns 
( ~ ~ 0 , s .  1990).  naving ou t l ined  t h s  major i n i t i a t i v e s  
undertaken by W P O ~ S  i n  t h i s  period,  a more c a r e f u l  
a n a l y s i s  of t h e i r  c l a ims  "ill now be presented.  
ThrDugh~ut t h e  Eour chap te r s  dea l ing  with t h e  "war" on 
poaohing, it has  been argued t h a t  WPO's becane 
progresnively more f r u s t r a t e d  and a l i e n a t e d  wi th  t h e i r  
work s i t u a t i o n s .  The claims made by t h e  WPOts Assoc ia t ion  
demonstrate t h e i r  growing d i s c o n t e n t  and support  t h i s  
argument. Def in i t ions  are one farm of grounds; t h e  b a s i c  
f a c t s  of  an argument ( sea t ,  1987:104). 1n t h i s  case t h e  
bas i c  f a c t s  of t h e  argument were claimed t o  ba t h a t  fewer 
and fewer WPO's ware facing more and more p o t e n t i a l l y  
dangerous situations. As mentioned above, the president 
of the Wm's Association received front page coverage in 
November, 1988 with his claims that protection officers 
needed sidearms and an increase in numbers to protect 
themselves and the province's wildlife. The Association 
President was quoted as stating: 
We need to protact officers from potentially 
danserous situationa...there are freouent en- 
oouitere with poachers who are eithei armed 
with a firearm or a knife ... We would like to 
see an increase in numbers. We are going to 
research this. There is a long way to go to 
properly address poaching in vast areas (% 
E v e n L n q u ,  November 5, 1988). 
This quote highlights the definition used throughout this 
stage in claims-making by the WPO's Association; WPO'e. 
working alone, faced potentially dangerous encounters and 
hence needed firearms to protect themselves. 
This sane definition was used in the brief presented 
to gOvBrnment in November, 1990: 
Although there has been drastic increaser in 
license quotas and the length of hunting sea- 
sons, it is alarming to note that the rate of 
wildlife officers is reducing year by year 
(WP0'6. 1990:30). 
This document went on to claim that Newfoundland and 
Labrador's WP08s were the most assaulted of all Canada's 
wildlife enforcement agents. This claim was based on a 
1907 study, titled Conservation Officers Killed and 
Assaulted. 1982. This report concluded that: 
The nationwide (Canada) assault rate was 5.1% 
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in 1987. This means that one of every 19 
officers Was assaulted. Newfoundland had the 
highest rate of assault with 19.11 (WPO'a, 
199O:Sl-54). 
The claim regarding the assault rate againstwPors 
was based on "offioial statisticsn and was an effort to 
persuade people that the WPO's plight was indeed serious. 
Best's work on the missing children problem argues that 
official numbers play a central role in claims-making and 
that these numbers need careful examination sinoe they 
nay be just guesses, or baeed on inaocurate research 
(Best, 1989:22-241. Similarly, Leyton et al.'s (1992) 
work on fear of violence asserts that groupe and 
individuals use official statistics in an uncritical 
manner to support their arguments. Therefore, social 
scientists must be cautious in their acceptance of such 
claims (Leyton et al., 1992:16-18). 
This claim that understaffed WPO's were facing 
inoreasing danger might also be considered an orientation 
statement, as the problen's domain was epacified and some 
assessment of the problem given (Best, 1987:102-103). The 
problem was identified as n combination of fewer WPO's 
facing increasing hunting activity. This definition may 
have been based on the reported emergence of a new type 
of poacher. Poachers were now claimed to be 
technalogioally advanced, more vicious and more apt to 
react violently toward WPO'r (The Evenin. Telesran, March 
19, 1988; me Newfoundland Her&& November 17, 1990; % 
ExDress. May 27, 19901. 
Examples are another type of ground. Two examples in 
particular supported WW'S complaints that conditions 
were becoming more dangerous and that poachers' reactions 
had changed. One report dealt with an attack upon an 
unarmed warden in Nova Scotis. The appearance of this 
story was significant, in light of the claims far 
sidearms made at this time by Newfoundland's WPO's 
Association ( T h e m T e l e q r a m .  December 5 ,  1988). 
Another important example appeared in November, 1989 when 
it was reported that a game warden in Quebec had been 
killed at night by a suspected poacher (The Sunday 
m, November 1, 1989; The Evenins T e l e o r ~ ,  October 
31, 1989). While both reports dealt with incidents on 
mainland Canada, they contributed to the atnosphere of 
danger and the potentially violent situations faoed by 
gane wardens in this province. Both examples could be 
pointed to by the WPO's Association to justify its 
position that more men and sidearms were needed. Both 
reports confirmed that the "docile reaction of poachers" 
had changed. 
Many other reports appeared in the media which 
supported the notion that WPOrs jobs had become more 
dangerous (The, April 3 ,  1990; The Evening 
-, February, 16 and April 19, 1991). The apparent 
disintegration of law and order and the reported 
escalation of violence against WPO's not only supported 
their olaimr and gave them the basis for more claims, but 
also helped frame the discussion of poachars and 
poaching. Interviews conducted in summer, 1990 revealed 
that WPO's do believe they are potential victims. For 
example, an eastern region WPO, when questioned about the 
issue of sidearm, stated that: 
... Ninety percent of the people encountered in 
a protection officer's work in the field have 
firearms. On a good many ocoasions people en- 
countered have been drinking, or are drinking. 
A high percentage of people are doing something 
illegal. more times than not the officer is 
alone. Often people who are caught poaohing are 
not interested in giving up a new truck (inter- 
view, June 14, 1990). 
similarly, a central region WPO said that: 
... there's one wildlife officer par district, 
under the muzzle of a firearm all the tine. 
You're doing it alone, one man on his own in 
high risk situations ... Hypothetically supposing 
two Wildlife protection officers were on patrol 
together, and they cite someone for a 
violation. What if buddy's a bit on the psycho 
side or in a cult? What do you do if he starts 
shooting? You need some sort of protection ... 
(interview, July, 29, 1990). 
These comments demonstrate the apprehension of WPops 
concerning working alone. Higher fines affected WW's by 
increasing the stakes in the "war." Also, WPo's opinions 
may have been shaped by media coverage of the poaching 
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war; 1.e.  a r epor ted  change i n  poacher 's  r eac t ion  may 
have influenced those  men responsible f o r  enforcing game 
laws. Such claims ware perhaps a l o g i c a l  extension of t h e  
t h i r d  s t a g e  claims concerning t h e  i n r u f f i o i e n t  number ot  
Wm's with in  t h e  province. I t  is s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  note the  
l i n k  between d r ink ing ,  c u l t s ,  i l l e g a l  behaviour and 
Poaching. There n i g h t  be considered "as rac ia ted  e v i l s , "  
which Bes t  (1987:105) de f ines  as a type of warrant .  
Best 's  (19871 ana lys i s  of t h e  missing Ehildren 
problem shows t h a t  claims-makers argued ch i ld ren  were 
abducted or l a t e r  f e l l  prey t o  "ch i ld  a b u s a m ,  sex 
of fenders ,  pimps, pornographers, drug d e a l e r s ,  organized 
c r imina l s ,  and satoiniets" (Best, 1987:110). s imi la r ly ,  
L ipper t ' s  (19901 study of satanism in Canada found t h a t  
satanism was o f t e n  l inked t o  "crimes euch as vic ious  
c h i l d  sexua l  abuse or murder" (L ipper t ,  1990:410). Hall  
e t  a l . ( s  (1979) examination or t h e  mugging problem i n  
B r i t a i n  argued t h a t  t h e  mugging l a b e l  was imported from 
t h e  United S t a t e s  along with a v a r i e t y  o f  Issocial  themess* 
which r e f l e c t e d  t h e  " c r i s i s  of U.S. soc ie ty"  ("all  e t  
-1.. 1979:19-20). A s  mentioned i n  t h i s  chap te r ,  WW's 
o f t e n  l inked  poaching t o  drinEing,  o u l t s  and i l l e g a l  
behaviours.  In te rv iews  and media sea rches  revealed t h a t  
Other "ev i l s "  were a l s o  assoc ia ted  with t h e  poaching 
problem by WPO's. Foe example, a c e n t r a l  region WPo 
linked poachers to the dumping of garbage (interview. 
July 29, 1990). A Western region WPO reported that a 
poacher confessed that he Wade mare aor.ey at the moose 
(i.e. selling noose illegally) than he did at the dope" 
(i.e. selling illegal drugs) (interview. June 30, 1990). 
The idea that poaching was now being oarriad out mainly 
far sale was supported by LU !+Po's interviewed. 
Another associated evil linked to poaching was 
unemployment. An eastern region WPO stated that "Now a 
different bunch are poaching ... they're lazy, ten weeks 
on, forty-two off end they see moose as beer money" 
(interview, September 14, 1989). Unemployment was linked 
to poaching by the majority of the protection officers 
interviewed. This was not an entirely new argument, it 
had been used at earlier points in the war. However, 
these claims were now being used by WPO'S as warrants to 
justify their calls for more .en and better equipment. 
Gusfield (1989) writes that criminals and "other objects 
of problems" are portrayed as deplorable, troubled, 
dangerous and "endlessly dramtic and interesting" 
[Gusfield, 1989:431). That is, not only are criminal 
types dangerous, but they are also newsworthy. This 
certainly must have helped WPO'r push their claims. 
Hasson's (1981) study of the "war" against unemployment 
insurenoe fraud waged by the Canadian government showed 
how unemployment in su rance  claimants have been regarded 
as p o t e n t i a l  c r imina l s  (Hasson, 1987:632). BY l ink ing  
poaching t o  unemployed persons,  WPo's s p e c i f i e d  an enemy 
which would l i k e l y  ga the r  widespread suppor t  from t h e  
pub l i c .  
The o t h e r  war ran t  found i n  WPO'S c l a ims  was what 
Best  (1987) c a l l a d  d e f i c i e n t  p o l i c i e s .  Newfoundland and 
Labrador's WW's Assoc ia t ion  clailned t h a t  e x i s t i n g  
p o l i c i e s  were i nappropr i a t e  and inadequate - t h e r e  were 
t o o  few men, equipment was inadequate and o f f i c e r ' s  
s a f e t y  was t h rea tened .  I t  was a l s o  claimed t h a t  WPO'S 
were t aken  advantage of by t h e  e x i s t i n g  sys t em of payment 
for overt ime hours worked (WPO's, 1390:39). When combined 
with t h e  c l a im t h a t  Newfoundland and Labrador 's  WPO's had 
t h e  lowest maximum s a l a r y  of any Canadian w i l d l i f e  agen t s  
(ww(e, 1990:38), one can see t h a t  t h e  s t a g e  war s e t  f o r  
WW'S t o  ques t ion  t h e  inadequacy of e x i s t i n g  po l i c i e s .  
Other " d e f i c i e n t  policy" warrants  p res sed  by wPOrs 
focused on t h e  r i f t  w i th in  t h e  d i v i s i o n  between t h e  
p ro tec t ion  and t h e  r e sea rch  and management s e c t i o n s .  For 
example, t h e  P res iden t  of  the  WPO Assoc ia t ion  pub l i c ly  
blamed t h e  d i v i s i o n ' s  b i o l o g i s t s  f o r  t h e  l a c k  of  ac t ion  
WPO'S complaints  had  received up t o  t h a t  p o i n t :  
The w i l d l i f e  d i v i s i o n  is r u n  mostly by b io l -  
o g i s t s  who have  no knowledge of whet's involved 
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in law enforcament...and this is just one of 
the reasons our concerns have not been 
addressed (The Evenins Teleqran, August 23, 
1990). 
The comments of a central region WPO highlight the rift 
between enforcement and research: 
There are two branchas in the division; 
research and managanent and protection and 
enforcement. Protection and enforcement have to 
take the crap out in the field and they're 
involved in stuff other people could taka care 
of like road kills or nuisance animals 
(interview, July 19, 1990). 
It semns clear that, by 1990. WPO's were not at all happy 
with the policies concerning the ~ n n i n g  of the division. 
Two of the three conclusions outlined by Best (1987) 
are found in claims made by the WPO's Association. Theaa 
are the conclusions of awareness and eocial control 
policies. Obviously awareness of the insues and concerns 
of field officers was raised considerably in the period 
1987-1991. Increasad media coverage in this stage most 
certainly raised awareness of the dissatisfaotion of 
WP0'6. Front page articles, editorials, full page reports 
ac~~npanied by photographs of WPO'a receiving self- 
defence training and support from proninsnt looal outdoor 
writers helped insrease publio awareness of the work 
situations of WPOf8 in this province (sea for example: 
The Evenina Telearam, November 5,  1988; July 27, 1990; 
February 4 .  1991; December 17, 1988; The ~ewfoundlsnd 
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HsxaU, September 2 2 ,  1990; The s ~ e v  ~xnresr, ~ovember 
13, 1988). 
The other conclusion reaohed by WPO's concerns what 
Bes t  (1987) c a l l s  s o c i a l  con t ro l  po l i c i es .  Two of t h e  
moat s i g n i f i c a n t  were t h a t  aidearns were needed and t h a t  
o f f i c e r s  be t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  the jus t ioe  department s ince  
they  enforce The c a l l  f o r  f irearms and a t r a n s f e r  
t o  the j u s t i c e  department were attempts t o  c r e a t e  or 
e s t a b l i s h  a l t e r n a t i v e  so lu t ions  f a r  t h e i r  pe rce ived  
problems. This f i t s  Spec to r  and Ki t suse ' s  (1977) 
d e f i n i t i o n  of s t a g e  four  complaints,  which they  
suggested,  "challenge t h e  legit imacy of e s t a b l i s h e d  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  and t h e i r  procedures fo r  p rocess ing  claims" 
(speotor and Ki t ruse .  1977:151). 
By publ ic ly  s t a t i n g  through t h e i r  I \ s rac ia t i an  Preei-  
d e n t  t h a t  f i r a a m s  and o t h e r  p ro tec t ive  equipment l i k e  
handcufer and n i g h t  s t i c k s  were needed, WPo's ware 
o f i e r i n q  a new s o l u t i o n  t o  the  poaching problem. When one 
cons ide r s  t h a t  t h e  p r o v i n c i a l  po l i ce  fo rce ,  t h e  Royal 
Newfoundland Constabulary,  does n o t  ca r ry  sidearms,  than 
t h e  fo rce  of t h i s  c l a im wan fu r the r  heightened.  
S imi la r ly ,  by ask ing  t o  be moved t o  the  j u s t i c e  
Other c o n ~ l v r i o n r  were t h a t  more men and b a t t e r  
equipment be provided.  However, such claims were not  
p a r t i m l a r l y  new or p e c u l i a r  t o  t h i s  s t age .  
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department because law enforcement was not understood by 
biologists in charge of the wildlife division, wPo*r ware 
offering another new answer to the problem of poaching. 
Offering this suggestion publicly demonstrates that M e  
officers perceived they lacked respect and were 
nisunderstood within the division. 
It is useful to consider WPO's conclusions in light 
of Becker's (1989) point that enforcement agents must 
justify the existence of their position and win the 
respect of those people with whoa they daal (Becker, 
1989:24). Similarly, Clark and Dear (1981) argued that 
the establishment of the forerunner of the American 
Psychiatric Association in 1884: 
... should be regarded as an effort to establish 
professional prerogative. The status of 
medicine in omtemporary America was rather 
low, end psychiatrists were mare ooncerned to 
maintain a separate identity. Hence, they laid 
emphasis on a broad range of physical, mental 
and moral factors in the etiology of moral 
illness (Clark and Dear, 1984:71). 
Clark and Dear also argued that a primary goal of arty 
agency was its own survival: "Agencies tend to develop a 
life and interest of their own, in which questions of 
status and reproduction dominate" (Clark and Dear, 
1984:GO). If one considers the position of WW's in 
Newfoundland and Labrador by 1990, it might be posited 
that they were try& to carve out their niche within the 
division. Throughout the thesis, it has been shown that 
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WPO'S lacked t h e  power and p r e s t i g e  of t h e  b i o l o g i s t s ,  
t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  exper t s  and adv i so rs  t o  t h e  Minister .  
Facing continued budget c u t s ,  increasing workloads and 
repor ted  increases i n  v i o l e n t  r eac t ions  from poachers,  
WPO's may have been t r y i n g  t o  increase t h e i r  s t a t u s  
wi th in  t h e  d iv i s ion .  The words of a cen t ra l  region NPO 
support  t h i s  conclusion: 
Wi ld l i f e  is the twelfth department i n  ~overn- 
ment, a f t e r  e i g h t  you're fo rgo t t en .  I can app- 
r e c i a t e  t h e  importance of medicare, but I ' m  a 
human resource and I ' m  not t r e a t e d  l ike  it 
(interview. July 19, 1990).  
By 1990, WPO'a had enough; peroeiving themselves t o  be 
backed i n t o  a oorner, they s t ruck  out pub l i c ly  a t  t h e i r  
tormentors.  An examination of t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of the  
salmonid council  i s  now Dresented 
THE SALMONID FISHERY COUNCIL 
Coa l i t ion  of Conservation GrouDr 
The Salnanid Fishery Council war es tab l i shed  i n  February, 
1989. I t  was o r i g i n a l l y  an a l l i a n c e  of t h r e e  salmon 
i n t e r e s t  groups; the  Selnon Preservation Associat ion for 
t h e  Waters of Newfoundland (SPAWN), the Environment 
Resource Management Agency (EWA), and t h e  Selnon Associ- 
a t i o n  of Eastern Newfoundland (SAEN), based i n  western,  
c e n t r a l  and eastern Newfoundland respec t ive ly .  The 
C o u n ~ i l ' s  main i n t e r e s t  was representing the  province's  
r e c r e a t i o n a l  fishermen. However, as discussed i n  previous 
chapters, groups like the salmon Preservation ~ssociation 
also made claims concerning big game, for example the 
c a l l  for the recreation of the Ranger Force. Similarly, 
in this fourth stage of the natural history of poaching. 
the Salmonid Council became involved in the "war" on big 
game poaching and became an ally of government. 
~n addition to allying with gaveenment, the Salmonid 
Council was linked to the Atlantic Salmon Federation, 
which was itself linked to the outdoor tourist industry. 
With its establishment in 1989, the Council became the 
provincial representative of the Salmon Federation, and 
the President of the Council became a member of the Board 
of Directors of the Federation (Salmonid Council. 1989). 
AS mentioned in chapter four, the Atlantic salmon 
Federation was set up in 1983, end the Salmon 
Preservation ~ssooiation and the Salmon Association had 
allied at that time to act an its Regional Covncil in 
this province. The Salmon Preservation Association had 
links to the outfitting ind~stry.~ I" 1985, the 
President of the Atlantic salmon ~edsration (me wulif) 
had claimed that privatizing rivers would curb poaching. 
While the counoil has links to outfitting, this 
does not imply that the perceptions, motives and agendas 
of all outfitters and the Council are always the aane. It 
is reasonabla to think that disagreements and tensions 
must exist on some insues. For example, perhaps Wulff may 
have alienated some with his call for privatizing rivers. 
As detailed above, he had worked for the Newfoundland 
government in the 1940's, promoting outdoor tourist 
opportunities. By June, 1990, the founding president of 
the Salmon Preservation Association, who was also the 
former hunting and fishing development officer for 
Newfoundland, had become the Salmon Federation's regional 
00-ordinator for Newfoundland and Labrador, and Nova 
Scotia. Clearly, the Salaonid Council was linked to 
outfitting interests through its membership in the Salmon 
federation. 
By Hay 1, 1990 ths Newfoundland end Labrador 
Wildlife Federation, and both the Labrador and the 
Newfoundland Outfitters Asroolations had become affiliate 
members of the Council (Salmonid Counoil. 1990a). This 
coalition of various private groups was explained by the 
current President of the salmonid Council: 
... I got educated fairly quickly and found that 
SPAWN was a regional organization, but like 
SPAWN there were organizations like SAEN on the 
east coast Lof Newfoundland. ERMA in central 
(Newfoundlandl, the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Wildlife Federation, the Outfitters. Thore was 
a lot of common denominator issues that needed 
to be addressed provincially okay? And we were 
not going to succeed unless we united ourselves 
together as one umbrella provincial group, to 
become a powerful end strong enough lobby group 
to get s directional change from federal and 
provincial government officials...if things are 
going to be managed politically, we will become 
politically involved, by using the numbers 
game, by using the 26.000 licenced anglers on 
this island (interview, June 27, 1990). 
It is clear that the Salmonid Council fits the definition 
of a fourth stage group as outlined by Spector and 
Kitsure (1977). Sportsmen united to try a new approach to 
getting their claims heard. 
  he alliance of the Newfoundland and Labrador 
wildlife Federation and both Outfitters Associations with 
the three largest salmon interest groups in the province 
was highly significant. As discussed in chapter six, the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation had argued 
that all moose and caribou outfitting on the island be 
cancelled. It also opposed the proposed revisions to the 
provincers Lands Act. Apparently, former opponents became 
allies on the issue of sportfishing st least. The 
executive director of the Wildlife Federation claimed 
that he was assured by the Outfitters Associations that 
they were not attempting to get special privileges within 
the province (interview, August 5 ,  1990). It might be 
Suggested that the Wildlife Federation's affiliation with 
the Salmonid Council was a move to silence and weaxen 
this critic of the outfitting industry; i.e. drawing the 
Federation into the Council was perhaps a move to co-opt 
this group. Significantly, the Salmonid Council was 
silent in the Bill 53 debate, despite the fact that 
recreational anglers apparently had the most to lose by 
waterways being privatized. The fact that both Outfitters 
Associations are members of the Council suggests that the 
Salmonid Council was (and is) an interest-oriented group. 
The alternative solutions suggested by the Salnonid 
Counoil in this fourth stage would chiefly benefit its 
members. Obviously, outfitters would also benefit highly 
from an increasing sport fishery. 
The power of a group depends on monetary support, 
social status, knowledge, organization and skills 
(Ritzer, 1986:20). The Salmonid Council had the nost 
monetary support of any group aotive in the war, dua in 
part to its membership in the Atlantic Salmon paderation. 
For example, in May, 1990 the Salmonid Council released a 
$32,000 study, prepared by a consulting firm, on the 
current economic benefits of the Atlantic salmon fishery 
(Gardener Pinfold, 1990). The current resource advisor of 
the Salmon Council stated that the funding for this study 
same from the Atlantic Sallnon Federation (interview, ~u1.y 
lo, 1990). The ability of an interest group to have such 
a costly document prepared demonstrates its power. 
It is also important to consider the membership of 
these groups. The President of the Atlantic Salmon Feder- 
ation in 1990 war a former justice Minister with the 
government of New Brunsvick (interview, June 13, 1990). 
As mentioned above, the first President of the Atlantic 
salmon Federation was Lee Wulff, professional sportsnan 
and former outdoor tourist promotional officer for 
~evfoundland. Having such individuals as President 
increased the prestige and political connections of both 
the Atlantic Salmon Federation and the Salmonid Council 
and thus added to their power. The Salmonid Council also 
held a certain amount of status due to the nature and 
size of its membership. While this group had a diverse 
membership, it included well educated individuals and 
members of the business community. The label "sports 
fishernen" also suggested that the members of this group 
Were ethical sportsmen. Of the three new groups 
established, the Salnonid Council had the mast status. 
Its link to the Atlantic Salmon Federation also increased 
its prestige. 
another example of the salmonid council's power is 
the joint calnpaign against poaching it launched in June, 
1990 with the Atlantic Salmon Federation. The launching 
of this campaign also adds support to the assertion that 
the Salmonid Council was an interest-oriented group. This 
campaign saw the placement of almost full page advertise- 
ments in newspapers (%-, June 19, 1990) 
and the release of posters titled "Poachers are stealing 
your heritage." The launching of this campaign received 
media attention (The Evenina Teleqram June 4, 1990) and 
demonstrates the resources and organization on which the 
salmanid council could draw. The Council was adept at 
handling the media and used press releases effectively to 
info2-rn the nedia of its actions. Also, the Salmonid 
Council was connected to the media through the outdoor 
writer of The Newfoundland H e r a u .  This was ths same man 
Who Was the Atlantic Salmon Federation's regional co- 
ordinator for Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, the former 
provincial hunting and fishing development officer and 
the founding President of SPAWN. 
A final example of the influence and power of this 
group comes from the comments of the President of the 
salaonid Council regarding the ~ial-A-poacher program for 
salmon on the province's west coast: 
we fought to get the money for Dial-A-Poacher 
here, while DFO (pause) that's something you 
can put in your report. Nobody knew about that. 
The Gulf Region (western Newfoundland and 
southern Labrador) lost the money for Dial-A- 
Poaoher program, we had to lobby heavy in 
Ottawa to get it back because we felt it was 
that important ... the most significant thing you 
could have on the go and they were prepared to 
shut it down because they didn't havo tho 
money.. . (Interview, June 27, 1990). 
The President went on to state that the Council is 
politically connected and that "one phone call will get 
phones ringing in Ottawa and confederation Building." The 
resource advisor to the Council corroborated the 
President's comments, regarding the phone line. Having 
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outlined the background of the salmonid Council, a brief 
analysis of its claims and its involvement in the "warM 
on poaching will now be presented. 
Salmonid Council clains 
=he salmonid Council made a variety of claims. Many of 
them understandably foourad on the Atlantic relaon. 
However, as mentioned, the group also made claims which 
concerned big game and various wildlife law enforcement 
agencies. For example, the Counail's joint campaign 
against poaching with the Atlantic Salmon Federation 
certainly helped increase the visibility of poaching in 
general. Salnonid Council claims-makers defined the 
problem as one of inadequate state resouroes facing a 
large amount of market poaching.' However, the main 
focus of these claims was the Atlantic salmon and as such 
did not really effect wildlife. Similarly, the examples 
and estimates of extent used by the salmonid Council Were 
directed mainly at salmon and shall not be discussed. 
However, the warrants and conclusions presented by the 
salmonid council conoerned the provincial wildlife 
' For example, the President of the Salmonid 
Council told me "there's not adequate money For 
enforcement" (Interview June 2 7 ,  1990). The Salmon 
Federation regional co-ordinstor for Newfoundland and 
Nova Scotia statad "there's a jurisdictional problem" 
which makes effective enforcement hard (Interview, June 
13, 1990). Like others, the Salmonid Council claimed that 
poaching war oocurring for profit (see for example: T!E 
yndav Express, January 28, 1990). 
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division, specifically WPO's. Thebe conclusions shall now 
be examined. 
Warrants act as bridges between the basic facts of 
the argument and the calls for action (Best, 1987:108). 
&t least three of the warrant8 outlined by Best were 
found in the claims of the Salmonid Council. one was what 
Best oalled deficient policies. This stemmed from the 
manner in which Council claims-makers defined the 
pr~blem. For example, a Salmonid Council document 
stressed that "inadequate enforcement does exist" 
(Salmonid Council, 1990b:3). Best (1987:lll) argues that 
by insisting current procedures and policies are 
inadequate, claim-makers present a warrant for change. 
salmonid council claims-makers defined the problem and 
presented a warrant for action. This warrant was 
important because the Salmonid Council called for 
wildlife to take control of enforcing inland fiehcry 
laws, using arguments made by the Salmon Preservation 
Aarocietion to support its clains (salnonid Council, 
19900; SPAWN, 1989). 
Another warrant found in Salaonid council clains was 
the notion of historical continuity and maintaining past 
links. For example, e Salaonid Council doousent stated 
"immediate astion has to be taken to protect the 
remaining stock and restore our rivera to historical 
le~els'~ (Salmonid Council, 1990b:31. A similar Warrant in 
that same document stated "The future of sportfishing in 
Newfoundland and Labrador is in our own handsN (Salmonid 
Council, 199Ob:lo). Suoh appeals were attempts to 
mobilize support by suggesting that a part of rn past 
w a r  in danger of being lost; similar warrants had bean 
pressed in stage one around the province's caribou. This 
warrant emphasized the need to change policy to preserve 
links with the paat end prevent the possible extinction 
of the salmon. It also set up another warrant based on 
the value of the sport salmon fishery. 
salmonid council clains-makers also stressed the 
value and potential economic benefits of sport salmon 
fishing to the province. For example, the President of 
the Council was quoted as stating: 
Poachers are stealing our heritage. They are 
not only taking opportunities from their own 
pockets, but from the pockets of other people, 
from businesses, from the sport fishery end 
from the commercial fishermen, and it's time 
they were stepped (The Western Star, April 16, 
1990). 
The Ealne Warrant was presented in the Council's Economic 
statement on Salmon (1990) which concluded that: 
... greater use of the Atlantic salmon resource 
by the recreational fishery would be of 
economio advantage for Newfoundland and 
Labrador...the Atlantic salmon could support a 
highly desirable type of sustainable 
development, much of which would occur in the 
form of small scale enterprise in the rural 
areas of the province (Gardener Pinfold, 
1990:36-38). 
The Council slso used an unpublished 1988 study by the 
department of fisheries and oceans to argue that 38% of 
non-resident anglers would not return to the province 
because of poor angling. It also argued that non-resident 
spending was dawn in 1988 from 1985 by at least 7 million 
dollars (Salmonid Council, 1990d). The Council claimed 
that: 
Properly managed, the Atlantic Salmon resource 
has excellent potential for the creation of a 
significant addition to the tourism indlrstrv of 
Newfoundlan' 
1990d:lZ). 
~ --.----- - - -~ ---- - ~ ---- 
I and Labrador (Salmonid council: 
A warrant for action on salmon poaching was presented 
based on the potential benefits of an expanded sport 
fishery and the regaining of recent losses in tourist 
traffic. 
The Salmonid Council presented many conclusions or 
calls for action (Best, 1987:112). A" obvious one was the 
heightened awareness oreated around the issue of 
poaching. Media coverage, poster campaigns and the 
presentation of professionally prepared economic 
statements to government ~ertainly raised awareness of 
the issue. The Salmonid Council slso suggested many 
conelusions which Best might oonsider social control 
policies. One was to re-create the Newfoundland Ranger 
Force (Salmonid Council, 199061. A similar conclusion had 
keen called for in stage one by the Salmon Preservation 
Association. The Council also called for auxiliary forces 
to be set up in which government agencies and interest 
groups would work together to combat poaching. Far 
example, a newspaper on the island's vest coast reported 
that the "Salmon council (was) 'enthused' by joint 
enforcement plans" and that the president of the Salmonid 
Council claimed cooperation between government agencies, 
private conservation groups and the media could help stop 
poachers (The Western Star, April 16, 1990). The salmon 
Preservation Association concluded that developing the 
recreational fishery would not only benefit the economy, 
but would also control poaching as the presence of 
anglers and guides would deter poachers (see for example: 
TheWestern A p ~ i l  16, 1990). 
Another significant conclusion arrived at by the 
Council was its call for the closure of the commercial 
~almon fishery and a shift to a sport-only salmon 
fishery. This call for action was based on the warrant of 
the value of a "recreational" salmon as opposed to a 
commercially taken salmon. Such a conclusion is highly 
significant when one considers who would benefit most 
from the implementation of such a conclusion. This 
conclusion makes it abundantly clear that the Salnonid 
council was an interest-oriented group, seeking solutions 
which would benefit its members most. A closure of the 
commercial salmon fishery and a shift to a 
reoreational/rport only fishery would benefit sport 
anglers and those involved in the aport al~gling business. 
That would include outfitters, guides, and operators of 
oharter aircraft to name but a few. It is significant to 
note that the Council, when discussing the move to a 
sport only fishery, suggested that "The vest coast of 
Newfoundland could offer the best immediate potential for 
recreational salmon fishing expansion ..." (salmonid 
council, 1990d). It is significant to consider the 
comments of the western region wildlife supervisor, that 
the west coast of Newfoundland is horns to a high 
percentage of the province's outfitters (interview, June 
29, 1990). 
The Council presented itself and its claims in such 
a manner that it would seem to be working for the goad of 
all the province's residents. nowever, a closer analysis 
reveals otherwise. The links between this group and the 
outfitting industry and its calls for increased 
outfitting demonstrate this group's alternative solutions 
would benefit those involved in the outdoor tourist 
industry. Having completed exalniningdthe activities of 
the Salmonid Council, an investigaiion of the third ncw 
i n t e r e s t  group is presented.  
THE HUNTERS RIGHTS ASSOCIATION 
The sundav Huntina ~ o b b y  
The Newfoundland and Labrador Hunters Rights Associat ion 
(HPA) was established i n  Noveneber, 1989. Th i s  group 
lobbied government t o  abo l i sh  t h e  ban on hunting on 
Sundays. I t s  formation received much media a t t e n t i o n  and 
t h e  group war ab le  t o  maintain i t s  media presence 
throughout t h e  s t a g e  (The Evenha  Telesram, September 3 
and November 11, 1989; The sundav E x e m .  November 5 ,  
1989; January za,  1990; October 13, 199u; Apr i l  28, 
1991). 
Th i s  group i s  a prime example of a four th  s t a g e  
claims-maker. I t s  l eader ,  nr. Rice was convicted of 
hunting on a Silnday i n  1985. That is, he was a conv ic ted  
poacher. Rice had appealed h i s  conviction,  which r e s u l t e d  
i n  hunting on Sunday being permitted f o r  a period.  The 
crown then  appealed and won, r e s u l t i n g  in t h e  re tu rn  t o  
no hunting on Sundays (The Eveninq Teleqram, September 3, 
1989; August l a ,  1990).  The f a c t  t h i s  man had been 
f i g h t i n g  s ince  1985 t o  have Sunday hunting l ega l i zed  
shove t h i s  i s z u e  was not new. s i m i l a r l y ,  i n t e r e s t  groups 
like t h e  Newfoundland and Labrador Wi ld l i f e  Federation 
(NLWP) claimed t o  have been lobbying for Sunday hunting 
f o r  f i f t e e n  yea r s  (The Evenina Talearam, November 11, 
1989).  The Newfoundland Natural  History s o c i e t y  opposed 
l e g a l i z i n g  Sunday hunting and had maintained such a 
s t ance  f o r  some time (Tbe Orarey, December, 1987:145- 
146) .  Clearly.  p r i o r  t o  1989. t h e r e  had been a c t i v i t y  
around t h e  i eaue  of Sunday hunting.  Thus, t h e  f a m a t i a n  
i n  November, 1989 of t h e  HRA shows t h a t  t h e  l eaders  of 
t h i s  group had enough of government's handling of t h e  
i s sue .  They re jec ted  o f f i c i a l  responses t o  t h e  Sunday 
hunting i s sue  and organized t o  t r y  t o  have a l t e r n a t i v e  
s o l ~ t i o n s  implemented. 
This Hunters Rights Associat ion was an i n t e r e s t -  
o r i en ted  group. An inspec t ion  of t h e i r  c l a ims  shows t h a t  
p r imar i ly  hun te r s  and members of t h e  Assoc ia t ion  would 
benef i t  from t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  so lu t ions  suggested.  The 
main concern of an in te res t -o r i en ted  group is " to  c r e a t e  
a v iab le  s o l u t i o n  f o r  members of t h e  group. . to be al lowed 
t o  p u ~ s u e ,  without hab.1~ o r  harassment, t h e i r  own 
s o l ~ t i o n b "  (Spector and Kitsune, 1977:154). C lea r ly  t h e  
Hunters Rights Assosist ion was lobbying t o  have po l i cy  
implemented which would benef i t  its membership. The 
Newfoundland Natural  His to ry  Society opposed t h e  Hunters 
Associat ion f o r  t h i s  reason,  claiming t h a t  l i f t i n g  t h e  
ban on Sunday hun t ing  discriminated aga ins t  b i rd -  
watohers, berry-pickers,  canoe i s t s  and even some hunte r s ,  
who had but one day a week to enjoy a day in the 
wilderness free from the sound of gunfire (Montevecchi, 
1987: 145-146; or Montevecchi, 1990). 
It is important to consider the power of the ~untees 
Rights Asso~iation. The group received much media atten- 
tion, and Mr. Ric,s had hie picture appear in the news at 
least five times during this fourth stage (The Evening 
Z~LSXEE, September 3; November 11; December 2, 1989; 
January 20 and September 24, 1990). Rice also wrote e 
half-page article in which he told "his story" (* 
Eveninq Teleam, September 3, 1989). He pressvd his 
claims on television and radio programs in debates with 
the Minister responsible for wildlife and a member of the 
Natural History Society. Rice and other leaders of the 
organization ~iroulated petitions, reportedly collecting 
aver z0,ooa names (The Bveninq Teleqreq, January 20, 
1990). Public meetings, which were well attended, were 
organized. In addition, the group solicited support 
through the placing of advertisements in the newspapers. 
These advertisements informed readers that donations 
oould be made to a trust fund set up with a local law 
firm (!he Eveninq Telesram, September 8, 1989). The group 
was also able to gather much support from various other 
sources. For example, the Telearsm's outdoor columnist, 
the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation (NLWF) 
and various individuals in letters to tne editor all 
supported the ~unters Association (The ~venina Teleqram. 
November 11. 1989; October 13, 1990; NLWF, 1990; 2bs 
eveninq ~eleoran, ootobee 16, 1990; The sundev Telearam, 
october 22, 1989).   he wildlife division's hunter 
eduoation co-ordinator publicly ~laimed there was no 
reason in terns of hunting accidents to continue the ban 
on Sunday hunting (The Sundav Eaoress, Novernber 5.  1989). 
Clearly, the Hunters Rights Association was able to 
gain access to the media and mobilize support from 
individuals and groups. The support of the Wildlife 
Federation was signifioant, since it represented all Rod 
and Gun Clubs in Newfoundland and had a large membership, 
organization and resources to draw on. The Hunters Rights 
Association must have had access to soma resaurr;er, since 
it war able to place advertisements in the newspapers and 
hire a law E i m  to handle donations. The colnbination of 
the above factors exemplifies the power of this Hunters 
group. However, the group was not successful (to data) in 
having its agenda established. 
The power of this group may have been offset by its 
lack of credibility. The ieader of the group was e con- 
victed poacher. Additionally, the group presented itself 
as a "working man'sM organization and appsared rough 
around the edger. This contrasted greatly with its 
opponents, like the Newfoundland Natural History Society, 
who were articulate and well educated and many of whose 
members were university professors. Tha difference in 
their olaims was great (see Natural History Soaiety 
claims in The Osnrey, December, 1987; Hunters ~ i g h t ~  
E I B ~ ~ S  in The Evenin. ~ e l e g r m ,  ~ p r i l  8, 1991).   he 
Hunters Rights Association's lack of credibility may 
perhaps be seen in Mr. Rice's claim that the Premier 
flatly refused to meet with him (The Evenins TeleqUllp, 
April 8, 19911. It is intarosting to Consider that a past 
president of the Natural History Sooiety told me that for 
a lobby group to be affective, it must not be "too 
outragemsly boisterous or too radical." He went on to 
say that groups nust be constructive in their criticism 
of government. If a group rakes government mad, then it 
can lose its credibility end influence (interview, July 
30, 1990). If we apply this comment to the Hunters Rights 
association, we can sea that this group was a "thorn in 
the side" of government. It also vehemently opposed 
government's proposed amendments to the province's Lands 
Act in 1990. That is, the Hunters Rights Association may 
have undermined itre1.f by being too coarse, too loud and 
too unruly. These attributes can be seen in thelr claims. 
Elaims o f  t h e  Hunters R iah t r  Associat ion 
Th i s  group and itti supporter* t y p i c a l l y  defined t h e  
problem of Sunday hunting as one of working c l a s ~  people 
being discriminated aga ins t .  Th i s  domain statement 
i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  problem and s e t  i t s  boundaries (Best ,  
1987ilD4).  The leader of t h e  Hunters Rights group argued 
t h a t  t h e  ban on Sunday hunting was a c a r r y  over from 
Englitih class-bared game laws and t h a t  man and women who 
worked a l l  week only had one day t o  hun t ,  Saturdays (m 
Eveninq Tel m, September 3 ,  1989). S i n i l a r l y ,  t h e  
Telesramte outdoor co lunn i s t  claimed t h a t  t h e  ban on 
sunday hunting "deprives t h e  working Joe of a chanoe of 
f i l l i n g  h i s  l icence" ( in te rv iew,  May, 14, 1990).    his 
w r i t e r  claimed t h a t  a l ioenced b ig  galme hunter,  who 
t r a v e l s  a11 t h e  way t o  s remote area o f  the  province,  may 
see no game except on a Sunday. Despite being e n t i r e l y  
i s o l a t e d ,  t h i s  peraon i s  l e g e l l y  bound not t o  shoo t  t h e  
animal because it is Sunday. He wrote t h a t  s person who 
shoota a noose or caribou on a Sunday is " t r e a t e d  no 
d i f f e r e n t l y  than  a run-of-the m i l l  poacher" (The Evening 
ZsLqrm, Novelnbar 11, 1989).  S imi la r ly ,  t h e  execu t ive  
d i r e c t o r  of t h e  Wi ld l i f e  Federation claimed t h a t  h u n t e r s  
were "ge t t ing  t h e  d i r t y  end of t h e  s t i c k "  by not be ing  
pe rmi t t ed  t o  hunt for r e c r e a t i o n  on t h e  one day t h a t  it 
was possible far many to do so (The Evenins Teleqram, 
April 8 .  1991). Significantly, these claims support the 
disc~ssion in chapter five that game laws are class laws. 
Having defined the problem as one of class bias and 
discrinination. Hunters ~ights claims-makers and their 
allies used various warrants to support thelr calls to 
legalize Sunday hunting. Ona ruoh warrant was what Bert 
(1987) referred to as rights and freedoms. Best suggests 
that claims-making about government policy often involver 
such warrants (nest, 1987:112). 1n this particular care, 
olaims-makars Who supported the Hunters Rights 
Asso~iation maintained that the ban on Sunday hunting 
violated the individual rights of hunters who only had 
weekends off. For example, the executive director of the 
Wildlife Federation made such e claim (The Eveninq 
T s k m g n ,  September 14, 1990). 
Another warrant pressed by pro-Sunday hunting 
claims-makers involved the value af recreational hunting 
activity to the province. The leader of the Hunters 
Rights group, the executive director or the Wildlife 
Federation, the ~slesrsln,a outdoor colunniet and various 
individuals who wrote letters to the editor ell used this 
warrant. Typically, they claimed that hunting on Sunday 
should be legalieed, since hunters spent large suns of 
money, and allowing an additional day to hunt would 
generate extra revenue (see for example: The ~vening 
!C%bxm, September 3 .  1989; September 14, 1990; November 
11, 1989; October 22, 1989 and October 6, 1990). A final 
Warrant found in pra-Sunday hunting claims war that 
existing policies were inadequate, outdated and in need 
of amendment. By arguing that existing government policy 
regarding Sunday hunting war inappropriate, claims-makers 
presented a warrant for change; hunting an Sundey should 
be allowed. Having outlined the maneuvers of these three 
new groups, the outcome of their actions by September, 
1991 is presented. 
STAGE FOUR TO SEPTEMBER, 1991 
The WPors Association 
spector and Kitsuse (1977) suggest that a frequent 
outcome of stage four social problems activities is ca- 
optation. The first President of the WPO'r Arsociation 
was so-opted in August, 1990 when he was made acting 
chief Of wildlife protection. The former chief had 
retired in 1989. The promotion of this man nay have been 
an attempt to silence an outspoken critic and say also 
have been a more general effort to appease WPO's by 
promoting a field officer, ainoe the previous chief of 
protection had been an ex-RCMP Officer. 
Promoting the head of the WPO's Association may have 
been an attempt to undermine this organization's 
effective and vigourour complaining. It is useful to 
consider Ritner's (1986) discussion of co-optation: 
The strategy is based on the principle, "let's 
not try to lick them, let's get them to join 
US. 9, often, op~osition can be silenced or 
The promotion of this WPO could be seen as an attempt to 
deflate the efforts of the WPO8s Association. This move 
was not entirely effective, since the next president of 
the WPo3a Association went public almost immediately with 
claims concerning the inadequacy of existing safety 
measures and the need to arm officers (see for example: 
The-, August 23, 19901. He also pressed 
these claims on the local CBC television news program 
"Here and Now" (August 23. 1990). 
Government's response to this man's claims was quick 
and harsh; the man was reprimanded. The officer i n  
question was called to a meeting with the Deputy Minister 
responsible for wildlife and war effectively silenced. It 
is significant to note that the man who reportedly 
arranged this meeting was the Assistant Deputy Minister 
who was a former wildlife biologist (The Evening 
m, August 31. 1990). His involvement in this 
action may have added weight to WPO's belief and 
resentment that "biologists were running the division." 
The President of the WPO's Association was accompanied to 
the meeting by 21 of his fellow WP03s, who ignored orders 
not to attend. This reprimand was effective bacaura the 
president of the Association puhlicly stated that he was 
afraid to comment further for fear of losing his job. The 
President of the Newfoundland Assooiation of Public 
Employees, the union which represents WPO's, was quoted 
ae saying that Further comments by the officer in 
question could lead to his dismissal (The Eveninq 
Telescm, Auqust 31, 1990). This action silenced the 
president of the Association, but it did not prevent the 
union from preparing and presenting the Brief Daalillq 
With the Concerns of Wildlife Proteotion Officers in 
Newfoundland 3 in November, 1990. This brief 
say have been instrumental in the implementation of a 
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary-led training program for 
WPO'8 carried out in early 1991. Siqniiicantly, the 
acting chief of protection publicly made claims 
concerning the need far sidearms in early 1991, 
demonstrating that his promotion had not entirely 
silenced him. 
T h e ~ u n t e r s - i a t i o n  
As discussed, co-optation is e frequent outcome of stage 
four social problems. However, co-optation has not 
OCcUrred yet with the Hunters Association. It might be 
reasonable to suggest that in presenting itself as a 
rough and tumble, down to earth, blue collar 
organization, the Hunters Rights A~sociation undermined 
itself and deflated its influence and respectability. 
This is seen in the absoluta refusal of the Premier to 
meet With gronp leaders. This perhaps demonstratas the 
lack of respect awarded this group. It is significant to 
consider that this group's presentation of itself as a 
vorkirlg class organization contrasted with the sporting 
ethic taught by government's now entrenched hunter 
education program. The Hunters group did not fit the 
ideal of the sportsman and his code of conduct being 
taught by the government. Despite having the support of 
the Wildlife Federation, the Hunters Rights Association 
has been unsu~cessful to date in getting its conclusions 
implemented. By April, 1991, Mr. Rice publicly threatened 
to stop his lobbying =€Ports if he did not get more 
support from hunters (The Eveninm Telearam. April 2 8 ,  
1991). This is a signal perhaps that this group is 
beginning to lose energy. 
me Salmonid Council 
Several of the conclusions called for by the Salmonid 
Council had been implemented by September, 1991. The most 
significant was the new form of wildlife law enforcenent 
whioh emerged. Iabellad "co-operative enforcenent" it saw 
different agencies and groups collaborate against poach- 
ing.' Siqnifioantly, the Salaonid councll and its 
affiliate, the Salmon Preservation Association, both 
called for this practice. Additionally, these groups had 
also called to be involved in law enforcement. The 
involvement of private groups in the "war" was nu: an 
entirely new idea, but this cooperative enforcement was. 
The involvement of an interest group, whish has such 
strong links to the outfitting industry, in wildlife 
management and protection is significant. The acting 
chief of fisheries and oceans protection branch in 
Western Newfoundland verified the above newspaper report 
and told me that the Salmon Preservation Association for 
the Waters of Newfoundland approached fisheries and 
This may be part of the typical pattern of 
privatization. In this caee government agencies dealing 
with wildlife resources suffer continued budget 
reductions, which make it practically impossible for them 
to do theit jobs. This in turn helps create and 
contributes to ~ublic disratisfartion. A solution to the 
oceans to establish an auxiliary force. Ha stated that a 
committee had been formed and that discussions would 
begin in fall, 1990 to exsmine the project's feasibility 
(interview, June 28, 1990). The increased role of 
interest groups in the war was covered by the print 
media: 
Offi~ials from federal fisheries, the 
provincial wildlife department and RCMP will 
combine forces to fight poaching in the main 
troubled areas as the need arises and there 
will ba volunteer help from members of groups 
such as SPAWN (The western Star, April 17, 
1990). 
Movements to establish an auxiliary force were 
highlighted in the fallowing newspaper headline "DFO 
hoping auxiliary force can be set up in western region" 
(The west S W ,  March 20, 1990). The article discussed 
the formation of the committee to develop plans in which 
the general publio could take a greater role in 
protection efforts in the upcoming sportfishing season. 
While this effort was directed at sportfishing, it was 
significant because it was part of the joint DFO- 
wildlife-RCMP-salmonid Council alliance. The article 
reported that: 
The committee is made up of Pitzpatrick, repre- 
senting the gulf region office of the 
department of fisheries and oceans, regional 
supervisor Clarsnce naloney of the provincial 
wildlife division ofFice in Pasadena, Supt. 
~ o r d  Butt of the RCMP's vest coast subdivision, 
and Tom Humphrey, president of the Salmonid 
Counoil of Newfoundland and Labrador and a 
member of its local sffiliete, the Salnton 
A s ~ ~ ~ i a t i o n  for the Waters of Newfoundland (m 
western Star, March 20, 1990). 
This quote not only highlights the impl?mentation of the 
co-operative law enforcement nodel, but also the co- 
optation of the Selmonid Council's President. Co-optation 
is a frequent outcome of stage four, as an attempt is 
made to ailance vocal critics by absorbing them, 
insulating them from their groups and reducing their 
future efrectivenesr (Spector and Kits~se, 1977:154). 
That is, state agencies may have tried to silence the 
salmonid Council's president by involving him more in 
management issues. 
SUMMARY 
It was decided to conolude analysis of this stage in 
September, 1991. However, "vents continue to unfold, 
suggesting that this stage is not yet complete. %%is 
chapter has outlined the continued expansion of the 
outdoor tourist industry and the reported escalation of 
the poaching issue. This chapter has tried to make clear 
the linka between outdoor tourism and the poaching issue. 
Also examined was the release, by both levels of 
government, of soma of the responsibility for wildlife 
protection to private groups. In many cases there groups 
had direct links to the outfitting industry. At the sane 
tima, the province's WPO's increased their actions in an 




The Natural Historv of Paachiw 
In this thesis I have examined the "war" that was fought 
against big game poachers in Newfoundland in ths 198Of~. 
specifically, I haveused Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) four 
stage natural history model, in conjunction with Bert's 
(1987) analysis of rhetoric, to argue that the "war" on 
poaching had little to do with actual illegal hunting. 
Rather, I have suggested thet the state in Newfoundland 
declared "war" on poachers in 1982 because it had taken a 
renewed interest in promoting the province's outdoors for 
touriam. Part of this planned growth in outdoor tourism 
involved the expansion of non-resident big ganc hunting. I 
contend that poaching was made an issue (i.e. "war" was 
declared on it) in 1982 not because it was suddenly 
"discovered," because of an escalation in poaching 
incidents, but because the state in Newfoundland needed 
extra big game licences to sell to non-resident hunters. 
Chapter one of the thesis did several things. It 
intreducsd the topic, stated the resaaroh problem, provided 
an overview of the thesis, identified the theoretical 
framework, discussed the significance of the work and 
outlined the research nethods employed. Chapter two 
reviewed the literature on the natural history model, 
focusingon Spector and Kitruse's (1977) four stage variant 
of it and Best 's  (1987)  ana lys i s  of rhe to r i c .  The t h i r d  
chapter provided background information on t h e  province, 
its inhab i t an t s  and the  h i s t o e i c a l  use of  w i l d l i f e  
 resource^. I argued t h a t  by t h e  e a r l y  twen t i e th  cen tu ry  i n  
Newfoundland, w i l d l i f e  had become an important  p a r t  of a 
f l edg l ing  t o u r i s t  indus t ry  and game lawn benef i t ed  those  
involved i n  t h i s  indus t ry  a t  t h e  expense of r e s iden t s .  
However, t h e  r e s i d e n t s  of t h e  province continued t o  use 
w i l d l i f e  as food resources and o f t en  broke t h e  game laws. 
Ths population,  s c a t t e r e d  over a v a s t  phys ica l  landscape, 
combined with r e a d i l y  ava i l ab le  animals and a l a c k  of 
wardens, made e f f e c t i v e  enforcement of t h e  game laws hara.  
Clearly,  poaching had e x i s t e d  long before 1982 i n  Newfound- 
land,  
I n  ohap te r s  f o u r  through seven, I analyzed t h e  
poaching problem using t h e  na tu ra l  h i s t o r y  framework t o  
assemble t h e  d a t a  and guide ana lys i s .  Each s t a g e  of Spector 
and Kitsuse 's  na tu ra l  h i s t o r y  model was ass igned  a chapter,  
and fal lowing t h e i r  gu ide l ines ,  each chap te r  focused on 
s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  poaching problem and t h e  
outdoor t o u r i s t  indus t ry .  At each s t age  I a l s o  used Best 's  
framework t o  analyze t h e  r h e t o r i c  of clains-makers around 
both the  poaching i s s u e  and outdoor tourism. I n  the  f i r s t  
s t a g e  of t h e  na tu ra l  h i s t o r y  of poaching, chap te r  four ,  I 
demonstrated t h a t  by 1980,  t h e  Nswfoundland government had 
t aken  a renewed i n t e r e s t  in outdoor tourism. I t  was not a 
c ~ i n ~ i d e n ~ a  t h a t  claims which argued poaching was a problem 
arose a t  t h e  same t ime. S ign i f i can t ly ,  such complaints 
o f t en  o r ig ina ted  from sources in t ima te ly  t i e d  t o  t h e  
outdoor t o u r i s t  indus t ry .  I have a l s o  mads c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  
w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion  was unsure about how much poaching vaa 
ao tua l ly  oooullring an,, what t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h i s  poaching on 
b ig  game populations n i g h t  be. S ign i f i can t ly ,  b i o l o g i s t s  
believed caribou populations were genera l ly  inc reas ing  by 
1980 and t h a t  moose herds  were experiencing only a a l i g h t  
dec l ine .  Research found t h a t  f a c t o r s  o t h e r  than  i l l e g a l  
hunting,  such as over-browsing and d i sease ,  played a p a r t  
i n  pas t  herd dec l ines .  At t h e  sane tlme, c r u c i a l  changer 
were occurring wi th in  t h e  w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion ,  which played 
a major rolz i n  t h e  * w a r n  being declared.  For example, an 
information and educa t ion  branch was added i n  1980. I have 
argued t h a t  no t  only was t h i s  branch of t h e  w i l d l i f e  
d iv i s ion  given t h e  mandate or informing t h e  pub l i c  about 
w i l d l i f e  conservation,  i t  a l s o  had t o  demonstrate its worth 
and came out a niche fo r  i t s e l f  within t h e  realm of 
w i l d l i f e  management. It was i n  a s u i t a b l e  p o s i t i o n  t o  both 
a g i t a t e  and suppor t  claims about poaching. At t h e  same t i n e  
t h e r e  was a growing body of w i l d l i f e  i n t e r e s t  groups i n  t h e  
province which a l s o  made claims about poaching and t h e  
b e n e f i t s  of outdoor tourism. This combination o f  f a c t o r s  
resulted in controversy and heightened awareness about the 
poaching issue. 
I have argued that the second stage in the natural 
history of poaching lasted from September, 1982 until the 
end of 1984. Poaching was redefined as claims-makers argued 
that it was being carried out for black-market sale. Harsh 
new penalties for poaching were enacted and it has been 
argued that these laws are best seen as class laws, i.e. 
serving the interests of certain classes; specifically, 
state supported tourist entrepreneurs and middle class 
sporting organizations. Significantly, big game outfitters 
had received a five year guerentee on licence allocations 
beginning in 1982. That is, the expansion of the non- 
resident hunt was slated to begin the bane year "warw war 
declared on poachers. I drew heavily on Gramsci'e analysis 
of hegemony to analyze the "war." I suggest the "war" can 
be summarized in two words; consent and coercion. I assert 
that rtage two culminated with the establishment, and 
provincevide implementation in October, 1984 of Operation 
SPORT. This was an anonynous telephone System for reporting 
poachers. 
stage three in poaching's natural history began in 
1985 and lasted until Nay, 1987. It witnessed the state's 
handling of the poaching problem and the outdoor tourism 
industry resisted by residents end organized groups. I 
argued that as the intentions of government became clear 
(i.e. that it was not trying to win the "war," and was only 
interested in expanding the lucrative non-resident hunt) 
opposition was generated. Claims-makers typically argued 
that resources to police wildlife laws were inadequate and 
that expanding outdoor tourism threatened residents. 
signifioantly, wildlife officers became increasingly 
militant, reacting against persistent budget cuts and the 
whole way the wildlife division was structured and run. 
This militancy and dissatisfaction ~ontinued to increase 
toward the end of the decade, exemplified by the establirh- 
ment, in stage four, a€ the Wildlife Proteotion Officer's 
Association. Significantly, this increasing militancy of 
officers war accompanied by a parallel esoalation in the 
poaching issue. 
In the final stage, chaptar seven, I outlined the 
continued growth of the outdoor tourist industry and the 
reported escalation of the poaching issue. I argued that 
this Stage began in June, 1987 and is currently still 
unfolding. I chose to end analysis in September, 1991. Once 
again, this stage saw poaching redefined, as claims-makers 
argued that poachers were more apt to react aggressively 
against wildlife agents. Stage four analysis focused on 
three new lobby groups and their attempts to create 
alternative solutionr tothe imputed problems. The Wildlife 
Officer's Association presented n united voice on the 
oonoerns of wildlife officers. The Hunters' ~ights ~ssoci- 
ation war a working class hunters organization, led by a 
00nvioted poacher, which wanted Sunday hunting legalized. 
Despite creating much oontroversy this group was virtually 
ignored by government. Finally, the Salmonid Counoil was a 
province-wide umbrella organization for all types of 
organizations, including sporting groups and outfitters. 
Not only was it linked to the outfitting industry, but it 
also called for new policies which would benefit out- 
fitters. The Salmanid Council lobbied for and was granted 
a mare active role in wildlife management and protection, 
due in part to persistent budget cuts to state agensies. 
These cuts foroed various enforcement agencies to rely on 
help from non-state groups and increase the level of 
cooperation between themselves. 
HOW and Why did Poachina Become An Issue in 1 9 8 Z  
I have argued that the emargencs of poaching as an issue in 
Newfoundland was inextricably linked to government's desire 
to expand the outdoor tourist industry. That is, "war" was 
declared on poaching in the early 1980's largely due to the 
fact that the provincial governmant of Newfoundland and 
Labrador had taken a renewed interest in promoting the 
Provinoers outdoors as s tourist connodity. An integral 
part of this revived interest in promotingthe vsportsman'r 
poradiae" was, of course, the province's wildlife. That is, 
"war" war not declared on poaching because of an escalation 
in poaching incidents, but beoause government wanted to 
expand non-resident big game hunting. The poaching issue 
was created to divert attention from the politically 
explosive issue of the expansion of non-reaident hunting. 
This assertion is supported by the work of Spector and 
Kitsure (1977:155) who suggest that governments may attempt 
to create one problem in order to draw attention away from 
another. They go on to assert that governments nay make 
claims concerning problems and play a major part in the 
definition process. 
More support for my argument that "war" war declared 
on poachers in 1982 as part of a move to expand non- 
resident big game hunting is the fact that there are no 
indications poaching actually worsened in the late 1970's 
and early 1980'8. 1n fact, research revealed that the 
government agency responsible for managing and protecting 
big game populations was unsure of both how much poaching 
was actually occurring and its effects on animal papula- 
tions. I have asserted that poaching did not emerge as an 
issue in 1982 because of an escalation in poaching inci- 
dents. I believe that the catalyst in the creation of the 
poaching issue was the provincial gavernmentrs renewed 
interest in outdoor tourism. 
While I have argued that the provincial government was 
the "primary definer" of the poaching issue, a variety of 
private interest groups also played a major role in the 
"war." These groups typically described themselves as 
"conservation qroupr." However, I suggest that they are 
better seen as interest groups, whore main concern was the 
potential economic returns wildlife resources could 
generate. These groups lobbied government to ameliorate 
poaching g0P expand outdoor tourism. There war a consistent 
link between claims ooncerning the resources lost to 
poachers and the potential benefits of outdoor tourism. I 
have examined at least three of these interest groups in 
detail, demonstrating two main things. First, actors were 
often members of more than one group, creating an inrormal 
inter-group network. Secondly, I traced out the links 
between interest groups and the state, the tourist industry 
and the news media. For example, one group I focused on had 
a membership which included outfitters. This war a clear 
link between "conservation group" and outdoor tourist 
industry. This same group was politically connected and had 
aoceas to the print media; thus it was in a good position 
to makc claims, "get heard" and get action on its agenda. 
Ritzer (1986:9) suggests that the power of a claim-making 
group depends on monetary support, bocial status, knowl- 
edge, organization and skills. I considered the extent to 
which these characteristics were applicable to the groups 
examined, demonstrating t h a t  c e r t a i n  groups occupied power 
p o s i t i o n s  and thus  had a b e t t e r  chance t o  success fu l ly  
p ress  t h e i r  c l a i n s .  
Both government and these  vested i n t e r e s t  groups 
wanted t o  sxpand t h e  non-resident hunt. The problem lac ing  
gove~nment was t h a t  only a f ixed  amount of animals could b e  
a l l o c a t e d  f o r  c u l l i n g  without jeopardizing t h e  f u t u r e  
v i a b i l i t y  of the  herds.  I have shown t h a t  cons tan t  budget 
r educ t ions  beginning i n  t h e  e a r l y  1980's and t h e  impreci- 
s ion  of w i l d l i f e  biology combined t o  make e s t ima tes  of b i g  
game herds  very uncer ta in .  B io log i s t s r  e s t ima tes  showed 
t h a t  ca r ibou  populations had been expanding from t h e  l a t e  
1960'5 and t h i s  t r end  was thought t o  be continuing i n t o  t h e  
e a r l y  1980'5. I t  was believed t h a t  moose were experiencing 
a s l i g h t  dec l ine  by t h e  l a t e  1970's. O u t f i t t e r s  had been 
awarded a f i v e  year guarantee on moose l i cences  beginning 
i n  1982 and I Eontend t h a t  t h i s  presented government w i t h  
a major problem; how could non-resident l i cence  a l l o c a t i o n s  
be  inc reased  without jeopardizing stocks? Where were t h e  
e x t r a  an imals  needed t o  immediately expand t h e  "on-resident 
hunt t o  be found? I have argued t h a t  i n  order t o  promptly 
increas4e "on-resident l i cence  a l loca t ions ,  government 
reduced res iden t  a l l o c a t i o n s  and s h i f t e d  these  l i cences  t o  
"on-resident hunters.  Such a c t i o n  was obviously p o l i t i c a l l y  
exp los ive  and I have suggested t h a t  government blamed t h e  
reduction i n  r es iden t  a l loca t ions  on i l l e g a l  hunting end 
declared "war" on poachers. 
I have suggested t h a t  t h e  "war" on poaching had two 
primary e f f e c t s .  F i r s t ,  it may have reduoed t h e  number of 
animals " l o s t "  t o  poachers. While government and w i l d l i f e  
managers vere unsure exac t ly  how many animals vere taken by 
poachers, every ex t ra  animal meant ano the r  po ten t i a l  non- 
r es iden t  l i c e n c e  sale.  A second, and perhaps more important 
e f f e c t  of t h e  s"war's was t h a t  it provided government with 
both a scapegoat and a smokescreen fo r  i t s  r educ t ion  of 
r e s iden t  quotas.  Government deoreased the  number of 
res iden t  b ig  game l icences,  pub l i c ly  s t a t i n g  t h i s  was done 
t o  help s t o c k s  recover from rampant poaching by res iden t s .  
There was no mention of t h e  subsequent r ed i rec t ion  of these  
l i cences  t o  non-residents (or of poaching by non-rasi- 
den t s ) .  It  is important t o  remember t h a t  t h i s  r ed i rec t ion  
of l i cences  was occurring a t  a t ime  when res iden t  demand 
fo r  big game l i ~ e n o a s  was inc reas ing .  The "war" on poaching 
helped d i s t r a c t  a t t en t ion  away from the s l e i g h t  of hand 
t h a t  aocompanied the expansion of t h e  non-resident b ig  game 
hunt.  Poachers were blamed for the  c u t  i n  r e s iden t  big game 
l icences,  while the drama of the  "war" diver ted  a t t e n t i o n  
away from t h e  expansion of the  non-resident hunt. I have 
argued t h a t  poaohing i s  what Nelson (1984:27)  calls a 
"valence issue;" it " e l i c i t s  a s i n g l e ,  s trong,  f a i r l y  
uniform response and does not have an adversarial quality." 
In declaring "war" on poachinq the government of Newfound- 
land set itself up as the "goad guy" fighting those 
terrible poachers. Fighting an enemy such as poachers was 
likely to alienate very few people or groups. It was not 
Until the mid-IOBO's, when government'= true intentions 
became clear, that opposition emerged to its handling of 
the poaching "war" and its' expansion of outdoor tourism. 
I have presented much evidence to support my argument 
that the expansion of the non-resident hunt was the main 
reason behind the declaration of "war" on poaching. Perhaps 
the primary piece of evidence was the very nature of the 
"War." The 1980's was a period of fiscal restraint and I 
have shown that the state in Newfoundland did not have ths 
rermrcer necessary to fight or win a "uar." In fact, while 
certain steps were taken, for example the wildlife act 
amendments, government did not really try to win the "war." 
The wildlife division was deprived of the resources needed 
for adequately counting or proteoting big game herds 
dispersed over large wilderness areas. The government's 
declaration of "warM raised the expectations of both 
wildlife agents and hunters. I have suggested that both 
wildlife biologists and WPors were st first willing to go 
along with the "campaign" against poaching because they 
believed government's rhetoric that the wildlife division 
was t o  be given p r i o r i t y  s t a t u s  and rece ive  increased 
funding. However, by t h e  l a t e  1980's, it was ev iden t  t h a t  
government was not going t o  d i v e r t  ex t ra  money i n t o  
w i l d l i f e ,  d e s p i t e  the f a c t  t h e  w i l d l i f e  d iv i s ion  was baing 
ca l l ed  on t o  do more work. Both b i o l o g i s t s  and w i l d l i f e  
o f f i c e r s  expressed t h e i r  d i s s a t i r f a c t i a n  with government's 
s t e a d i l y  diminishing e f f o r t s  t o  combat poaching. Therefore. 
8 have suggested tha t  t h e  "war" was r e a l l y  a phantom vnvar," 
which government did n o t  r e a l l y  t r y  t o  w i n .  
I have a l s o  argued t h a t  t h e  news media played a 
c r u c i a l  role k making and sus ta in ing  t h e  poaching i s sue .  
I have asse r t ed  tha t  news r e p o r t s  on poaching were n o t  
(are not)  unbiased. ' l faotoo based accoun t s  r e f l e s t i n g  t h e  
r e a l i t y  of poaching. My work suppor t s  Lippert 's  (1990:420) 
contention t h a t  newspapers a c t  both a s  forum f o r  claims- 
makers and as a source of claims.  For example, r epor te r s  
o f t en  unquestioningly accepted the  c la ims  of key a c t o r s  as 
*the  t ru th"  about poaching and then presented t h i s  as news 
t o  t h e  pub l i c .  Similarly,  e d i t o r i a l s  and columns made 
claims of t h e i r  own, which shaped perceptions about 
poaching and outdoor tourism, and t h u s  con t r ibu ted  t o  t h e  
duping of the  Newfoundland pub l i c .  Reliance on, and 
acceptance o f ,  t h e  statements of o f f i c i a l  sources by media 
personnel framed the poaching i s sue  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  manner 
and s e t  t h e  boundaries f o r  f u r t h e r  deba te  around poeohing 
(Hall e t  e l . ,  1979:58). I presented one s ign i f loan t  example 
i n  which two s e t s  of r ev i s ions  were made t o  the p rov inc ia l  
w i l d l i f e  a c t ;  one which increased p e n a l t i e s  fo r  poaching 
and t h e  o the r  which had t o  do with regu la t ing  non-resident 
hunters.  The media foouaed in tense ly  on t h e  former ( B i l l  
NO. 70) while it v i r t u a l l y  ignoeed t h e  l a t t e r  ( n i l 1  NO. I ) .  
I n  doing t h i s ,  t h e  loca l  nedia con t r ibu ted  t o  t h e  c rea t ion  
of t h e  poaching issue and thus helped government maintain 
i t s '  smokescreen and cloak its expansion of outdoor 
tourism. Addit ionally,  I have argued t h a t  newspapers are 
guided by c e r t a i n  world-views which a f fec ted  what *newam' 
g o t  r spor ted  abou t  poaching. Por example, I have suggested 
t h a t  me menins Teleqbam 1s guided by a pro-conservation 
philosophy, which i i f luenceswha t  g e t s  s a i d  about poaching, 
what Bources g e t  heard by media personnel and i f  p ic tu res  
w i l l  accompany t h e  story.  
I paid p a r t i c u l a r  a t t en t ion  t o  the  ro le  of media 
columnists  i n  t h e  "war" on poaching. I u t i l i z e d  Beckerrs 
(1989) concept of the  "crusading reformer" t o  argue t h a t  
column w r i t e r s  were t h e  source of many inflammatory claims 
which con t r ibu tad  g r e a t l y t o t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  andmaintenance 
o f t h e  poaching issue. These columns were of ten  accompanied 
by l a r g e  photographs of w i l d l i f e  agen t s  and the remains of 
poaohed b ig  game animals. I have argued t h a t  these  oolunms 
helped t o  c r e a t e  a f ee l ing  t h a t  w i l d l i f e  herds were 
threatened by dangerous poachers, while only a few 
embattled wildlife off icers  stood between the poachers and 
the destruction of the herd-. 
It is not eurprising that newspaper oolumnists 
presented this picture, given that they were hunters, 
members of hunting interest groups and promoters of 
hunting. For example, columnists with The ~venina Teleoram 
were hunters end members of interest groups, while the 
columnist with The Newfoundland Herald was the government 
agent responsible for developing the outdoor tourist 
industry. It follows from this that aooebr to the media was 
not an equal opportunity arena. Certain groups and individ- 
uals were in better positions to gat heard and get their 
viewpoints presented. For example, I have documented 
interest groups which not only had links to columnists, but 
a180 :ad their awn coluans, or in some cases magazines. 
Clearly, such groups have the potential to reach a broad 
audience and influence many people. 
Despite being highly critical of the news media and 
the role they played in making poaching an issue, I 
utilized media coverage of the poaohing "war" to help frame 
the et'ady. That is, I may have seemed to contradict myself. 
However, I tried, where ever possible, to use other sources 
to support, or in some cases question. media coverage. 
Also, s ince  I war aware of t h e  problematic na tu re  of news 
repor t s ,  I at tempted t o  be cautious i n  my handling of them. 
I s ~ l i c a t i o n s  fo r  Understandinrr Poliov Formation 
This a n a l y s i s  of t h e  "war" on poaching provides ins igh t  
i n t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  prooeas and agenda s e t t i n g .  That  i s ,  it 
con t r ibu tes  t o  our understanding of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process. 
t h e  s t a t e ,  and t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between po l i cy  and i n t e r -  
e s t s .  I have argued poaching was put  on the  p o l i t i c a l  
agenda t o  a c t  as a d ive r s ion  f o r  t h e  s t a t e ' s  expansion of 
t h e  outdoor tourism sec to r .  The p rov inc ia l  government of 
Newfoundland provided a olimate s u i t a b l e  For outdoor 
tourism's growth, and responded favourably t o  t h e  lobbying 
of t o u r i s t  en t repreneurs .  Some groups were a b l e  t o  "get  
heard," some were not i n  the  ea r ly  s t a g e s  of t h e  "war." I  
have argued t h a t  o u t f i t t e r s  end groups of " r i g h t  th ink-  
ing" sportsmen were a b l e  t o  "ge t  heard." 
TWO groups whioh had d i f f i c u l t y  g e t t i n g  government t o  
l i s t e n  t o  then  and ac t  on t h e i r  claims were t h e  Wildlife 
P ro tec t ion  Of f i ce r s '  Associat ion and t h e  Hunters Rights 
Associat ion.  I argued t h a t  w i l d l i f e  o f f i c e r ' s  claims 
received l i t t l e  ac t ion ,  because the 1980'8 was a decade of 
f i s c a l  r e s t r a i n t  f a r  t h e  Newfoundland government. That is, 
t h e  s t a t e  oould n o t  a f fo rd  t o  expand the  p ro tec t ion  s t a f f  
and replace old equipment. Related to this lack of funds 
was the expansion of wildlife education programs. In 1980 
an intensive public awareness campaign was begun concerning 
wildlife conservation. A part of this was a new hunter 
education program. Hunter education was looked to by 
government as s means to train hunters to obey the game 
lawr and behave like "sport~nan.~ If hunters could be 
taught to adhere to the game laws, than fewer WPOrs would 
be needed. I have argued such education programs were a 
means to generate consent. These were accompanied by 
coeroive maneuvers; namely, harsh game laws. That is, the 
g~vernnent used education programs and wildlife act 
revisions to manipulate hunters. much like a donkey is 
trained with a carrot and a stick. If the donkey does not 
follow the carrot, it is hit with the stick. That is, the 
combination of harsh new lawr and intensive training gave 
the government a means to circumvent its inability to 
increase wildlife protection in other ways. The Wildlife 
Protection Officers' never had a ahanoe of getting heard. 
Similarly, I have argued that the working class hunters had 
too few resourcar to be successful. 
another important politisal implication of my thesis 
is that it shows that public attitudes end peroeptions 
about poaching were shaped and molded by government's 
campaign. The public were informed that poaching was a 
serious problem and that government was going to "crack 
down" on it. I have argued that both of these claims were 
false. Government was unsure how much poaching was ocsur- 
ring and it did not try to win the "war." That is, I am 
suggesting that the government of Newfoundland misled the 
public regarding its intentions for wildlife resources, 
their management, use and protection. This is signifioant 
when we consider that residents stand to lose rights of 
access to wilderness areas and wildlife resources if 
government continues to expand outdoor tourism. For 
example, in chapter seven, I outlined proposed changes to 
the province's lands act which would have allowed govern- 
ment to grant private ownership of land around lakes and 
rivers. one possible implication of this legislative 
amendment war that outfitters would have been able to apply 
for lend rights to waterways around their camps and thus 
control access to those areas. since residents compete with 
outfittersr olients, it is reasonable to suggest that 
residents would be denied access to areas near outfitters' 
camps. 
Not only did government mislead the public of the 
province about the "war" on poaching, but it ale0 misled 
the employees of the wildlife division. There people were 
called on to do more work with less resources. Government 
mads promises it could not and perhaps had no intention of 
keeping to WPO's and biologists regarding funding 
increases. Like the resident hunters of the province, WW's 
jobs became more dangerous because of the "war." That is, 
government's campaign of untruths had very real effects. of 
course, those convicted of poaching after the new game laws 
ware introduoed cannot bs forgotten. People were (and are) 
punished very harshly as a result of the wildlife act 
amandnents of 1982. Can harsh penalties be justified when 
we know that wildlife conservation Wes the driving 
force behind the ravisians of the wildlife act? 
Studvin(l Social Problems 
My thesis suggests that the natural history nodel as put 
forth by Speotor and Kitsuse (1977), and Bast's (1987) 
analysis of rhetoric are good tools with which to analyze 
sooial problems. The so-called "social constructionist" 
viewpoint is an appropriate and effective one for critioal- 
ly examining how and why social problems emerge. My thesis 
lands support to B1umer.s (1971:301) assertion that a 
social problem does not srist for a society unless it is 
recognized. Like Lippert's (1990:436) work on satanism, my 
work on the poaching offensive "reveals how social problems 
can emerge, grow, and become legitimated quite apart from 
conditions of objective reality." Additionally, my work 
supports Kitruse and Spectorrs (1977:155) suggestion that 
government's may attempt to Eeeate one problem to divert 
attention from another. Finally, my thesis also lends 
supports to Best's (1967) assertion that claims-makers, 
rhatorio be oarefully examined i.r order to undersrand 
claims-makers attempts to persuade. 
In this case poaching was identified as a problem 
beoause government needed a smokescreen to hide its 
politically dangerous expansion of outdoor tourism. 
Poaching had been ocourrinq in Newfoundland since the first 
game laws were enacted in the mid-1800's. The 1980's was 
one period in which illegal hunting was singled out as a 
peoblem. However, I have argued that the identification of 
poaching as a problem in 1982 in Newfoundland was & 
brought on by concern with wildlife resources. Instead I 
have argued that "war" was declared on poaching because the 
government of Newfoundland wished to expand outdoor 
tourism, a specific component of which was non-resident 
big game hunting. That in, I contend that a "war" on 
poaching helped government meet its agenda of expend:ng 
OUtd.Ot' tourism. 
The four stages of Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) 
natural history model were a good way to assemble data and 
at the same time acted as a guide for analysis. However, I 
did enoounter soma problems with the natural history model. 
one major difficulty was that it Is hard to fit the often 
tangled, confused events of the social world into four neat 
stages. For example, I often had to make arbitrary deci- 
sions on where to start and end analysis of the stages. 
Similarly, I oPten had data which did not fittha spaoiei- 
cations of the model. For example, in stage two (chapter 
five), the poaching data not only did not Pit the model, 
but beelningly refuted it. 
spector and Kitsuse (1977:148) suggest that stage two 
begins with otofficial" acknowledgement of the problem, 
which contrasts with stage one activities which are "almost 
entirely unofficial." Both of these assertions were 
problematic when applied to the "war" on poaching. Spector 
end Kitsuse (1977) seem to assume original problem defini- 
tion will come from sources outside the state and that in 
stage two state agencies will take action in the area of 
problem. I documented how stage one Eaw many state aotara 
make claims about poashing. That is, claims-making orig- 
inated from within the state in stage one. The poaching 
problem was acknowledged prior to stage two. similarly, 
Kitsure and Spector also seem to assume that no prior 
legislation existed in the area of the imputed problem. 
Obviously, laws regulating wildlife had existed long before 
1982 in Newfoundland. That is, poaching had been "offi- 
cially" aoknowledged prior to September, 1982 and the 
declaration of "war." Diffioulties with the model also 
arose in stage three (chapter six). However, I tried to be 
flexible and creative with my use of the model and avoided 
becoming bound by the rigidity of the four stages. AS 
spector and Kitsuse (1977:158) point out, the modal is 
hypothetiosl. 
A final comment on the natural history model concerns 
my decision to end analysis in September, 1991. How and 
when doer analysis end? What happens after stage four? How 
and why do issues die? Do they die? Are they maintained? If 
SO, how? Future work might be done on this facet of the 
model. Also, it would be beneficial to attempt to increase 
the predictive nature of the model. At present it is fine 
for describing past events, however, its ability to make 
suggestions and predictions about the future are  limited. 
Using the critiques outlined in chapter two, it might be 
possible to rework spector and Kitsuse's (1977) modal to 
enhance its research potential. 
e a l  and Praotical Imolicetions 
The 1980's was a period of fiscal restraint for the 
government of Newfoundland. That is, the state in Newfound- 
land did not have the resources necessary to fight, let 
alone win, a "war" on poaching. Therefore, I have suggested 
that the campaign against poaching be thought of as a 
phantom "war. '1 
In fact, the provincial wildlife division may now be 
in a worse position to protect wildlife than when the "war" 
began. Fieldwork was conducted from May to September, 1990 
and most wildlife personnel interviewed complained about 
lack of manpower, old equipment and being overworked. This 
was especially true of the WPO's who are responsible for 
enforcing the wildlife act, protecting wildlife and 
apprehending poashers. While such claims might be expected 
from individuals with so many occupational woes, abserva- 
tionb mads during fieldwork showed that WPO's do seem to 
lack new equipment, such as trucks, boats and radios. Wid 
the exception of the regional office in Pasadena, the other 
wildlife regional offices appeared shabby, run-down and 
neglected. Significantly, from 1983 to 1990 there was a 
steady decrease in the number of wildlife protection staff. 
In that same period, the nunber of resident and non- 
resident big game hunters going afield has been increasing. 
Additionally, the expansion of the non-resident hunt has 
been aoconpanied by new regulations, such as the guide 
regulations discussed in chapter seven, which have 
increased the duties of WPO's. That is, we ere witnessing 
a scene in whioh fewer and fewer wildlife officers ere 
being asked to do more and more work. When we combine the 
large patrol areas and decreasing aircraft budgets with the 
increasing level of hunting activity, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that wildlife protection has to be suffering. 
Similarly, it is reasonable to suggest that the management 
end counting of big game herds is no better now then when 
"war" was declared. For example, the farmer chief biologist 
told me that the wildlife division had eight full-tine 
biologists in 1957 and that in 1990 it had ten (interview, 
July 25. 1990). As detailed throughout thethesis, coneist- 
ent budgets reductions, especially in flying tine, have 
made the job of counting herds harder and more speculative. 
Another important implication concerning wildlife 
protection is the co-operative law enforcement progran 
discussed in chapter seven. This law enforcement model is 
based on higher involvement by private groups and individ- 
uals in wildlife protection and enforcement. It is import- 
ant to be critical of such a program for .any reasons, 
prilnarily because many private "conservation" groups have 
vested interests in game resources. some might argue that 
since groups, such as outfitters, rely on wildlife 
resources foe their livelihood they will be sure to protect 
the resource well. This logic war used, for example, by the 
president of the Atlantic Salmon Federation in 1985 when he 
claimed salnon poaching would always be a problem unl~ss 
private ownership of river sections was allowed (see 
chapter six). similarly, the western region wildlife 
protection supervisor rtatad that it was unlikely for 
outfitters to poach since "aninals are the goose which lays 
the golden egg for outfitters" (interview. June 29, 1990). 
He implied that because outfitters have an economic 
interest in wildlife resources they are above breaking game 
laws. 
However, there are problems associated with involving 
interest groups in wildlife protection, particularly when 
these groups are outfitters or have links to the outfitting 
industry. We must remember that first and foremost out- 
fitters are capitalists. They are involved in a business 
venture to make money. Some nay argue that outfitter. are 
concerned with conserving game stocks for long tern use. 
However, capitalists may also want quick profits. Capital- 
i s t ~  have historically respected no resource or people; 
they manipulate and use both to increase profits. Why 
should we expect things to be different at any time? Any 
"good capitalists" concerned with resource maintenance are 
likely to be devoured by competitors. Any concern expressed 
by outfitters for game populations is made on purely an 
econonic basis. 
Outfitting is big business with big economic returns 
at stake. Outfitters will do just about anything to realize 
profits. The outfitter who can deliver trophy animals will 
get more nonay, more clients and more prestige. Is it 
appropriate for wildlife protestion and enforcement to be 
carried out by private citizens and groups which have 
vested interests in wildlife resources? How well protected 
will the resources be? Will only economically important 
species be given priority? Will only areas around out- 
fitters oarnps be patrolled? Who will have access to 
resources? Who will decide who has aooess to resources? 
It is significant to examine the case of residents 
when considering co-operative enforcement. Resident 
sportsmen compete with outfitters, clients for wildlife 
resources. Thay do this by hunting in areas near out- 
fitters' camps and thus take resources which the out- 
fitters' clients are paying handsomely to pursue. Often, 
outfitters' clients want to experience a "kildernesa tripa* 
and residents interfere with this by their mere presence. 
One way to solve this problem is, of course, private 
ownership of land and waterways, thus allowing outfitters 
to control who has access to their areas. If outfitters and 
other vested interest groups are highly involved in 
wildlife management and protection, they may be in a 
position to influence government polioy. I have shown that 
outfitters have in the past decade been highly successful 
in getting government to listen to them. As entrepreneurs 
with vested interests to protect, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that outfitters would try to undermine competi- 
tion, including residents. For example, Bill 53 (discussed 
in chapter seven) nay have resulted from lobbying by 
outfitters far tighter control over resources. Of course, 
it has been suggested that the "war" on poaching might be 
seen as governmont'r way to fulfill the licence allocations 
promised to outfitters. 
Susaestionz for Future Rescahfl? 
In this study of the "war" on poaching, several questions 
arose which I was unable to answer. Future research might 
investigate some of these. For example, where exactly did 
agitation about poaching first originate in the late 1970's 
and early 1980'~? It Is clear that s considerable amount 
cane from sources within the state. Howevar. I was unable 
to pinpoint precisely the source of poaching claims. RIture 
work night try to discover the exact source of poaching 
olaimr in order to support or refute my thesis. Another 
issue future work might investigate is why the media 
virtually ignored the revisions to the wildlife ast (Bill 
No.4) to do with the non-resident hunt and focused intently 
on the increases in penalties for poaching (Bill No. 70)? 
The answer to this question can provide important infoma- 
tion into how journalists piok nswsworthy topics and how 
issues are created and maintained. Another question I have 
left unanswered is whether the PaDer on Commercial Cams 
(Esrles et al., 1987) was an internal policy paper (*white 
paper'] or a public d i ~ ~ u s s i ~ n  paper ('green paper').   ha 
answer to this question can provide valuable insights into 
the political prooess and the management of the outfitting 
industry. Was this document an internal policy paper that 
got leaked to the public? If so, who leaked it and why? Was 
the leak a result of resistanoejopposition to expanding the 
non-resident hunt and acoompanying loss of residentss 
rights? This can 8150 provide insight into how the state 
works and of the rifts and fractures within the structure 
of the state. For example. I have detailed how the mandates 
of the wildlife division and the department of developmant 
difeered, causing tension and pressure in the expansion of 
the non-resident hunt. future research might investigate 
this rift between departments and consider how it affects 
policy setting. What department wins out and why? What 
factors influence which department wins in e struggle over 
conflicting mandates? such questions are highly important 
given the structure of our government. A similar research 
topir: is the rift within the wildlife division between the 
researchjnanaganent and protectionlenforcement staff. 
Another research question stemming from my thesis is 
whether or not unemployed people do poach more often? This 
is an important question because being unemployed was often 
linked to poashing by WPOts, media personnel and interest 
groups. such perceptions m y  influence wildlife policing 
efforts. ~uture work might investigate if such notions 
affect wildlife law enforcement? Are wildlife patrols 
concentrated in areas known to have higher rates of 
unemployment? A r e  certain groups or classes identified for 
intensive wildlife work? who influences such decisiann? 
More research might consider attempting to determine if the 
unemployed do poach more often. In an economically 
depressed province such as Newfoundland and Labrador, might 
not the poor poach to increase their standard of living and 
"get by?" That is, is poaching a necessity for Newfound- 
land's unemployed? Is black market sale of illegally taken 
game a common occurrence? If it is, how important is it to 
those involved in this black market trade? If it is not, 
how have such notions arisen and how do they persist? Prom 
where did these claims originate? 
A final question arising from my thesis in how and 
when doer the poaching issue die? Or will it die? Will it 
be maintained? It night be interesting to consider what 
happens with the poaching issue into the 1990'6 Will it 
oontinua to ssoalate, peak and then subside? Or will it 
follow s more gently undulating path? One WPO stated that 
a problem the division will have to focus on in the future 
is meat leaving the province. Perhaps this will emerge as 
the "new type of 1990's poaching problem." Will poaching be 
redefined in the future? Does the above comment foreshadow 
a new d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  poaching problem for t h e  near 
fu tu re?  It seems l i k e l y  t h a t  enforcement agencies,  such as 
t h e  d iv i s ion ' s  p ro tec t ion  arm, w i l l  continue t o  evperienea 
=educed budgets. The t r a i n i n g  pragraln f o r  w i l d l i f e  o f f i c e r s  
implemented i n  e a r l y  1991, may pacify f i e l d  o f f i c e r s  f o r  
some t ime,  b u t  it seems unl ike ly  t h a t  t h i s  w i l l  s a t i s f y  
c a l l s  f o r  more men, b e t t e r  equipment and sidearms. ~ i v e n  
t h e  harsh reprimand t h e  Associat ion's  p res iden t  received i n  
September, 1991, it might be suggested t h a t  resentment i s  
still smoldering wi th in  t h e  w i l d l i f e  o f f i c e r s  ranks. Also 
g iven  t h e  prominent p lace  t h a t  t h e  outdoors seems t o  hold 
i n  government's development plans f o r  t h e  f u t u r e ,  it might 
b e  suggestad t h a t  t h e  guardians of w i l d l i f e  may denand 
b e t t e r  treatment from t h e i r  employer, thus  keeping t h e  
poaching i s sue  a l i v e .  Also, o the r  high p r o f i l e  groups, such 
as t h e  salmonid Council ,  w i l l  help t o  keep t h e  poaching 
problem "in t h e  news. 
Other ques t ions  f u t u r e  work might examine include: do 
repor ted  e s c a l a t i o n s  i n  poaching continue t o  be  accompanied 
by moves t o  inc rease  outdoor tourism? W i l l  outdoor tourism 
prove t o  be as economically benef ic ia l  a s  soma claim it 
w i l l ?  How b e n e f i c i a l  i s  outdoor tourism? Does t h e  money 
genera ted  g e t  d i spe r sed  equa l ly  throughout t h e  province's  
r eg ions?  o r  is it concentrated i n  c e r t a i n  areas? Are t h e r e  
g r e a t  a c o n o ~ i c  impacts among res iden t s?  For example, how 
many, and what types  o f  jobs are crea ted?  DO o n l y  a handful  
o f  t o u r i s t  en t repreneurs  r e a p  t h e  benef i t s  of a n  expanded 
outdoor t o u r i s t  industry? I n  whose i n t e r e s t  does  t h e  s t a t e  
seem t o  r u l e  when enac t ing  outdoor t o u r i s t  l e g i s l a t i o n ?  
what problems are assoc ia ted  with expanded outdoor tourism? 
W i l l  r e s i d e n t s  s u f f e r  l o s s  of r i g h t s  i f  outdoor tourism Is 
expanded? W i l l  r e s i d e n t s  continue t o  oppose moves t o  expand 
outdoor tourism and p rese rve  and p r i v a t i z e  wildlands? Do 
inc reas ing  amounts of v i s i t o r s  p u t  more p ressure  on both 
w i l d l i f e  and wildlands? For example, t h e  more people who 
walk along a pa th  through a g rassy  meadow, t h e  more t h e  
pa th  g e t s  beaten down, t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  l ike l ihood  t h a t  
garbage w i l l  be l e f t  behind and t h a t  w i l d l i f e  w i l l  be 
d i s tu rbed .  Th i s  does no t  seen l i k e  w i l d l i f e  conse rva t ion .  
However, such an outcome is not s u r p r i s i n g  i n  l i g h t  of my 
argument t h a t  governments' "war" on poaching was n o t  
motivated by humanitarian concern with w i l d l i f e  s tocks .  I 
have shown t h a t  "war" was dec la red  on poaohing because it 
f i t  with governments' d e s i r e  t o  expand t h e  outdoor t o u r i s t  
indus t ry .  
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